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Abstract
People in human-computer interaction have learned a great deal about
how to persuade and influence users of computing technology. They
have much less well-founded knowledge about how to help users choose
for themselves. It’s time to correct this imbalance. A first step is to
organize the vast amount of relevant knowledge that has been built
up in psychology and related fields in terms of two comprehensive but
easy-to-remember models: The Aspect model answers the question
“How do people make choices?” by describing six choice patterns that
choosers apply alternately or in combination, based on Attributes, So-
cial influence, Policies, Experience, Consequences, and Trial and error.
The Arcade model answers the question “How can we help people
make better choices?” by describing six general high-level strategies for
supporting choice: Access information and experience, Represent the
choice situation, Combine and compute, Advise about processing, De-
sign the domain, and Evaluate on behalf of the chooser. These strate-
gies can be implemented with straightforward interaction design, but
for each one there are also specifically relevant technologies. Combining
these two models, we can understand virtually all existing and possible
approaches to choice support as the application of one or more of the
Arcade strategies to one or more of the Aspect choice patterns.
After introducing the idea of choice architecture for human-
computer interaction and the key ideas of the Aspect and Arcade
models, we discuss each of the Aspect patterns in detail and show how
the high-level Arcade strategies can be applied to it to yield specific
tactics. We then apply the two models in the domains of online com-
munities and privacy. Most of our examples concern choices about the
use of computing technology, but the models are equally applicable to
everyday choices made with the help of computing technology.
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1Introduction
1.1 What Is Choice Architecture for HCI?
If you work in human-computer interaction, you are probably a choice
architect—even if you have been as unaware of that role as Molière’s
“bourgeois gentleman” was of having spoken prose all his life.
As Thaler and Sunstein [2008] wrote when introducing the term:
“A choice architect has the responsibility for organizing the context in
which people make decisions” (p. 3). And users of today’s ever-present
computing technology are constantly making small choices and large
decisions:
1. Sometimes, the main purpose of an interactive system is to help
people make a particular type of choice: Think of e-commerce websites
and of apps for helping people choose healthy food.
2. Even if the main purpose is different—as with a navigation sys-
tem that helps you follow a route from one place to another—the user
often has choices to make about details—such as which of the several
proposed routes to follow. Helping people make these “microchoices”
(2.1) better is one (often not obvious) way of enhancing the user expe-
rience.
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3. Finally, just about any interactive system, regardless of its pur-
pose, requires its users to make some choices about how to operate the
system: Which of these two text entry methods should I use to enter
text right now? How might I configure this application so as to make
it more convenient to use? And might I be better off using some other
application instead of this one?
In all of these cases, the fact that the choice is “up to the user” does
not release the designers from their responsibility as choice architects
to “organize the context” so that users can easily make choices that
they will ultimately find satisfactory. But fulfilling this responsibility
is easier said than done, if we want to go beyond reliance on designer
intuition and familiar design patterns. Good choice architecture for
human-computer interaction (HCI) must ultimately be based on a solid
understanding of two complex topics:
• The psychology of choice and decision making: How do people
go about making choices in their everyday lives, with or without
computing technology?
• Strategies and technologies for supporting everyday choice: What
are the general ways in which it’s possible to help people make
better choices; and how can these be applied in the context of—
and with the help of—today’s interactive computing technology?
This publication aims to equip readers with a coherent understand-
ing of both of these topics, along with an ability to pursue them in more
depth by following up on the references. Figure 1.1 gives a preview of
the two complementary models that we call the Aspect and the Ar-
cade models after their two acronyms: The letters in Aspect stand
for the six choice patterns that we introduce to cover the phenomena of
everyday choice and decision making. The letters in Arcade stand for
the six high-level choice support strategies that we have distilled from
previous research and practice.
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Figure 1.1: High-level overview of the Aspect and Arcade models of choice pat-
terns and choice support strategies.
1.2 Hasn’t It Already Been Done?
The idea of combining psychology and computing technology to help
people make better choices is not new. So why does the HCI field
need a new conception of choice architecture? We will explain by first
introducing two general conceptual distinctions and then considering
in turn several related lines of research and practice.
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1.2.1 Preferential vs. Nonpreferential Choice
Many of the “choices” that have received the most attention in the
HCI field are nonpreferential choices: A user wants to choose the steps
(e.g., clicks on particular icons) that are required to achieve a particular
goal, such as turning on change-tracking mode in his1 word processing
application. With nonpreferential choices, the question is not what the
chooser prefers to do but rather what she has to do if she wants to
achieve a particular goal.
With preferential choice—for example, “Shall I turn on change
tracking or simply use the commenting functionality to recommend
changes to my coauthors?”—a user can prefer one option over another
one even though neither one is objectively right or wrong. A preferential
choice can be influenced by factors such as the value that the chooser
assigns to particular anticipated consequences, the policies the chooser
wants to follow, and social expectations that the chooser wants to con-
form to—a multifaceted set of considerations that will be discussed in
connection with the six Aspect choice patterns.
1.2.2 Persuasion vs. Choice Support
It is also worthwhile to distinguish between two goals that a choice ar-
chitect can have when attempting to influence a person’s choices: per-
suasion versus choice support. It is true that neither of these concepts
is easy to define crisply and that there are multiple equally reasonable
alternative definitions for each concept. Still, there is an important
high-level difference between them:
• We will use the term persuasion when the goal of the choice
architect is to increase the likelihood that the chooser will choose
a particular option (e.g., fruit salad instead of cake); or choose
an option from some particular class (e.g., fruits and vegetables);
or adopt a particular goal (e.g., eat in a more health-conscious
way).
1To avoid clumsy formulations like “him or her” when using personal pronouns
in a generic way, we will alternate between the masculine and feminine forms on an
example-by-example basis.
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• One possible definition of choice support runs as follows: The goal
is to help the chooser make the choice in such a way that, from
some relevant perspective, the chooser will be satisfied with the
choice. One candidate for a “relevant perspective” is: “after learn-
ing about the consequences of the choice and taking the time to
reflect on all important aspects of it”. But other definitions can
be argued for. In fact, a first step toward getting better at sup-
porting choice is to understand better what constitutes a “good
choice” from the point of view of the chooser (see the discussion
in 3.6 below).
These two goals of persuasion and choice support can be pursued
simultaneously in various ways. Sometimes, persuasion is used even
when the top-level goal is that of choice support. A doctor who tries
to persuade a patient to stop smoking presumably believes that the
patient will ultimately approve of this choice from some relevant per-
spective. And in fact maybe the patient has arrived at this conclusion
himself and begged the doctor to “persuade” him to perform the spe-
cific actions required to stop smoking.
Conversely, even if your top-level goal is to induce a chooser C to
choose a particular option O that is in your own interest—for exam-
ple, the option of buying your software application—adopting choice
support as a subgoal can be a good strategy, for either of two reasons:
• You are convinced that C, given high-quality, unbiased choice
support, will conclude for herself that O is her best option.
• There are various specific ways of executing O (e.g., various ways
of using your software application); and you think that by help-
ing C to choose the specific ways that are best for her, you will
increase the likelihood that she will find it attractive to execute
O.
Because of these and other interrelationships, techniques for per-
suasion and choice support can be compared to the black and white
keys on the piano (Jameson, 2013): There are some tunes that you can
play on just the black keys or on just the white keys; but if you know
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how to use all of the keys together, your range of possibilities is vastly
increased.
1.2.3 Thaler and Sunstein’s Conception of Choice Architecture
Thaler and Sunstein [2008], who coined the term choice architecture,
present a synthesis of psychological research (chaps. 1–4) that overlaps
at many points with the synthesis in our newer Aspect model, along
with six “principles of good choice architecture” (chap. 5), captured
with the acronym NUDGES, which suggest how to help people make
better choices in everyday life. The remaining 13 chapters of this stim-
ulating and influential book discuss in detail how their principles can
be applied in a variety of areas of life, such as personal finance and
health.
The relevance of this work for the HCI field is somewhat limited by
the fact that Thaler and Sunstein do not devote particular attention to
computing technology, either as a means for supporting everyday choice
or as a domain in which choices need to be made. Also, as is understand-
able for a best-selling book, the synthesis of psychological research and
the NUDGES principles do not have the clearly articulated structure
and explicit grounding in previous literature that is required in a solid
foundation for HCI researchers and practitioners. Work that has built
on Thaler and Sunstein’s conception (e.g., Johnson et al. [2012]) has
begun in both of these respects to make the idea of choice architecture
more relevant to HCI, but there are still many gaps for the present
work to fill.
It is instructive to relate the concept of a nudge, which lies at the
center of Thaler and Sunstein’s conception of choice architecture, to the
two conceptual distinctions just introduced above. On close inspection,
we can see that the term nudge has several different meanings even in
these authors’ own book:
1. It often refers to a mild form of persuasion intended to bias a
person’s choice in the direction of a particular option while still
being largely compatible with the goal of choice support in that
the suggested option seems to be at least reasonably good for the
1.2. Hasn’t It Already Been Done? 9
chooser and in any case the chooser is not compelled to choose it.2
One of the types of nudge that they suggest (see, e.g., chaps. 5,
6, and 11)—the careful design of default options (cf. 6.2 below)—
clearly illustrates this interpretation of the concept of a nudge.
2. Other forms of nudge that they propose—such as structuring
complex choices, giving informative feedback, and helping peo-
ple to “map” information onto concepts that are meaningful for
them—can be useful approaches to supporting preferential choice
that do not necessarily involve bias toward any particular option.
We will be discussing these forms of choice support (along with
many others) at many points in the present publication, relating
them to the Aspect and Arcade models.
3. Finally, several of the forms of nudge can be seen as approaches
to supporting nonpreferential choice. Under the category “Ex-
pect error”, the authors present ideas, which will look familiar to
readers from the HCI field, about how to help people to avoid
doing the objectively wrong thing (e.g., forgetting to attach a
document to an email message). Their examples of the nudges in
the previous category likewise sometimes concern nonpreferential
choice.
The existence of these very different meanings limits the usefulness
of the term nudge as a way of communicating about tactics for choice
support and persuasion. In particular, we may be inclined to agree
readily that “people could use a nudge” when we think of the broad
meaning that includes any sort of intervention to support or influence
choices; but when doing so we can be interpreted as having accepted,
in the narrow meaning of the term, a vision of a world in which peo-
ple’s choice processes are constantly being intentionally biased in subtle
ways, often without their awareness.
2They write: A nudge is “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters peo-
ple’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly
changing their economic incentives” (p. 6).
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1.2.4 Persuasive Technology
When HCI people hear the idea of “helping people make better
choices”, they often think of persuasive technology: a line of research
and practice which was introduced mainly by B. J. Fogg (2003) and
which has since become widely represented both in the research litera-
ture and in practical systems and interface design methodologies. Like
the present publication, Fogg’s seminal book systematically combines
research from psychology with a framework for making use of the re-
search results in interactive computing technology. Many others have
expanded and fleshed out Fogg’s framework, and persuasive technology
constitutes an important part of a choice architecture for HCI.
A limitation is that persuasive technology focuses squarely on per-
suasion, as opposed to choice support, as a way of influencing people’s
choices. It therefore does not provide direct guidance to choice archi-
tects who are pursuing the goal of choice support. For this purpose, we
need to exploit and organize (in the Aspect and Arcade models) a
vast amount of literature on choice and choice support that is seldom
taken into account in the persuasive technology area.
Paradoxically, our inclusion of concepts and research results that
are not oriented toward persuasion may well provide new ideas even
to readers who are interested exclusively in persuasion. The reason is
that just about every tactic that is designed with the goal of supporting
choice can also be (mis)applied in an intentionally biased way (4.7.1).
In the present work, we will focus our attention almost entirely on
choice support efforts that are not characterized by intentional bias;
readers more interested in persuasion will find it easy enough to work
out biased versions of any new ideas that they acquire here.
1.2.5 Recommender Systems
A major computing paradigm that can be seen as supporting every-
day nonpreferential choice is that of recommender systems (see, e.g.,
Jannach et al., 2011; Ricci et al., 2011). These systems aim to support
and influence users’ choices concerning products to buy, documents to
read, and a variety of other types of item. As we will see in Section 4,
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recommender systems essentially implement one of the six Arcade
strategies for choice support, Evaluate on Behalf of the Chooser : They
typically apply any of a variety of algorithms to predict how satisfied
a given chooser would be with particular options. In some cases, an
algorithm of this sort can be seen as realizing a variant of one of the
six Aspect choice patterns. For example, some variants of the popular
paradigm of collaborative filtering (see, e.g., Ekstrand et al., 2011) can
be seen as automating a variant of the socially based choice pattern
(3.3.4; Section 8), since they make use of information about choices or
evaluations made by people who are similar to the current chooser.
1.2.6 Other Contributing Technologies
There are a number of other areas of computer science which, like
persuasive technology and recommender systems, contribute techniques
that can be used as part of a choice architecture. A number of these
are discussed in Section 4 in connection with the Arcade strategies,
which help to explain how they fit into the picture.
1.3 Preview of the Rest of This Publication
Section 2 introduces the several types of choice problem that will yield
most of the examples for the present publication. Section 3 offers a
compact but broad overview of how people make everyday choices,
introducing the Aspect model. Section 4 introduces the other major
part of our conceptual framework, the six high-level Arcade strategies,
giving initial examples of their application and discussing the most im-
portant technologies that can be used to realize these strategies. Each
of the subsequent six major sections looks at one of the Aspect choice
patterns in more depth, summarizing key ideas from psychological re-
search and discussing how the Arcade strategies can be applied to
support choosing according to the pattern. In the final two main sec-
tions, we illustrate how the Aspect and Arcade models can help to
enhance understanding of choice processes in two important contexts:
online communities and privacy, respectively. The final brief section
12 Introduction
lists several directions in which the foundation laid in this work can be
extended in future work.
2Types of Preferential Choice in HCI
As was mentioned above, we will focus in this work on preferential
choices that users make about the use of computing technology, leav-
ing the extension to other types of choice mainly as an exercise for the
interested reader. In this brief section, we introduce a general concep-
tual distinction and three generic, domain-independent types of choice
that are frequently encountered in connection with computing technol-
ogy use.
2.1 Macro- vs. Micro-Level Choices
It will be useful to bear in mind a distinction introduced by Fogg [2003]
in his seminal book on persuasive technology: He distinguished between
macro-level persuasion, which is done by systems that are specifically
designed to persuade people to do things—for example, an application
or website designed to encourage more efficient use of energy; and (b)
micro-level persuasion, which can occur at various points in any type
of interactive system, when the designer intends to persuade the user
to perform a particular action or adopt a particular attitude (e.g., the
13
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user may be persuaded to back up his work at regular intervals, where
doing so is just a small part of the overall operation of the application).
Analogously, we can distinguish between systems that are designed
primarily to support choice and systems that apply choice support
tactics at various points where a nontrivial preferential choice needs to
be made. Whereas systems of the former type are often based explicitly
on particular approaches to choice support, in the latter case the choice
support will often be the result of a decision by the interaction designer
that is not based on any explicit principles, though it may be informed
by previous practice and experience of the designer.
2.2 Generic Choice Problems
Though opportunities to make preferential choices crop up constantly
with just about every type of interactive system, there are three generic
classes of choice that are worth distinguishing, because of their fre-
quency of occurrence and because they have attracted a fair amount
of attention in HCI research. Table 2.1 introduces them to facilitate
reference to them at various points later in this publication.
2.2.1 Choice of a System to Use
One common type of choice is that of whether to use a given system
at all, or which of a set of possible systems to use. The most exten-
sive line of research that has looked into this question is research on
technology acceptance. A good entry point to this literature is the in-
fluential article by Venkatesh et al. [2003], which presented the Uni-
fied Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT), a model
that integrates eight previously developed models, including the es-
pecially widely studied Technology Acceptance Model (TAM; see, e.g.,
Venkatesh and Davis, 2000). These models in turn drew their inspi-
ration from more general theories from social psychology and soci-
ology, such as the precursors of the Reasoned Action Approach of
Fishbein and Ajzen [2010].
Table 2.2 gives an impression of the basic nature of the models in
this area by depicting the four main variables in the UTAUT model
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Table 2.1: Three general types of preferential choice that have been studied in HCI.
Generic Choice 
Problem 
Selected Research Issues 
Decision about 
whether to use a 
given system 
What variables influence people’s decisions about 
whether to use a given system if it is made available to 
them (usually: within an organization)? 
What are the causal relationships among these variables? 
How can these variables be measured? 
Choice of a 
method from a 
set of alternative 
methods 
When more than one method is available for a particular 
subtask, how do users decide which one to use? 
Why do even experienced users sometimes persist in 
using inefficient methods? 
Configuration 
decision 
How do people decide whether and when to configure an 
application? 
What difficulties do they encounter when making 
configuration choices? 
that are thought to influence a person’s intention to use a given system
and her actual use of the system, along with examples of questionnaire
items typical of those used to measure these variables. The model also
includes claims about several variables that moderate the influence of
these main variables: gender, age, experience, and voluntariness of use.
Though some of these questions are reminiscent of questions from
usability scales such as SUS (System Usability Scale, Brooke, 1996),
the overall goal of the model and the associated measuring instruments
is not to assess usability but rather to predict whether potential users
(typically, employees in a given company) will actually use a given sys-
tem (e.g., a new videoconferencing system) if it is made available to
them. Note that most of the questions related to the variables Social In-
fluence and Facilitating Conditions concern considerations other than
usability.
Researchers and practitioners in the HCI field usually want to go
beyond predicting whether people in a given target group will use a
given (type of) system, to attempt to improve the system (and/or re-
lated resources) to increase the likelihood that the system will be used
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Table 2.2: The four main variables in the UTAUT model and typical question-
naire items used to measure them. (Based on parts of Figure 3 and Tables 9–12 of
Venkatesh et al., 2003.)
Performance Expectancy 
Using the system in my job would enable me to accomplish tasks more 
quickly. 
Using the system would improve my job performance. 
Using the system would make it easier to do my job. 
... 
Effort Expectancy 
Learning to operate the system would be easy for me. 
My interaction with the system would be clear and understandable. 
I would find the system to be flexible to interact with. 
... 
Social Influence 
People who influence my behavior think that I should use the system. 
People who are important to me think that I should use the system. 
... 
Facilitating Conditions 
I have control over using the system. 
I have the resources necessary to use the system. 
I have the knowledge necessary to use the system. 
The system is not compatible with other systems I use. 
... 
and the success of its use. Still, the large amount of information col-
lected in the technology acceptance literature about variables related
to choices about system use and about ways of measuring these vari-
ables can help to stimulate and structure thinking about this class of
choices. Researchers in this area regularly introduce new variables and
new perspectives that shed light on different aspects of acceptance de-
cisions (see, e.g., Bagozzi, 2007; Loraas and Diaz, 2009).
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2.2.2 Choice of a Method
In all but the simplest interactive systems, there is often more than
one method available for achieving a given goal. Whenever the user
can choose freely between two or more methods, the choice is pref-
erential. Card, Moran, and Newell introduced in their GOMS model
(described most completely in Card et al., 1983; see also Kieras, 2008)
a notation for such cases: The two or more available methods are de-
scribed as part of the model for a given task, and it is assumed that
each user has learned a selection rule for making the choice (e.g., “Use
the mouse instead of the cursor keys if the target is more than a cou-
ple of inches away on the screen”); this assumption is plausible given
that the GOMS model assumes that users have considerable experience
with the system and the tasks in question.
In the intervening years, some researchers have looked at the ways
in which users learn selection rules on the basis of experience with the
methods in question (see, e.g., Gray and Boehm-Davis, 2000) and at
the considerations that users take into account when choosing among
methods (see, e.g., Young and MacLean, 1988; Jameson and Klöckner,
2005). Other researchers have investigated situations in which users
systematically fail to use suitable methods that are available to
them (see, e.g., Carroll and Rosson, 1987; Bhavnani and John, 2000;
Bhavnani et al., 2008; Charman and Howes, 2003).
2.2.3 Configuration Choices
A usually more complicated type of choice that users can make concerns
whether, when, and how to configure an application to suit their own
tastes and needs. Over the years, researchers have repeatedly found
this type of problem to be challenging for most users (see, e.g., Mackay,
1991; McGrenere et al., 2007). It has attracted increased attention in
recent years because of the practically important problem of configuring
privacy settings in social networking sites and ubiquitous computing
systems (see Section 12).
One way to see why configuration choices are so challenging is to
consider an example of a relatively simple configuration problem. As
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Figure 2.1: Configuration screen for a Logitech trackball.
is illustrated by the screenshot in Figure 2.1, with most computers it
is possible to configure the relationship between the movement of the
mouse and the movement of the cursor in terms of at least two pa-
rameters: speed and acceleration. In the example configuration screen,
that of a widely used brand of mouse, there are 4 possible accelerations
and 11 possible speeds, for a total of 44 combinations. So in princi-
ple the user should try to figure out which of these 44 combinations
works best for him. Even if trying out one combination took only a
few seconds, presumably few users would have the patience to try out
even a large sample: Among other things, the user would have to keep
track of which configuration has worked best so far and how well it
has worked, so that he can determine whether the next configuration is
better. Worse yet, it would actually take much more than a few seconds
to determine reliably how well a given parameter combination would
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work for a given user: The user would have to try the configuration
out on a representative sample of tasks which require different types
of mouse movement, and he would have to take into account the fact
that his performance with a given configuration is likely to improve
over time.
2.3 Preview of Sections on Content-Specific Types of Choice
In addition to these three generic types of choice, we will discuss in
separate main sections of this publication (Sections 11 and 12) and in
occasional examples in the sections before them two types of choice
defined in terms of their content: choices concerning contribution to
online communities and choices about privacy, respectively. Readers
who would like at this point to get a broader view of the types of
choices that arise in connection with computing technology may want
to read the introductory subsections (11.1 and 12.1) of these sections
before turning in the next two main sections to the general Aspect
and Arcade models.
3Choice Patterns: The ASPECT Model
3.1 The Need for a Comprehensive View of Human Choice
Psychological research about how people make preferential choices
has received limited attention in HCI so far.1 One reason may be
the fact that there is no single relevant theory in psychology that
could be straightforwardly adapted to the needs of the HCI field.
Though dozens of books and hundreds of articles from relevant psy-
chological research exist, they come from several research traditions
that only partly overlap with and refer to each other. Our discussion
will draw from these areas, among others: judgment and decision
making (see, e.g., Hastie and Dawes, 2010; Koehler and Harvey,
2004; Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006; Schneider and Shanteau,
2003; Newell et al., 2007; Weber and Johnson, 2009), natural-
istic decision making (Klein, 1998), the Reasoned Action ap-
1Two thorough book-length syntheses of cognitive psychology research for HCI
(Gardiner and Christie, 1987; Johnson, 2010) include hardly any references to the
sort of psychology literature cited in the present publication. A recent exception is
the book of Payne and Howes [2013], which proposes “a utility-maximization ap-
proach to understanding human interaction with technology” and accordingly cites
psychological works that are relevant to this perspective.
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Table 3.1: Overview of the choice patterns in the Aspect model. (C = the chooser.)
Attribute−Based Choice 
Conditions of Applicability 
− The options can be viewed meaningfully as items that 
can be described in terms of attributes and levels 
− The (relative) desirability of an item can be estimated 
in terms of evaluations of its levels of various attributes 
Typical Procedure 
− (Optional:) C reflects in advance about the 
situation−specific (relative) importance of attributes 
and/or values of attribute levels 
− C reduces the total set of options to a smaller 
consideration set on the basis of attribute information 
− C chooses from among a manageable set of options 
Consequence−Based Choice 
Conditions of Applicability 
− The choices are among actions that will have 
consequences 
Typical Procedure 
− C recognizes that a choice about a possible action can 
(or must) be made 
− C assesses the situation 
− C decides when and where to make the choice 
− C identifies one or more possible actions (options) 
− C anticipates (some of) the consequences of executing 
the options 
− C evaluates (some of) the anticipated consequences 
− C chooses an option that rates (relatively) well in 
terms of its consequences 
Experience−Based Choice 
Conditions of Applicability 
− C has made similar choices in the past 
Typical Procedure 
− C applies recognition−primed decision making 
− or C acts on the basis of a habit 
− or C chooses a previously reinforced response 
− or C applies the affect heuristic 
Socially Based Choice 
Conditions of Applicability 
− There is some information available about what 
relevant other people do, expect, or recommend in this 
or similar situations 
Typical Procedure 
− C considers examples of the choices or evaluations of 
other persons 
− or C considers the expectations of relevant people 
− or C considers explicit advice concerning the options 
Policy−Based Choice 
Conditions of Applicability 
− C encounters choices like this one on a regular basis 
Typical Procedure 
− [Earlier:] C arrives at a policy for dealing with this 
type of choice 
− [Now:] C recognizes which policy is applicable to the 
current choice situation and applies it to identify the 
preferred option 
− C determines whether actually to execute the option 
implied by the policy 
Trial−and−Error−Based Choice 
Conditions of Applicability 
− The choice will be made repeatedly; or C will have a 
chance to switch from one option to another even after 
having started to execute the first option 
Typical Procedure 
− C selects an option O to try out, either using one of 
the other choice patterns or (maybe implicitly) by 
applying an exploration strategy 
− C executes the selected option O 
− C notices some of the consequences of executing O 
− C learns something from these consequences 
− (If C is not yet satisfied:) C returns to the selection 
step, taking into account what has been learned 
proach (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010); and research on fast and
frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999), habitual behavior
(Wood and Neal, 2007), behavioral economics (Ariely, 2008; Iyengar,
2010; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), self-control (Rachlin, 2000), com-
pliance tactics (Cialdini, 2007), and the neuropsychological bases of
choice (Glimcher and Fehr, 2014).
3.2. Introduction to the ASPECT Model 23
3.2 Introduction to the ASPECT Model
In an effort provide a compact synthesis that will be useful for re-
searchers and practitioners in HCI, we introduce in this work a novel
way of conceptualizing choice and decision making processes: We define
six basic choice patterns, of which Table 3.1 gives an overview. Each
of these patterns is sometimes found in its pure form, especially in
research, which tends understandably to focus on relatively pure vari-
ants of the phenomena under investigation, often creating this purity
through experimental manipulations. In real life, these patterns some-
times likewise appear in pure form, but often they are mixed together
in various ways.
An advantage of distilling out these six basic patterns is that it
becomes more straightforward to think about how to support choice
when it occurs according to each pattern. As can be seen in Table 3.1,
each pattern comprises a set of typical processing steps that are mostly
different from the steps found in the other patterns.2
As can be seen in Figure 3.1, the first letters of these six patterns
make up the word Aspect—which is fortuitous, since each pattern can
be viewed as an “aspect” of choice, in the (relatively infrequent) sense
of the word referring to a “way in which a problem, idea, etc. may be
considered: ’to consider a problem from every aspect’”.3
Each of these basic patterns will be discussed in detail in one of
the Sections 5 through 10. We will summarize relevant psychological
research on the pattern and discuss ways of supporting choice processes
that fit the pattern.
The inclusion of these six patterns makes our summary of choice and
decision making research broader (though necessarily less deep) than all
2Readers who are already familiar with other ways of conceptualizing psycholog-
ical research on choice are advised to view the Aspect model as they would view a
new textbook on the psychology of choice that organizes the material in a novel way,
not as a new theory that aims to compete with existing theories. The criterion for
judging the value of this type of exposition is the extent to which it helps researchers
and practitioners in the HCI field—and maybe in other areas as well—to think re-
alistically and productively about the choices that are made by users of computing
technology.
3Collins English Dictionary, Complete Unabridged 11th Edition, 2011.
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Figure 3.1: Graphic intended to aid recall of the 6 choice patterns distinguished
in the Aspect model.
accounts known to us that are currently available in the literature, even
in textbooks such as those of Hastie and Dawes [2010], Newell et al.
[2007], and Jungermann et al. [2010]. It is understandable and desirable
that when a researcher in one of the relevant areas writes even what
is purported to be a fairly comprehensive account of work on choice
and decision making, she tends to devote most attention to the topics
to which she herself has made important contributions, leaving other
topics in the background. For the purpose of serving the HCI field,
it is important to be as balanced and comprehensive as possible. For
example, if a researcher or practitioner took into account only 2 of the 6
choice patterns shown in Table 3.1, he would have to try to understand
and support processing that occurs in accordance with the other 4
patterns in ways that in fact make sense only for the 2 patterns that
he was aware of.
If the reader is wondering “How do we know that these six choice
patterns exist and no others?”, our answer is this: These six patterns
have proven useful and adequate in several years of studying the re-
search literature and applying its concepts and results to examples of
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of the six Aspect choice patterns. (Discussion in text.)
choice processes both within and outside of the HCI field. It would
surely be possible to formulate an alternative model with 5 or 7 choice
patterns by defining the patterns differently; but it seems unlikely that
this alternative model would do a much better job of covering the rel-
evant phenomena.
3.3 Preview of the ASPECT Choice Patterns
To give a more concrete idea of the patterns and the relationships
among them, we will discuss how each pattern could be applied in
the following situation: An English-speaking tourist is about to visit
France, so he would like to buy a French-English dictionary for his
iPhone. The Apple App Store offers a number of such dictionaries, of
which several are visible in Figure 3.2.
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3.3.1 Attribute-Based Choice
If our tourist applies the attribute-based pattern, he will view each
dictionary as an object that can be described in terms of various
evaluation-relevant attributes. Each object has a level with respect to
each attribute, such as a particular number of words, which the user
may or not be aware of in advance. The chooser assigns an (absolute or
relative) value to (at least some of) the levels of the attributes. Roughly
speaking, the chooser will select the dictionary that seems most attrac-
tive in terms of the values of its attributes. But there are many ways
of doing so, ranging from thoroughly considering each object’s values
on all of its attributes to considering only a small sample of the at-
tribute information and taking the object that looks best in terms of
the sample.
Useful entry points to the literature on attribute-based choice in-
clude Payne et al. [1993], Hsee [2000], Pfeiffer [2012, chap. 2], and
Bhatia [2013].
3.3.2 Consequence-Based Choice
A different way of thinking about an option is to consider the con-
crete consequences of choosing it. So instead of contemplating the large
number of words that are offered by a particular dictionary, our tourist
might consider how well he could use it to meet French people dur-
ing his vacation—or, in the longer term, to read the great works of
French literature. Consequence-based choice raises a partly different
set of issues than attribute-based choice: The chooser needs to deal
with uncertainty about what consequences would occur and the fact
that they may occur in the distant future. And there can be a consid-
erable variety of possible consequences, including feelings such as the
regret that he may feel if he later finds out that he could have chosen
a much better option.
Useful entry points to the literature on consequence-based choice
include works on the most prominent descriptive model, prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Wakker, 2010) and works that focus on
support for consequence-based choice (e.g., French et al., 2009).
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3.3.3 Experience-Based Choice
The two preceding choice patterns can involve some quite elaborate
reasoning about the merits of the available options. The remaining four
patterns describe how people use quite different approaches to arrive
at choices more quickly and with little effort (though it is possible to
apply them in elaborate ways as well).
Experience-based choice occurs when the chooser’s past experience
with the choice situation and/or with particular options directly sug-
gests some particular option (without any need for the chooser to think
about its attributes or consequences). For example, if our dictionary
chooser has had positive experience with the products of a particular
publisher, he is likely to have a good feeling when he thinks about
purchasing another product from the same publisher, even if he does
not remember the previous experiences. Or he may have fallen into the
habit of purchasing products from a particular publisher, even without
any particularly rewarding experiences. Experience-based choice is of-
ten quick and effortless, and it accounts for a large proportion of our
everyday choices. A limitation is that the past experiences do not nec-
essarily offer good guidance in the current situation. For example, the
positive affect associated with a particular publisher may be due to
skillful advertising rather than to any relevant positive experience of
the chooser. And habits can be picked up that do not yield particularly
good outcomes.
Entry points to the literature on experience-based choice include:
Klein [1998], Betsch and Haberstroh [2005a], Plessner et al. [2008],
Wood and Neal [2007], and Gigerenzer [2007].
3.3.4 Socially Based Choice
Especially when the previous three patterns do not straightforwardly
suggest a particular choice, the chooser may allow himself to be guided
by the examples or expectations of others.
If many other people have tried a given dictionary and rated it
positively, their ratings can be seen as a summary of a great deal of
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relevant experience that it would be impractical for the current chooser
to acquire himself.
In addition to providing such social examples, other people can pro-
vide social expectations: For example, a given brand may be viewed as
“cool”, while another is seen as politically incorrect. It is understand-
able that people should be inclined to conform to social expectations
of relevant persons, for various reasons.
Entry points to the literature on socially based choice in-
clude: Ariely [2008, chap. 4], Cialdini [2007, chaps. 4 and 6],
Fishbein and Ajzen [2010, chap. 4], and Thaler and Sunstein [2008,
chap. 3].
3.3.5 Policy-Based Choice
Often, the choice process can be seen as comprising two phases, which
may be separated considerably in time: In the first phase, the chooser
arrives at a policy for making a particular type of choice (e.g., “When
buying a dictionary for your smartphone, always choose the Oxford
dictionary if there is one available”). Later, when faced with a specific
choice to make, the user simply applies the policy.
Acting according to policies can have several benefits: It requires
less effort at the time of making the individual choices; and it yields
a degree of consistency that may be valuable in some situations (e.g.,
when the choices need to be anticipated by other relevant persons).
Perhaps least obviously and most importantly, a policy can (implic-
itly) take into account important considerations that are often other-
wise not visible. For example, always choosing the same publisher’s
dictionary should increase the average usability of these dictionaries
for the individual user, since the chooser will become skilled at using
this publisher’s dictionary interface.
The ways in which choosers arrive at policies in the first place are
diverse; they can in principle involve any of the other choice patterns.
For example, a farsighted user may reason about the consequences of
always choosing the same publisher’s dictionary, taking into account
emergent consequences such as the usability benefit just mentioned.
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Policy-based choice has been mainly discussed in the literature on
organizational decision making, where policies play a more obvious
role than they do with individual choice. March [1994, chap. 2] dis-
cusses the relationship between what we are calling policy-based and
consequence-based choice. Relevant research on individual choices has
been conducted in connection with the concept of choice bracketing
(see, e.g., Read et al., 1999b) and in connection with self-control (see,
e.g., Rachlin, 2000).
3.3.6 Trial-and-Error-Based Choice
Especially if none of the other patterns leads readily to a choice, a
chooser may simply (perhaps randomly) choose an option and see how
well it works out. For example, our dictionary chooser might download
the free dictionary and quickly look up a few words, judging whether
it seems necessary to spend money on one of the other dictionaries.
One of the tricky questions here, with which a chooser can use
some support, is that of the order in which the options should be tried.
For example, it may be a good idea to try one of the nonfree dictio-
naries first, if it seems much more likely that this dictionary will be
satisfactory. The other key aspect of this pattern where users can be
supported is the interpretation of feedback that the chooser gets when
trying out an option. The chooser needs to infer from the results of the
trial whether to stick with the current option; and if not, how his strat-
egy for choosing the next option to try should be adapted. Interpreting
feedback in this way is not in general straightforward.
It is useful to view the trial-and-error-based pattern as being ap-
plied even in some cases where the chooser does not go all the way
in executing the chosen option. For example, our dictionary chooser
might “try out” a dictionary in the weaker sense of closely examining
its description in the app store and carefully reading the reviews. The
choice process and the appropriate forms of support are largely similar
to those that arise when more thorough trials are involved.
This pattern is often applied in combination with others: The
chooser may initially choose on the basis of one of the other patterns,
believing that his selected option is the best one—only to notice on the
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basis of unexpected feedback that the originally chosen option wasn’t
as good as expected. So the process becomes one of trial and error even
though it was not originally intended as such.
Trial-and-error-based choice has been studied from various perspec-
tives in the psychological literature, mostly not associated with the
term “trial and error”. Useful entry points include: Rakow and Newell
[2010], Cohen et al. [2007], Pirolli [2007], Lindblom [1979], and
Zwick et al. [2003].
3.3.7 Combinations of Choice Patterns
The six choice patterns are often used in combination. Explicit dis-
cussions of forms of combination are rather rare in the psychologi-
cal literature (which is not surprising, given that these six patterns
have not previously been distinguished as such); but see, for exam-
ple, Johnson and Busemeyer [2005] for a simulation model of the tran-
sition from the consequence-based to the experience-based pattern;
March [1994, chap. 2] for a discussion of the relationship between
the consequence-based and the policy-based patterns; and Mukherjee
[2010] for a model of how the consequence-based and experience-based
patterns can be applied in parallel. Many studies do indirectly yield
ideas about forms of combination, as does everyday experience:
• Simultaneous application of patterns
Sometimes, the chooser applies two choice patterns and compares
the results. If the results differ, there is a conflict that needs to
be resolved somehow (e.g., with reference to the amount of con-
fidence that each pattern gives rise to). We can all, for example,
remember choice situations in which our experience-based “gut
feeling” conflicted with the result of a careful consequence-based
analysis, indicating that the two patterns had been applied in
parallel and perhaps largely independently of each other.
• Invocation of one pattern by another one
Within one pattern, another pattern can be invoked as a sort
of subroutine; for example March [1994, chap 2] points out that
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the decision policies of a basically policy-based organization can
include particular forms of consequence-based evaluation of op-
tions. Similarly, an attribute-based chooser who doesn’t know
how desirable a particular feature of an option is can rely on
the judgments of others to answer this question (borrowing from
the socially based pattern). In another common combination, one
choice pattern is used to reduce a large number of options to a
manageable set and then a different pattern (e.g., trial and error)
is used to choose among these options (cf. 5.3).
• Application of a choice pattern on the meta-level to determine
which choice pattern to apply on the domain level.
Given that people apply different choice patterns on different oc-
casions, they are in at least some sense “choosing” among choice
patterns. For example, a chooser might in effect reason “If I take
the time to think carefully about which restaurant to go to, I
won’t have enough time left to eat lunch. So I’ll just go right away
to the same restaurant that I chose last time.” Here, consequence-
based choice is being applied on the meta-level to select a par-
ticular subpattern of the experience-based pattern for choosing
among the options in the choice domain. It seems more typical for
these meta-level choices to be experience-based (e.g., habitual).
It will be interesting to see further descriptive research on the ways
in which choice patterns are combined in naturally occurring everyday
choice. As choice architects, though, we also have the opportunity to
consider what combinations of patterns could usefully be applied if we
provided adequate support for them.
3.4 Relationship to Two Modes of Processing
A distinction that is largely orthogonal to the distinction of the six
choice patterns in the Aspect model concerns two modes of processing,
each of which can be found in conjunction with each of the patterns.
Throughout the psychological literature and even in everyday parlance,
we find different variants of a general distinction between two modes of
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Table 3.2: Some features typically associated with the intuitive and analytic modes
of choosing.
Intuitive Analytic 
Automatic, unconscious Deliberative, self−aware 
Fast, effortless Slow, effortful 
Concrete, emotional Abstract, largely affect−free 
Parallel, high−capacity Serial, low−capacity 
Exploits automatic learning from 
experience 
Exploits prior acquisition of beliefs 
Changes only with repetitive or intense 
experience 
Can change immediately 
thinking, which we here call intuitive and analytic, respectively, since
these terms seem to work naturally in HCI contexts. In the scientific
literature, many other pairs of terms are found; it appears as if no two
writers use the same terms.4 On close inspection, the conceptions used
by these different authors differ in some respects, but for our purposes
it is more important to understand the common ideas underlying this
distinction. Table 3.2 lists some of the characteristics of each mode that
are repeatedly mentioned.
The intuitive mode of processing occurs most prominently in the
experience-based pattern, where often (almost) all of the processing
occurs in this mode. But in all of the other patterns as well, a good
deal of processing can occur in this mode, as when the chooser roughly
assesses the likelihood that a particular consequence will occur or gets
a sense of the social expectations that prevail in a particular situation.
3.5 Ecological Rationality
As preparation for the next main section, in which we will survey pos-
sible forms of choice support, we should now consider from a psycho-
4See, for example, Epstein [2010]; Hogarth [2001]; Thaler and Sunstein [2008,
chap. 1]; Kahneman [2011].
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logical perspective what constitutes a “good” choice process in the first
place.
Before considering what everyday choosers themselves think about
this issue, we should mention a shift in the thinking of scientists who
have studied choice and decision making. Traditional notions of what
constitutes a good choice are that a decider should (a) apply a decision
procedure that is normatively justifiable (e.g., consistent with the laws
and principles of logic, probability, and expected utility) and (b) choose
the action that will maximize desirable (and minimize undesirable)
outcomes under idealized conditions (see, e.g., Gigerenzer and Todd,
1999, chap. 1; Gigerenzer, 2007, chap. 5). But inspired by thinkers like
Simon [1956], researchers have become more impressed by the extent
to which animals and humans can function quite effectively by using
choice procedures that are ecologically rational: justifiable in the sense
that they work well in the environment in which they are applied and
make good use of the chooser’s limited time and cognitive resources.
For example, Simon [1956] discusses the choice processes required by
two hypothetical species of animals that forage for food in two different
types of environment: (a) an environment in which food is distributed
randomly, making systematic search strategies useless; and (b) an en-
vironment in which there are cues available to the animal which signal
the regions in which it makes sense to look for food. In each of these
environments, there is a relatively simple strategy for the animal that
works just as well as any more sophisticated strategy would and that is
much simpler than general normative models of decision making, which
involve notions such as estimating and maximizing overall utility.
Looking at our six choice patterns (Table 3.1), we can see that
each one seems likely to work better under some conditions than under
others. For example, being guided by the choices that other people make
(the socially based pattern) could hardly be advocated as a universally
applicable normative model for decision making; but it can be the best
procedure available if (a) other people have successfully learned how
to make the type of choice in question, (b) they are sufficiently similar
to the chooser so that it is reasonable for her to try to benefit from
their experience; and (c) reasonably reliable information about their
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choices is available. The fact that each pattern is ecologically rational
under some circumstances helps to explain why these different patterns
exist. It also implies that, to support everyday choice, we should aim
to support each of these patterns in situations where it works well. In
particular, we should not try to impose any particular procedure as a
substitute for combinations of these patterns; such a procedure might
look great on paper, but it would probably not be well adapted to the
many environments in which people make everyday choices.
3.6 What Constitutes a Good Decision for Choosers?
3.6.1 Factors That Influence Satisfaction With a Choice
In addition to aiming to achieve ecological rationality, we should con-
sider what ordinary people view as constituting a good choice pro-
cess. A number of researchers have investigated this question (see, e.g.,
Bettman et al., 1998; Hastie, 2001; Yates et al., 2003). Although spe-
cific answers to this question vary, the following statements are widely
accepted:
1. Choosers want their decision to yield a good outcome.
This point isn’t as straightforward as it may seem, because what
counts as a good outcome depends in turn on a variety of factors, as
we will see. In particular, the criteria by which a chooser evaluates
an outcome can be quite different after the outcome has occurred—
and especially much later in time (cf. March, 1994, chap. 6). To take
a familiar case, an immediately gratifying outcome (e.g., watching an
amusing video on YouTube) may be evaluated highly as it is being ex-
perienced but evoke only regret at a later point in time. A much more
subtle example is given by Hsee [2000]: A person who has carefully
compared two sets of stereo speakers in a store chooses the set with
slightly higher sound quality, even though its appearance is displeasing,
on the grounds that sound quality is the most important attribute of
speakers. When the buyer uses the speakers at home, he can no longer
perceive the slight superiority in sound quality of his speakers, but he
is constantly disturbed by their appearance and hence he regrets his
choice. Note that the result could be different if the buyer regularly
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had a chance to compare his speakers with others (e.g., if his spouse
had bought the more physically attractive set of speakers). An impli-
cation is that choosers and those who want to support choosing should
try to take into account the context in which the chosen option will
be experienced, including the subtle features such as whether the com-
peting options will still be available for comparison. One approach is
to aim to achieve similarity between (a) the way in which the options
are presented to the user at choice time and (b) the way in which the
chosen option will be experienced after the choice has been made (cf.
also Read et al., 1999a).
In the present publication, we will generally view a “good outcome”
as one that the chooser is (or would be) satisfied with in retrospect,
after having acquired the most relevant knowledge and experience. Ad-
mittedly, this assumption is subject to debate, and other assumptions
could be substituted for it.
2. Choosers don’t want to invest time and effort in the decision
making process itself that is out of proportion to the resulting benefits.
For example, when installing a new application, a user who is asked
which specific components should be installed will often choose the
option “Everything” simply to save the time of deciding about the
individual components, since the possible benefits of choosing any other
option (e.g., saving a few megabytes of hard disk space) do not seem
to justify the investment of even a few seconds of time to make a more
deliberate choice.
This tendency to want to save time and effort is more important
than you might expect, because of the special salience of the effort that
is invested in a choice process, relative to the benefits that can be ob-
tained with a better choice. For example, even if 2 minutes invested
in configuring a new application could end up making the user’s ex-
perience more pleasant during many hours of use of the application,
these future benefits may be insufficient to motivate the user to think
carefully about the configuration problem: Whereas the tedium and
frustration of the configuration work is immediately experienced, the
benefits are uncertain and largely distant in time (cf. Bettman et al.,
1998); and as we will see in 6.8 and 6.9, consequences like these tend
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to be discounted heavily. An implication of these facts for supporting
everyday choice is that any measure which reduces time and effort is
likely not only to be appreciated by users but also to encourage users
to improve their choice process in ways that they would otherwise not
consider worthwhile.
The following two desiderata of a choice process are much more
specific than the first two, but they can likewise help to guide the
selection of forms of support for choice:
3. Choosers prefer to avoid unpleasant thoughts.
Some ways of thinking about a decision can involve distressing
thoughts, as when a driver faces a choice between (a) ignoring an in-
coming text message from her boss and (b) driving less safely for a
while in order to respond to the message. The chooser may be moti-
vated to think about the decision in a way that avoids such thoughts
(e.g., by convincing herself that she can respond to the boss’s message
without taking the slightest risk, or by ignoring safety considerations
entirely).
4. Choosers often want to be able to justify the decision that they
have made to other persons—or to themselves.
Justifiability is often simply a necessary condition for being able
to implement a decision (cf. Lerner and Tetlock, 2003). For example,
even if a business person would really like to buy the latest iPad for
professional use, he is likely to request a less flashy tablet instead if he
thinks that this choice is more likely to be approved by his company’s
purchasing department. But even just the prospect of being able to
convince another person or oneself that a decision was sound can cause
people to look for justifiable decisions (see, e.g., Shafir et al., 1993).
Consequently, one way of supporting preferential choice is to make
it easy for the user to come up with a satisfying justification of whatever
option is best for her, for example, by supplying a justification explicitly
(as is done by many recommender systems; see Tintarev and Masthoff,
2010).
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3.6.2 Choice Overload as an Illustration
The importance of these different determinants of satisfaction with a
choice is illustrated by the oft-discussed phenomenon of choice over-
load: the fact that, at least in some cases, choosers end up less satisfied
when they have been offered a large number of options than when they
have been faced with a smaller number.5 The question of how prevalent
this phenomenon is and under what conditions it occurs is a complex
one that is still being researched; but there is considerable agreement
on some of the possible reasons why choice overload can occur, and
these reasons illustrate the factors listed above:
• All other things being equal, choosing from a larger number of
options requires more time and effort, which may not be compen-
sated for by an improvement in the quality of the result.
• With a larger number of options, it is more likely that there will
be competing options of similar attractiveness, which can vary
in their relative attractiveness with every shift in the chooser’s
attention to different priorities. Oscillating between competing
alternatives can be a frustrating as well as a time-consuming pro-
cess.
• For the same reason, it tends to be harder for the chooser to
justify—to himself or others—whatever choice he finally does
make. This difficulty is exacerbated when there are options that
the chooser did not manage to consider at all.
In situations in which choice overload seems likely to occur, an
obvious remedial tactic is to limit the number of options made available
to a chooser. From the point of view of choice architecture, limiting
a priori the number of options is just one of many possible tactics
5The report by Iyengar and Lepper [2000] on the “jam study” is the most widely
cited (and overinterpreted) example of apparent choice overload. Both Iyengar [2010]
and Schwartz [2004] offer popular book-length discussions of issues related to choice
overload. Scheibehenne et al. [2010] present a compact but comprehensive meta-
analysis and synthesis of ideas. Oulasvirta et al. [2009] studied choice overload in a
typical HCI context, finding evidence of the phenomenon in connection with the use
of web search engines.
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for supporting choice—one which is derived from the general Arcade
strategy Design the Domain (4.5).
The next main section will show how a comprehensive conception
of approaches to choice support can help to generate a variety of tactics
for helping choosers to overcome challenges—of which choice overload is
but one of many—that can arise during the application of the Aspect
choice patterns.
4Choice Support Strategies: The ARCADE Model
Against the background of the overview of human choice that has been
presented, how can designers of interactive systems help people make
better choices?
Just as it is important to have a comprehensive view of how peo-
ple make choices (cf. 3.1), choice architects also need to bear in mind
the full range of possible approaches to supporting choice. Otherwise,
we might overuse one or two approaches even in cases where another
approach would be much more effective. Interaction designers in partic-
ular are in a position to deploy a wider range of strategies and tactics
than most others who try to help people make better choices, such as
authors of self-help books and even professional consultants.
The Arcade model (summarized in Figure 4.1) distinguishes six
high-level strategies that have been used in various combinations and
implemented in various ways, with and without computing technol-
ogy. The model takes into account many ideas contributed by ear-
lier analyses of approaches to choice support (see, e.g., Fischhoff,
1982; Payne et al., 1993, chap. 7; Larrick, 2004; Yates et al., 2003;
Johnson et al., 2012). Each of the Arcade strategies has been dis-
cussed in at least some previous literature (though not with the same
39
40 Choice Support Strategies: The ARCADE Model
Figure 4.1: The six high-level strategies for choice support in the Arcade model
and some of the technologies for realizing them.
designation), but to our knowledge they have never all been presented
together in a coherent way.
Each of these strategies may be too abstract in itself to be very sug-
gestive to interaction designers; but when we consider how the strate-
gies can be applied to particular choice patterns, we will be able to
derive a large number of fairly concrete support tactics.
4.1 Access Information and Experience
4.1.1 Basic Idea
The most obvious way of supporting choice is to supply the chooser
with relevant information. A bit less obviously, we can provide access
to relevant experience, which can help in roughly similar ways.
In fact, this strategy is so obvious that there can be a tempta-
tion to respond to any perceived need for choice support by displaying
potentially relevant information and assuming that the chooser will
somehow benefit from it. The limitations of this approach can be seen
especially clearly in domains, such as automotive user interfaces, where
the chooser has very limited capacity to process such information at the
time of choosing. One advantage of thinking in terms of the six choice
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Figure 4.2: Examples of how information relevant to consequence-based choice can
be provided straightforwardly in a user interface with text or graphics.
patterns is that they indicate to us what particular types of informa-
tion and experience can be used in what ways; they therefore help us
focus on the most useful ways of making information and experience
available.
Here are some examples of different types of information and expe-
rience that can be useful in connection with different choice patterns;
many more examples will be given in the sections on the individual
patterns:
• Attribute-Based Choice: Information about each option in terms
of its levels on the various attributes.
• Consequence-Based Choice: Information about what’s going on
in the current situation and what consequences particular ac-
tions are likely to have (see, e.g., Figure 4.2); a preview of the
experience of executing a particular action.
• Experience-Based Choice: Reminders of past experience with par-
ticular options.
• Socially Based Choice: Information about choices made by rel-
evant other people, or about their expectations concerning the
chooser’s choices.
• Trial-and-Error-Based Choice: Information about (not immedi-
ately visible) consequences of an option that the chooser has ex-
ecuted.
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4.1.2 Straightforward Interaction Design
As with all of the other five Arcade strategies, there are ways of pro-
viding access to information and experience in an interactive system
through what we will call “straightforward interaction design”: design
patterns and elements that are typical of the interaction style being ap-
plied, which do not require any particularly sophisticated or intelligent
technology.
A lot of choice-relevant information is conveyed in user interfaces
via natural language (e.g., English) text, which can be shown in var-
ious places in a graphical user interface or spoken in a speech-based
interface. In the example shown at the bottom of Figure 4.2, the in-
formation being provided concerns a general fact that is known to the
interaction designer; hence no particular technology for acquiring the
information is needed.
Often, nonverbal ways of conveying information are more effective,
as with the simple graphical representations at the top of Figure 4.2,
which inform the user unobtrusively about potentially choice-relevant
facts (e.g., her likelihood of getting a good connection to the mobile
internet if she tries).
Where the relevant information or experience concerns what it’s
like to use a part of a system, it is often possible simply to offer the
user the opportunity to use that part of the system (e.g., to try out an
unusual text entry method briefly before deciding whether to use it to
enter some text).
4.1.3 Relevant Technology
A large proportion of the computing technology that has become widely
used in recent years can be seen as helping to enable the provision of
information and experience, such as access to databases via the world-
wide web and mobile apps; and semantic technology for linking data
from diverse sources. The following particular technologies can be sin-
gled out for mention:
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• Web search engines
Even a chooser who is armed simply with a (mobile) web browser
and a search engine may be able to access most or all of the types
of information and experience that are relevant to a particular
choice, ranging from objective facts about products offered for
sale to vivid experience reports about the consequences of un-
dergoing a particular medical treatment. In that sense, a web
browser with a search engine can be seen as a general-purpose
choice support system—one which does, however, leave it up to
the chooser to decide what particular information and experience
to access and what use to make of it.
• Multimedia technology
Access to experience is often most effectively provided via media
such as photos, audio tracks, and video. Hence the increasing ca-
pabilities of multimedia technology to identify and deliver media
relevant to a particular information need, combined with the in-
creased ability of users to consume media even on mobile devices,
offer great potential for choice support—provided that the role
of such media in the choice process is well understood.
• Simulation and gaming
Knowing what it’s like to perform a given action or to experience
a particular consequence sometimes requires more than just the
passive consumption of media: Interacting with a simulation of
reality can be more effective; such simulations are often embedded
in games. An example is the simulation game used by Chittaro
[2012] to teach air travelers what it is like to be involved in an
airplane crash without having learned proper evacuation proce-
dures.
• Social media
Technologies that enable computer users to publish their opin-
ions, knowledge, and experience make it possible for other users to
access not only information relevant to the socially based choice
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pattern but also a wide range of other information and experi-
ence.
• Digital life logging
Much of the experience that is relevant to a person’s choices lies
in his own past; but there is no guarantee that a chooser will think
of relevant experiences or recall them accurately (cf. Kahneman,
2011, chap. 35). The many life logging systems that now exist for
helping people to record their experiences were mostly developed
with other goals in mind; but helping people to access past expe-
riences that are relevant to current choices is a promising way of
putting this technology to good use (see, e.g., Plate et al., 2006).
4.2 Represent the Choice Situation
4.2.1 Basic Idea
One of the key points emphasized in the Thaler and Sunstein [2008]
conception of choice architecture, as well as in some of the psychological
research that it is based on, is that the particular way in which a choice
situation is represented to the chooser can strongly influence how she
goes about making the choice and which option she will choose, even
when the information being presented remains essentially the same.
Thaler and Sunstein [2008, Introduction] discuss the case where the
choice architect is the manager of a cafeteria: The way in which particu-
lar foods are arranged on the shelves will inevitably have some influence
on which foods the visitors to the cafeteria tend to choose. As the au-
thors emphasize, there is no completely “neutral” way of arranging the
options. For example, it is inevitable that some dishes will tend to be
encountered before others and to be more perceptually salient. We will
return to this point in 4.7.1.
We can see different possible effects of representation of the choice
situation in different choice patterns:
• Attribute-Based Choice: Presenting information about options in
a neat tabular form makes it easier to engage in attribute-based
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processing; the order in which options and attributes are shown
will influence the amount of attention that is paid to them.
• Consequence-Based Choice: A suggestive representation of the
choice situation can help the chooser predict quickly what will
happen next (see, e.g., Figure 4.2). The various different types of
consequences that the chooser may be interested in can be rep-
resented (if at all) in more or less salient ways. Even the values
that the chooser assigns to particular consequences are often in-
fluenced by the exact ways in which they are represented (see
6.7.2 for examples).
• Experience-Based Choice: The way in which a choice situation is
represented to the chooser can help determine which (relevant or
irrelevant) experiences the situation evokes in the chooser’s mind.
• Trial-and-Error-Based Choice: A convenient representation of the
results of the chooser’s experience in trying out options can make
it easier for the chooser to judge which option is emerging as the
winner.
4.2.2 Straightforward Interaction Design
Designing appropriate representations is a key part of good interac-
tion design. Designers typically think carefully about how to represent
items visually (or via other sensory channels) and about how to arrange
them (e.g., on a visual display) so as to suggest appropriate interpre-
tations, processing, and actions. These skills and experience can be a
valuable resource to interaction designers as they fulfill their role as
choice architects—provided that they understand the ways in which
different representations can influence processing within the various
choice patterns. A number of examples will be given in the next six
main sections of this publication.
4.2.3 Relevant Technology
More complex techniques are explored in the area of information visu-
alization (see, e.g., Ware, 2004; Card, 2012), where sophisticated com-
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putation and computer graphics are used to create representations of
information that support particular types of visual and cognitive pro-
cessing especially well. To give just one example, Pu and Faltings [2000]
provided a sophisticated visualization of various options for flying from
one city to another which supported attribute-based processing more
effectively than a traditional tabular representation could have.
4.3 Combine and Compute
4.3.1 Basic Idea
This third general choice support strategy involves performing on be-
half of the user mechanical tasks such as calculations and other manip-
ulations of available information.
• Attribute-Based Choice: Decision aids in e-commerce often enable
the chooser to sort and filter options according to their levels
on particular attributes (see, e.g., Pfeiffer [2012]). Note that the
system is not providing any new information; it is helping with
the manipulation of available information.
• Consequence-Based Choice: A mobile app for helping to choose
food will normally go beyond providing information about the
various options: It is likely to compute quantities such as the
percentage of the chooser’s target calorie budget or the amount
of weight that the chooser would gain if he consumed the food.
• Socially Based Choice: Ratings and opinions supplied by other
persons can be clustered and summarized so that they can be
more easily processed by the chooser.
• Policy-Based Choice: If the system knows the chooser’s relevant
policy for a given choice, it may be able to determine which of
the available options are consistent with that policy.
As these examples show, application of the strategy Combine and
Compute is often, but not always, combined with the accessing of in-
formation that is not already available to the chooser.
4.4. Advise About Processing 47
4.3.2 Straightforward Interaction Design
Useful computations can often be performed with straightforward al-
gorithms such as those for sorting items or for standard arithmetical
operations.
4.3.3 Relevant Technology
In individual domains, the strategy Combine and Compute can in-
volve the application of sophisticated algorithms. One characteristic
feature of many decision support systems (see, e.g., French et al., 2009,
chap. 14; Clemen and Reilly, 2013) is the presence of sophisticated al-
gorithms for diagnosing the current situation (e.g., determining the
likelihood that a patient has a particular disease) and predicting future
outcomes (e.g., the likelihood that particular medical treatments will
be successful). This sort of heavyweight computation is more typical
of systems that are designed to support extensive, deliberate decision
making in organizations, as opposed to everyday choice; but there is
no reason in principle why scaled-down versions of these techniques
should not be applied, when applicable, to everyday choices, especially
in view of the increasing computational capacity of today’s personal
computing devices.
4.4 Advise About Processing
4.4.1 Basic Idea
Traditionally, an important way of helping people make better choices
has been to give them advice as to how to proceed. A famous example
is Benjamin Franklin’s 1779 letter to Jonathan Williams (discussed,
e.g., by Gigerenzer, 2007, p. 4), in which he outlined a systematic way
of writing down arguments for and against particular options and inte-
grating the information to arrive at a decision. Decision analysts who
help their clients make decisions (see, e.g., Clemen and Reilly, 2013;
Keeney, 1992) often recommend particular procedures, such as first re-
flecting on their fundamental values before they start to evaluate partic-
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ular options; or systematically considering arguments against whatever
option the decision maker tends to favor at a given moment.
Popular books about how to make decisions in everyday life tend
to be full of less formally articulated advice. For example, the book
by Schwartz [2004], which helped to popularize the concept of choice
overload (3.6.2), advises choosers not to worry too much about finding
the best possible option but to be satisfied with a solution that is
adequate. (Further advice from this book is mentioned in 6.6.3.)
In terms of our six choice patterns, this type of advice can be seen as
urging the chooser to apply a particular choice pattern (or combination
of patterns) and to execute individual steps in particular ways.
4.4.2 Straightforward Interaction Design
The most obvious way to provide procedural advice is with texts like
“Try out the free version before buying the app!”. But since an interac-
tion designer typically has a lot of control over the choice environment,
it is often easy and more natural to influence a chooser’s procedures im-
plicitly by making some procedures more salient or easier to execute—
for example, by providing an easily accessible link to the free version
of an app, so as to facilitate the trial-and-error-based pattern; or by
prominently displaying user ratings and reviews, encouraging the appli-
cation of the socially based pattern. That is, tactics derived from other
Arcade strategies can often be interpreted as implicit procedural ad-
vice. We will normally refer to the strategy Advise About Processing
only when the procedural advice is reasonably explicit, but the reader
should remain aware of the various implicit forms that procedural ad-
vice can take. In fact, in order to avoid influencing the procedures
employed by the chooser, an interaction designer would often need to
make a special effort to enable the chooser to employ several different
procedures with approximately equal ease.
4.4.3 Relevant Technology
A more sophisticated way of offering verbal procedural advice is to de-
ploy conversational agents. These systems engage in a dialogue with
the user that has some features of human-human dialogue, and they
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sometimes involve human-like features such as speech and animated
faces. Virtual sales agents were popular in e-commerce and other web-
sites around the turn of the century (see, e.g., André et al., 1999), and
they seem to be regaining some popularity at the time of this writ-
ing. Although an agent of this sort can’t compete very well with other
interaction styles when it comes to applying the other five Arcade
strategies, maybe a careful consideration of how they can be used for
providing procedural advice can help them to gain a foothold as com-
ponents of choice support systems.
4.5 Design the Domain
4.5.1 Basic Idea
In connection with the strategy Represent the Choice Situation, we
mentioned how an interaction designer has many opportunities to rep-
resent a choice situation in ways that support choice. Going a step
further, especially where choices are being made about the use of com-
puting technology, the interaction designer can even change the basic
reality in the domain in question in a way that makes it easier to make
choices.
4.5.2 Straightforward Interaction Design
A typical example is sometimes found in the area of privacy choices:
If users find the set of privacy configuration options to be confusing
and have difficulty choosing among them, the most effective approach
may be to reconceptualize the set of privacy options so that users are
offered a different (probably smaller) set of options that they can more
easily understand and choose from (cf. 12.2.3).
A somewhat more specific variant of this strategy is that of mini-
mizing (a) the number of choices that users need to make in the first
place and (b) the number of options that are available when they do
need to choose. Steve Jobs (see, e.g., Isaacson, 2011) was a powerful
advocate of this strategy, even in the early days of the Macintosh, when
he opposed the inclusion of a second mouse button and cursor keys; and
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this principle is still a subject of heated debate between supporters of
the Apple and Android approaches to designing smartphones.
Here are two examples concerning different choice patterns:
• Trial-and-Error-Based Choice: Applications (and methods used
within them) can be designed in such a way that they can be
tried out easily—for example, with little effort or commitment.
• Consequence-Based Choice: The possible actions that users can
perform can be designed in such a way that their consequences are
easy to predict. This principle is a general HCI design principle
whose benefits are not restricted to cases involving preferential
choice; but it does also make it easier for a chooser to evaluate
alternative options by anticipating their consequences.
4.5.3 Relevant Technology
Since there are many ways in which a choice domain can be redesigned
so as to facilitate choosing, this strategy is not strongly associated with
any particular technology. To some extent, however, the technology of
adaptive user interfaces (see, e.g., Jameson and Gajos, 2012) can be
enlisted in the service of this strategy. For example, a user interface
that somehow recognizes that the current user is a novice and switches
to a simple “novice mode” can be seen as automatically changing the
choice domain—which is in this case the user interface itself—in the
way described above.
4.6 Evaluate on Behalf of the Chooser
4.6.1 Basic Idea
This support strategy involves doing some choosing or evaluating on
behalf of the chooser and (implicitly or explicitly) advising the chooser
to adopt the result. This strategy has been applied for millenia by
human advisers; in the realm of technological support, it is found
most prominently in recommender systems (1.2.5; Jannach et al., 2011;
Ricci et al., 2011).
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4.6.2 Straightforward Interaction Design
Interaction designers often provide recommendations straightforwardly
via natural language texts such as “It is recommended that you close all
other applications before continuing” and “[This configuration setting
is] Recommended for new users”. A less obtrusive way of conveying
the second recommendation is to preselect the option in question as a
default.
4.6.3 Relevant Technology
There are various points in the different choice patterns at which a
recommender system can make an (absolute or relative) evaluation on
behalf of the chooser.
One possibility is for the recommender to take over the entire pro-
cess of making a choice: from recognizing that a choice should be made
through selecting a particular option and then even executing it. An
example is a music recommender that fully automatically decides what
songs to play for the user. In this limiting case, instead of “choice sup-
port” we could speak of replacing the human chooser by a recommender
system.
A more common and somewhat less aggressive role for recom-
menders is to reduce an initially very large set of options to a man-
ageable consideration set (see 5.3).
Often, though, recommenders take over particular parts of the
choice process and provide some support for the other parts (often
applying one or more of the other Arcade strategies).
• Trial-and-Error-Based Choice: A particular type of recom-
mender system, the critique-based recommender (see, e.g.,
McGinty and Reilly, 2011; Ricci and Nguyen, 2007; Reilly et al.,
2007) provides support for the trial-and-error-based pattern: The
recommender suggests which option to choose next, applying an
exploration strategy that it does not necessarily expose to the
user.
• Policy-Based Choice: A less frequent but potentially important
function of recommenders is to recommend a policy that applies
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to a large number of similar choices; the policy can then be ap-
plied either by a system or by the individual chooser. An example
would be a system that recommends a particular daily calorie in-
take for a user who wants to achieve a weight loss goal.
4.7 Alternative Goals in Applying the ARCADE Strategies
The overall goal pursued by a choice architect who applies the Arcade
strategies is to help people make better choices. The architect can also
pursue two more specific goals that we haven’t mentioned so far and
that require the strategies to be applied in somewhat different ways:
1. Avoid unwanted bias in the choice architecture.
2. Help the chooser deal more successfully with similar choices in
the future.
For each of these goals, we consider why it is often worth pursuing
and how it requires somewhat different ways of applying the Arcade
strategies.
4.7.1 Goal 1: Reduce and Avoid Bias in the Choice Architecture
To see what sort of bias we are talking about, recall a point that was
made in 1.2.2 and 1.2.4:1 Although the Arcade strategies have been
presented as ways of achieving choice support, each of them can also be
applied for the purpose of persuasion: an attempt to induce a person
to choose a particular (type of) option. Although the present authors
don’t want to advocate this type of use of the Arcade strategies, it is
important to be aware of them, since similar effects can arise despite
the best intentions of the choice architect.
1The sort of bias discussed in this subsection exists in the choice environment. By
contrast, the term bias is most commonly used in connection with the psychology
of judgment and decision making to refer to some sort of systematic error that
people make, typically while judging things like frequencies and probabilities; see,
for example the collections by Kahneman et al. [1982], and by Gilovich et al. [2002].
Discussions of the relationships between biases “in the head” and those in the choice
environment can be found in the collection edited by Fiedler and Juslin [2006], in
particular in the introductory chapter.
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Suppose you are the choice architect and that you would like a
chooser C to choose a particular option O. Here are some examples of
how you could apply Arcade strategies in biased ways for this purpose:
• Access Information and Experience: Give the chooser access to
an unrepresentative sample of information or experience which
will incline her to prefer O.
For example, make sure that the positive aspects of O are over-
represented and its negative aspects underrepresented.
• Represent the Choice Situation: Arrange the choice environment
in such a way that O is more likely to be identified as an option
or is likely to be seen as the default option.
Example: Make the icon for choosing O bigger and easier to click
on than the others.
• Combine and Compute: Perform computations which, although
not necessarily strictly incorrect, are more likely to lead to a
choice of O than other equally valid computations would.
The seemingly limitless possibilities of introducing bias into com-
putations have been popularized by books like How to Lie With
Statistics (Huff, 1993).
• Advise About Processing: Encourage C to apply a procedure that
is especially likely to lead to the choice of O.
Example: Encourage affect-based choosing when O evokes posi-
tive affect.
• Design the Domain: Make options that might compete with O
unavailable or costly to reach.
Example: If O is a commercial product, put competing products
on separate, hard-to–access pages or screens.
• Evaluate on Behalf of the Chooser: Recommend O to C regardless
of whether there is reason to believe that C will be satisfied with
it.
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Example: Use a recommendation algorithm that is biased in favor
of recommending things like O.
Biases like these can slip in despite the best intentions of the choice
architect: They may already be present in the choice situation (as when
information is available to the chooser from sources that lie outside of
the control of the choice architect), or the choice architect may intro-
duce them inadvertently. So we should aim to reduce existing biases
and avoid introducing new ones.
A general limitation here was pointed out in the discussion (already
mentioned in 4.2) by Thaler and Sunstein [2008, Introduction] of the
example of arranging food in a cafeteria: While some choice architec-
tures may be clearly more biased than others, there is in general no
such thing as complete lack of bias.
This point is important, but it is not obvious what its practical im-
plications are. One possible conclusion is that, given that some amount
of bias is inevitable anyway, we might as well introduce a bit of bias
that serves some apparently desirable goal that may not be shared by
the chooser, such as a bias toward organ donation (cf. the first sense of
the term nudge discussed in 1.2.3).
In the present work, instead of advocating a particular approach to
this question, we will view the minimization of predictable bias as one
goal that can be pursued in the application of the six Arcade choice
support strategies. Our readers as choice architects are free to think for
themselves about how to deal with any inevitable residual bias, taking
into account the relevant details of the choice situation.
4.7.2 Goal 2: Support Future Choices
Up to now, we have been implicitly assuming that the goal of a choice
architect is to help a chooser deal with a choice situation that she is
currently facing. But it often makes sense to take a longer-term perspec-
tive, taking steps now that will help the chooser deal more effectively
with choice situations that arise in the future.
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Education and Training
The most obvious situation of this sort is education and training in deci-
sion making, which can occur anywhere from the school classroom (see,
e.g., Hogarth, 2001; Gigerenzer, 2014) to professional training courses
(see, e.g., Phillips et al., 2004; Ross et al., 2005). In these contexts,
choosers are typically given choice support as they handle a carefully
chosen range of example choice situations. The Arcade strategies are
still relevant, but the goal of applying them is different: It is less im-
portant that the chooser handles the example choices well than that
the chooser learns how to do a better job of handling similar choices
in the future. While acknowledging the general importance of educa-
tion and training in choice and decision making, we do not discuss it
in this publication, partly because education and training, at least in
their familiar forms, do not in general constitute a natural and feasible
type of choice support for everyday choices made by users of computing
technology: People seldom take courses to learn how to make the types
of choice that we have been discussing.
Support for “Learning While Choosing”
There is a related approach, however, which is feasible even for small
everyday choices: Help the chooser to learn while making real every-
day choices, so that he can do a better job with similar choices in the
future. We will see a number of examples of this approach when dis-
cussing support for trial-and-error-based choice (Section 10), which by
definition involves learning from the experience of making choices. But
with the other five Aspect choice patterns as well, any application of
an Arcade strategy can lead to some amount of learning; so it can
make sense for a choice architect to aim intentionally to support that
type of learning, especially if it is known that similar choice situations
will arise repeatedly in the future.
We will use as an example here the type of choice that concerns
health and well-being (rather than the use of computing technology):
a choice about what sort of exercise (specifically, running) to do on a
particular day. The screenshot in Figure 4.3 shows feedback that was
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Figure 4.3: Screen shot from the iPhone application Polar Beat showing feedback
on a running session performed with a heart rate (“HR”) monitor.
given to a runner after the completion of a run. It therefore constitutes
support for trial-and-error-based choice; but note that a similar screen
could be presented to a runner who was simply considering a particular
trajectory and speed, previewing for her the likely outcomes of choosing
this option.
This example illustrates several tactics that are well suited to sup-
porting similar choices in the future:
• Access Information and Experience: Instead of giving the chooser
access to just the information and experience that she needs to
deal with the current choice, the screen includes textually pre-
sented information that helps her to acquire a more complete
mental model of the effects of running.
• Represent the Choice Situation: The histogram encourages a way
of conceptualizing the properties of a running session (in terms
of time spent at different levels of heart rate) that can influence
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the chooser’s thinking about running even when she is not using
this decision aid.
• Evaluate on Behalf of the Chooser: The screen includes an explicit
(positive) evaluation of the depicted run, which may encourage
the runner to choose similar runs in the future.
This goal of supporting “learning while choosing” has received rel-
atively little attention in the scientific literature so far, but it deserves
close attention of choice architects in HCI, especially because of the
fact that most choices in this area occur repeatedly.
5Attribute-Based Choice
In this and each of the following five main sections, we will look more
closely at one of the six Aspect choice patterns, noting some of the key
concepts and results that have emerged in research about the pattern
and considering how the Arcade strategies can be applied.
5.1 Introduction to the Pattern
The attribute-based pattern (summarized in Table 5.1) can be applied
whenever the set of available options can usefully be described in terms
of attributes (e.g., “price”, “average user rating”) and levels of those
attributes.1 The most obvious cases where this style of choice is rele-
vant is when users are shopping in e-commerce sites (e.g., app stores)
that explicitly present available products and services in terms of their
attributes.
1Note that the attribute “average user rating” summarizes information about the
evaluations of other persons. So a chooser who takes this attribute into account is
also invoking part of the socially based pattern of choice, in the way described in
3.3.7.
59
60 Attribute-Based Choice
Table 5.1: Attribute-Based Choice. (In this and subsequent similar tables, each
tactic in the right-hand column can be seen as an instantiation of the general Ar-
cade strategy listed just before it. These tactics are just a sample from the set of
tactics that can be formulated on this level of abstraction. In the left-hand column,
a step that is indented to the right should be seen as one possible way of executing
the more general step shown above it.)
  Steps Support Tactics 
− (Optional:) C reflects in advance 
about the situation−specific 
(relative) importance of attributes 
and/or values of attribute levels 
Advise About Processing: Encourage C to reflect in this 
way 
Represent the Choice Situation: Represent the choice 
situation in a way that avoids unnecessary bias in favor 
of particular attributes or levels 
− C reduces the total set of options to 
a smaller consideration set on the 
basis of attribute information 
Design the Domain: Make only a limited set of options 
available in the first place 
Combine and Compute: Offer computational support for 
winnowing strategies 
Evaluate on Behalf of the Chooser: Recommend a 
consideration set 
  C considers only the first few 
items that are presented 
  
  or C filters (or sorts) the options 
according to one attribute A at a 
time, until there are only a 
manageable number left 
Combine and Compute: Filter or sort according to 
criteria specified by C 
Represent the Choice Situation: Display winnowing 
results so as to enable C to judge how successful the 
winnowing has been 
− C chooses from among a 
manageable set of options 
Access Information and Experience: Provide objective 
information about the attribute levels for options 
  C applies a comparative 
integration strategy 
Represent the Choice Situation: Present information 
about attribute levels in a way that facilitates mental 
application of comparative strategies 
  or C applies an additive evaluation 
strategy 
  
  C evaluates each of (a sample of) 
attribute−level combinations 
Evaluate on Behalf of the Chooser: Suggest evaluations 
for particular attribute levels 
Represent the Choice Situation: Represent attribute 
levels relative to evaluation−relevant reference points 
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5.2 Thinking in Advance About Evaluation Criteria
As we will see, there is a wide range of strategies that the chooser
can (implicitly) apply with attribute-based choice. Within each strat-
egy, the chooser’s evaluation criteria—for example, which attributes
he considers most important when looking for a new smartphone and
how he evaluates particular attribute levels—will influence the out-
come. So a relatively deliberate chooser may want to take some time
from the start to settle on a particular strategy and particular eval-
uation criteria, maybe before looking at any particular options. This
sort of reflection is a standard part of decision analysis, for which elab-
orate procedures and representations have been developed (see, e.g.,
Keeney, 1992; Clemen and Reilly, 2013, sect. 3). In terms of the As-
pect model, this step is most naturally seen as the construction of a
policy for making the choice, which will subsequently be executed. The
main section on policy-based choice includes a discussion of the various
ways in which choosers can arrive at policies (see in particular 9.4).
We note here the following points about the evaluation criteria ap-
plied in attribute-based choice:
1. It is not necessary for the chooser to be able to assign some sort of
value to every observed level of every known attribute. As we will
see shortly, choosers can often arrive at a choice by considering
a small subset of the available information about attributes and
levels and by applying a small and possibly vague set of evaluation
criteria (e.g., “the most important attribute is A, and the most
desirable level of A is L”).
2. It’s also not realistic to expect choosers to bring to the choice
situation comprehensive, stable evaluation criteria, unless they
have a good deal of knowledge and experience with the domain
and/or they have gone to the trouble of working out an evaluation
policy.
3. A consequence of these first two points is that the chooser’s eval-
uation criteria can evolve during the process of choosing, as she
encounters more information about the options; and that her
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specific evaluations can be influenced by contextual factors that
would normally be considered irrelevant.
A striking example of the third point is provided by a study by
Mandel and Johnson [2002]: They found that two different colored
backgrounds of an experimental e-commerce website for car buyers,
which suggested the values of “safety” or “economy”, respectively, led
to measurably different choices of prospective buyers. Results like these
underscore the importance of the support strategy Represent the Choice
Situation and in particular of the need to represent choice situations
in ways that do not introduce unintended bias (cf. 4.7.1) .
5.3 Winnowing
5.3.1 Key Concepts
In some real-life situations, the number of options to be considered is
limited from the start to a small number that can be easily contem-
plated at the same time (e.g., 5 or 6). And many experimental studies of
attribute-based choice create situations of this sort. But in many real-
life situations, a chooser will start off with a set of options that is too
large to permit consideration of each one. In these cases, people often
use some procedure to winnow (Edwards and Fasolo, 2001, p. 593 ff.)
the set of options to a manageable number of options, sometimes called
a consideration set.
Consider, for example, a user who is trying to find a suitable navi-
gation application for use in his car. The initial set of options may be
returned by a query in an app store with keywords like “car, naviga-
tion”. If this search returns, say, 50 apps, the chooser is likely to start
by trying to eliminate most of them.
A typical procedure is to focus on one important attribute and filter
out all options whose levels are inadequately desirable with respect to
that attribute. As long as the number of options that remain is still too
large, the filtering is repeated with another attribute. This procedure
is similar to the elimination by aspects strategy that Tversky [1972]
introduced as a general model of choice.
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A winnowing procedure is typically quicker (at least for the chooser)
and less reliable than the procedure that the chooser will subsequently
apply when focusing on the consideration set (see below). A common
phenomenon is therefore the “winnowed-out winner”: An option that
the chooser would have chosen if she had considered it carefully is
eliminated the winnowing phase. For example, if elimination by aspects
is used, an option that rates poorly on the most important attribute
will be eliminated even if it is outstanding on all other attributes.
5.3.2 Support Tactics
A commonly applied support tactic is to have the computer take over
the mechanical work of winnowing, in accordance with the strategy
Combine and Compute:
• The application of filters is often supported, as in commonly
found decision aids for e-commerce websites (see. e.g., Pfeiffer,
2012, especially chap. 5). A large number of variants of the fil-
tering approach have been explored within the the widely ap-
plied paradigm of faceted search or faceted browsing (see, e.g.,
Tunkelang, 2009; Hearst, 2009, chap. 8). At any given point in
time, the user is considering a (possibly very large) set of options
that he has reached by searching or filtering. He is typically of-
fered a number of possible ways of filtering the set down to a
smaller set (e.g., by specifying a range of acceptability for a nu-
merical attribute or one or more desired levels for an attribute
that has discrete levels).
• In a roughly similar way, the user can be offered the option of sort-
ing the options according to their levels on particular attributes.
If the chooser then attends only to the first options in the sorted
list, the effect is similar to that of filtering (cf. Pfeiffer, 2012,
chap. 5).
In addition to the strategy Combine and Compute, tools like these
apply the strategy Access Information and Experience, in that they
access information about the options (much of which would normally
not be known to the chooser).
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In practice, their usefulness is sometimes reduced by limitations in
the criteria that the tools allow the chooser to specify. Here are some
typical problems:
• In some simple tools, the chooser can filter or sort according to
only one attribute, which means that the winnowing task can be
only partly accomplished if the chooser would have liked to apply
other filters as well.
• The chooser may be unable to specify a filtering criterion that
she would like to apply. For example, using the “color” attribute,
the chooser might want to eliminate several colors while keeping
several others, whereas the system allows the specification of only
one desired color.
A straightforward way to improve the usefulness of filtering and
sorting tools is to determine the winnowing criteria that users are likely
to want to apply and ensure that these can be expressed in the user
interface.
One benefit of automating winnowing in this way is that it becomes
feasible for the chooser to redo the winnowing if the result does not seem
very promising. For this purpose, the new consideration set should be
displayed in a way that supports a quick assessment of how likely it
is to yield a good choice. Faceted browsing systems normally make it
easy for the user to try an alternative winnowing principle by removing
one of the currently used filters and applying a new filter. A relatively
new approach is to enable the user to see the results of two or more
winnowing attempts at the same time, so as to judge which one(s)
should be pursued further (see, e.g., Buschbeck et al., 2013).
Automatic support for winnowing does not need to be restricted to
methods (like repeated filtering) that people could in principle apply
themselves. In a system that supports keyword search, the chooser can
use search terms to arrive at an initial consideration set (which he may
then winnow further). In the extreme case, a recommender system can
take over the entire winnowing step, generating a consideration set on
the basis of some sort of model of the chooser’s interests. This tactic
is shown in Table 5.1 as being derived from the strategy Evaluate on
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Behalf of the Chooser, because the recommender has to perform some
evaluations or comparisons on the chooser’s behalf.
5.4 Choosing From a Manageable Set of Options
Once the chooser has done any winnowing, how does she choose among
the available options in the consideration set, which may or may not
still be fairly numerous?
Over the past few decades, several conceptions of how people handle
this task have been studied. There is still no consensus about the rela-
tive prevalence of these approaches in realistic situations, but they are
all worth taking into account. After all, even if a given approach does
not occur frequently in unaided choice processes, it might work well if
effectively supported with tactics derived from the Arcade strategies.
A wide variety of strategies for examining and integrating informa-
tion about attribute levels have been compared in the research liter-
ature (see, e.g., the influential book-length treatment by Payne et al.,
1993, or the more compact summaries by Payne and Bettman, 2004,
and Hastie and Dawes, 2010, chap. 10). Instead of discussing the many
dimensions along which strategies can be compared, we will discuss
here one broad distinction between what may be called comparative
and additive strategies.2
The key distinction is whether the chooser, when contemplating the
fact that a given option has a given level of a given attribute, needs
to assign some sort of quantitative evaluation to that attribute-level
combination (in the spirit of “I’ll give this dictionary 20 points for
having such a large number of words”). If so, the chooser can apply
an additive strategy, adding up these quantitative evaluations to arrive
at an overall quantitative evaluation of the option in question (even if
not all of the attribute-related information about the option is taken
into account). Even though we normally don’t intuitively feel that we
are adding up numbers when we form an impression of the desirability
of an item on the basis of its attributes, both behavioral studies (see,
2The most closely related distinction that already occurs in literature such as the
works just cited is that between noncompensatory and compensatory strategies.
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e.g., Glöckner, 2008; Dijksterhuis et al., 2009) and neuropsychological
studies (see, e.g., Glimcher and Fehr, 2014, chap. 13) have shown that
partial evaluations are often represented and added up in the brain
without conscious control.
By contrast, a comparative strategy presupposes only that the
chooser can compare any two levels of a given attribute to determine
which level is more desirable (e.g., 50,000 words in a dictionary is a
better number than 40,000 words, regardless of how good these num-
bers are in an absolute sense); and (in some such strategies) that the
chooser can judge which of two attributes is more important.
5.4.1 Comparative Strategies
A frequently studied comparative strategy is the lexicographic strat-
egy:3 The chooser focuses on the one attribute that he considers most
important and chooses the option with the most desirable level on that
attribute; if two or more options are equally desirable, the second most
important attribute is used in a similar way to break the tie. This
strategy is “frugal” in the sense that it normally requires processing of
information concerning only one attribute and the processing concerns
only the question of which option rates best on that attribute.
The elimination by aspects strategy that was discussed in connec-
tion with winnowing likewise falls into the category of comparative
strategies.
Many strategies of this general sort are noncompensatory: An option
can be eliminated on the basis of its level on one attribute even though
it rates very well on other attributes.
Research on these strategies (often in comparison with additive
strategies) has yielded several general conclusions, which mostly make
comparative strategies seem more attractive to choosers than they
might appear at first glance:
1. The fact that comparative strategies typically involve less precise
evaluation criteria fits well with the fact that choosers often have only
incomplete, unstable evaluation criteria anyway.
3In recent literature, variants of this strategy have often gone under the name
take the best, as in the work of Gigerenzer and Todd [1999]
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2. How well a given strategy works in terms of yielding a good out-
come depends strongly on the specific choice task that is involved, as
well as on aspects of the context such as time pressure. In particular,
even strategies that make use of only a small proportion of the available
information can be surprisingly effective in some choice environments.
Intuitively, it can be understood that a lexicographic strategy will work
well if (a) there are large differences among the options in terms of the
most important attribute and (b) the differences with respect to other
attributes are small, or the other attributes are much less important. In
an environment like this, a person who tries to apply a more elaborate
strategy, such as an additive strategy, will at best obtain no more desir-
able result and may at worst run out of time before she has processed
the most important information. There is a good deal of evidence (see
Payne et al., 1993, and Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999) that people are
adaptive in the sense that they have some ability to choose a strategy
that is relatively well suited to the current task and context.
3. Comparative strategies often offer advantages in terms of the
third desirable property of good choice procedures that was mentioned
in 3.6: the avoidance of unpleasant thoughts. One type of unpleasant
thinking that people often like to avoid is thinking about trade-offs: If
Dictionary 1 has more words but poorer usability than Dictionary 2,
C needs to think about which of these differences is more important.
This task can be especially difficult if C has not previously thought
about the exact relative importance of these attributes and the values
of particular levels of them. And after having decided, C will be aware
of having chosen a dictionary that has a significant drawback relative
to one of the other dictionaries. With most comparative strategies, such
as the lexicographic strategy, C can remain blissfully ignorant about
any such trade-offs.
Another type of unpleasant thought is related to specific attribute
levels that bring to mind unpleasant associations. When choosing
among several foods, at least some of which have high caloric content,
C may be reminded of the problems that he has keeping his weight un-
der control; if he applies a selective comparative strategy that ignores
68 Attribute-Based Choice
the attribute “number of calories”, he will be spared any such negative
associations.
4. A choice made with a comparative strategy also tends to be easy
to understand and justify: Compare “I chose this dictionary because it
has the largest number of words” with an explanation that mentions a
number of attribute-level combinations of the options and claims that
the sum of these values for one particular option is greater than the
corresponding sum for any other option.
5.4.2 Additive Strategies
The classic additive strategy, which is often seen as an ideal that can
at best be approached by other strategies, is called weighted adding:
The chooser assigns a value for each level of each attribute of each
option and then adds up all of these values to see which option is
best. When applied deliberately, this strategy would in general require
a good deal of cognitive effort, and it might even be impossible to
execute. But research in recent years has suggested that people can do
something like weighted adding quite effectively as long as they don’t
pay too much attention (see, e.g., Glöckner, 2008; Dijksterhuis et al.,
2009). Still, it would often be superfluous and impractical to take into
account every single attribute of every option: Some options can quickly
be seen to be inferior, and some attributes are so unimportant that they
can safely be ignored. Many computational models of attribute-based
choice postulate the use of selective additive strategies in which the
attribute/level combinations to be evaluated are sampled from those of
all options.4 The sampling is typically assumed to stop once one option
has emerged as being sufficiently superior to the others.
One advantage of an additive strategy is that it can be used to
evaluate each option separately, whereas comparative strategies pre-
suppose that options can be compared with each other attribute by
attribute, which is normally easy only if they are perceptually present
at the same time. The downside is that an additive strategy requires
4An influential model of this type has been Decision Field Theory
(Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993), which has been extended over the past two
decades (see, e.g., Roe et al., 2001; Bhatia, 2013).
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the chooser to be able to assign some sort of meaningful value to in-
dividual attribute-level combinations, which may be impossible if the
chooser has little relevant knowledge or experience. In a classic study,
Hsee [2000] showed that nonspecialists had difficulty assigning a value
to the fact that a given music dictionary had 10,000 entries (or 20,000
entries) when judging such a dictionary separately. Hence this attribute
had relatively little impact on their choices when they contemplated the
dictionaries separately—but it had a large impact when the dictionaries
were compared with each other directly. Hsee [2000] argued that, if an
attribute like this is going to figure in a noncomparative evaluation of
an object, it can be important to take measures to increase the evalu-
ability of the attribute—for example by providing information about
the typical range of values or by using terms like “above average”.
5.4.3 Support Tactics Related to Attribute-Based Strategies
A general approach to supporting this phase of attribute-based choice
can be based on the idea of helping the chooser C with the selection
and application of an appropriate strategy:
1. Consider what sort of strategy is desirable for the specific choice
situation:
• Is C likely to have relatively precise and comprehensive evalua-
tion criteria or only a few vague notions about the relative im-
portances of some attributes and the relative desirability of some
of their possible levels?
• Is the domain one for which a simple comparative strategy is
likely to yield satisfactory results?
• How much processing is C likely to want to engage in?
• Is it a good idea to enable C to avoid thinking about trade-offs,
or is it in the best interests of C to be confronted with important
trade-offs?
• How important is it for C to be able to understand and justify
(to herself and/or others) the choice she has made?
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2. Take measures to facilitate and encourage the application of the
desirable strategy. These steps can take various forms:
• Represent the Choice Situation: Display the options in a way that
makes it relatively easy to apply the strategy.
Comparative strategies tend to be easier to apply if the options
are displayed simultaneously in tabular form, with the attributes
as rows and the options as columns (or vice versa). By contrast,
if each option is described on a separate screen in a paragraph of
text, applying a comparative strategy could require great mental
effort.
• Combine and Compute: Have the system perform mechanical
computations that are required by the strategy. Computational
support for filtering and sorting has already been mentioned.
Some systems (see, e.g., Edwards and Fasolo, 2001; Pfeiffer, 2012)
support a weighted additive strategy by computing the necessary
weighted sums after the chooser has supplied the relevant pa-
rameters (attribute weights and values of the various attribute
levels).
• Evaluate on Behalf of the Chooser: The system can go beyond
the previous tactic by making assumptions (maybe derived using
recommender system technology) about the evaluation criteria
that C must have in order to apply the strategy (e.g., concerning
attribute importances and the values of particular levels). In this
case, the system is not just combining available information but
also performing some evaluation on behalf of the chooser.
6Consequence-Based Choice
6.1 Introduction to the Pattern
When applying the consequence-based pattern, the chooser contem-
plates possible actions and evaluates them in terms of their anticipated
consequences.
6.1.1 Status in Scientific Research
This choice pattern is the one which, in both the popular mind and
the thought of many scientists, is most closely associated with the idea
of rational decision making (cf. March, 1994, chap. 1). In their in-
fluential textbook on artificial intelligence, Russell and Norvig [2010]
define a rational agent as “one that acts so as to achieve the best out-
come or, when there is uncertainty, the best expected outcome” (sect.
1.1.4). Payne and Howes [2013] propose for the HCI field a theoretical
framework based on the idea that “people choose strategies so as to
maximise utility given constraints” (p. xi). From these perspectives,
all of the other five Aspect choice patterns can be seen as indirect
ways of finding an option that will yield a good outcome, which may
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be helpful when the chooser does not have the information or resources
that would be required to evaluate anticipated outcomes directly.
This choice pattern has understandably attracted more attention in
research and practice than any of the other choice patterns. Nonethe-
less, there remain important gaps to be filled if we want to provide a
coherent picture of consequence-based choice that will be useful in HCI
contexts.
6.1.2 Complications Relative to the Gambling Paradigm
To see why, let’s consider the most prominent single descriptive theory
of consequence-based choice: prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Wakker, 2010). This theory
is based on numerous studies that were conducted within the
gambling paradigm. A typical choice presented to participants in
such a study is the following one (adapted from Problem 12 of
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 273):
“In addition to whatever you own, you have been given $2,000. You
are now asked to choose between:
• a 50% chance of having to give back $1000; and
• the certainty of having to give back $500.”
Everyday choices made by users of computing technology differ from
this type of choice in important ways:
1. In the gambling paradigm, the chooser is presented with a small
set of explicitly described options and is asked to choose among
them.
By contrast, users of computing technology are often not even
aware that there is a choice that can be made; and if they do,
they may not know what options are available to them.
2. In the gambling paradigm, the consequences are normally a lim-
ited number of hypothetical financial gains or losses that can be
quantified in a natural way.
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By contrast, the consequences of users’ everyday choices range
from the subjective experience of performing an action to a va-
riety of types of consequence in a dynamically changing physical
and social world. And there are often so many different conse-
quences of a given action that it is impractical for a chooser to
consider all of them; instead, he must in some way consider a
subset of the consequences, much as the chooser in the attribute-
based pattern typically considers only a subset of the potentially
relevant attribute/level pairs (5.4).
3. Although many of the outcomes in the gambling paradigm are
not expected to occur with certainty, they are at least explicitly
associated with numerical probabilities.
By contrast, when a user of computing technology is not sure
what will happen, she in general has no straightforward way
of quantifying her uncertainty.1 Moreover, some of these conse-
quences may be expected to occur at some time in the more or
less distant future, a fact which has implications for the weight
that they receive in the choice process.
These gaps can be filled in part with the help of research from
paradigms other than the gambling paradigm. But the account in this
section will necessarily remain sketchy at some points, leaving oppor-
tunities for others to flesh it out in the future.
The first four steps shown in Table 6.1 belong to what is some-
times called the preselectional phase of choice or decision making (see,
e.g., Betsch and Haberstroh, 2005b). They occur before the chooser
has finished identifying a set of options whose consequences are to be
anticipated and evaluated.2
1Discussions of the distinction between precisely quantified risk and subjec-
tively experienced uncertainty are given, for example, by Fox and Tversky [1998],
Gigerenzer [2014], and Wakker [2010].
2The preselectional phase can also occur with the other choice patterns, but
adding it explicitly to the descriptions of other patterns would produce redundancy
in the set of Aspect patterns. We discuss it as part of the consequence-based pattern
because the steps in this phase are most naturally illustrated with cases in which a
person is choosing among possible actions that will have consequences.
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Table 6.1: Consequence-Based Choice.
  Steps Support Tactics 
− C recognizes that a choice about a 
possible action can (or must) be 
made 
Advise About Processing: Alert C to the opportunity or 
need to make a choice 
Design the Domain: Ensure that, if the choice 
opportunity is not recognized, what happens by default 
will be acceptable 
− C assesses the situation Access Information and Experience, Represent the 
Choice Situation: Provide information about the current 
situation in a form that makes it easy to see what is 
going on and what is likely to happen 
Combine and Compute: Compute diagnoses or 
predictions about the situation 
− C decides when and where to make 
the choice 
Design the Domain: Avoid forcing a choice to be made 
in an unfavorable situation 
− C identifies one or more possible 
actions (options) 
Access Information and Experience: Provide explicit 
information about possible actions 
Represent the Choice Situation: Represent the situation 
in such a way that the possible actions are easy to 
recognize or infer 
− C anticipates (some of) the 
consequences of executing the 
options 
  
  C anticipates objective 
consequences 
Access Information and Experience, Represent the 
Choice Situation: Conveniently represent information 
about likely consequences 
Design the Domain: Make consequences inherently 
easy to anticipate 
  C anticipates the experience of 
executing particular actions 
Access Information and Experience: Enable C to sample 
the relevant experience 
  C anticipates possible affective 
responses concerning the decision 
process 
Advise About Processing: Alert to possible negative 
affective responses (e.g., disappointment, regret) 
− C evaluates (some of) the 
anticipated consequences 
  
  ... temporally distant consequences Design the Domain: Avoid cases where the 
consequences of different options lie at different 
temporal distances 
Represent the Choice Situation: Make the distant 
consequences salient enough to be given due attention 
  ... uncertain consequences Represent the Choice Situation: Depict the 
consequences in a way that suggests an appropriate 
weighting 
− C chooses an option that rates 
(relatively) well in terms of its 
consequences 
Represent the Choice Situation: Represent possible 
consequences and/or their evaluations in a way that 
facilitates application of an appropriate integration 
strategy (cf. integration strategies for attribute−based 
choice) 
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6.2 Recognizing That There Is a Choice Opportunity
Here are two examples of how a computer user can recognize a choice
opportunity:
• Method selection: The user employs a particular method to
achieve a goal (e.g., choosing a command from a menu) with-
out being aware that there exists at least one other method for
achieving the same goal (e.g., using a keyboard shortcut).
One common support approach is to apply the strategies Access
Information and Experience and Represent the Choice Situation
by “advertising” the available methods (e.g., by displaying a vi-
sual representation of the keyboard shortcut next to the relevant
menu option). This tactic is unfortunately more difficult to apply
with some types of interactive system, such as those that are em-
bedded (largely) invisibly in the environment (cf. Bellotti et al.,
2002).
• Configuration choice: When a user is operating a system that
can be configured in some way, he in principle could choose at
almost any time whether he wants to change the configuration in
an attempt to improve the system’s behavior. But it is in general
difficult for him to know when it is worthwhile even to consider
such a configuration change.
A designer can apply the strategies Evaluate on Behalf of the
Chooser and Advise About Processing by considering at what
point in the operation of the system a user might be interested
in changing a configuration setting and alerting her to the choice
opportunity. Figure 6.1 shows an example of this approach, in
which the user is also offered information about the consequences
of the two available options (turning on Wi-Fi vs. leaving it off).
Note that the user is being offered, in the context of her navi-
gation app, essentially the same information that is available on
the “Settings” screen that was shown in Figure 4.2.
A related approach is to offer the user an opportunity to change
a specific setting without having to visit a different part of the
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Figure 6.1: Example in which a system alerts a user to an opportunity to make
a configuration choice. (The user has just launched the TomTom navigation app,
which uses the iPhone’s built-in GPS.)
system, as by offering the option “Don’t ask me again” next to a
regularly appearing query that the user might find superfluous.
In addition to (or instead of) trying to alert users to a choice op-
portunity, interaction designers often find it more appropriate to (a)
accept the fact that many users will not recognize the opportunity and
(b) ensure that whatever option gets chosen by default is likely to be
acceptable to the user, if not optimal. It is in fact a widely accepted
HCI design guideline that default options should be chosen carefully
by designers. This approach instantiates both the strategy Evaluate
on Behalf of the Chooser—because the designer is thinking about the
likely desirability of particular options for the users—and the strategy
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Design the Domain—because the way in which the system behaves in
a particular circumstance is being designed.
It is worth bearing in mind that there are reasons why users are
likely to (implicitly) choose the default option even if they are aware
of alternative options:
• Accepting the default option often requires less effort than choos-
ing any other one.
• The user is often justified in assuming that the default option has
been selected by the designers because it is appropriate in most
cases.
Outside of the domain of computing technology, the judicious de-
sign of default options constitutes one of the primary and most suc-
cessful tactics of interventions based on behavioral economics (see,
e.g., Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; Johnson et al., 2012). For example,
laws that state that every person can be viewed as an organ donor
unless he has specified otherwise yield dramatically higher donation
rates than laws according to which not donating is the default option
(Johnson and Goldstein, 2003).3
6.3 Situation Assessment
6.3.1 The General Concept
In cases where it is important to anticipate the consequences of actions,
it is often important to have some understanding of what the current
situation is and—if the situation is changing—how it is likely to become
in the future. After all, these facts will help to determine what the
consequences of actions will be. Outside of the domain of computing
technology, clear examples where this type of situation assessment (or
situation awareness) is important include (a) choices about medical
3Appendix D of the 2010 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal
Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, by the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of the U.S. Office of Management and
Budget, includes a detailed set of prescriptions about how to use defaults effectively
for the purpose of choice support.
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treatments, since the consequences of any treatment will depend on the
patient’s current state and prognosis; and (b) choices about emergency
situations such as those faced by firefighters.
Situation assessment has been extensively studied in the research
paradigm of naturalistic decision making (see, e.g., Klein, 1998; Maule,
2010), and in the field of human factors engineering (see, e.g., Guastello,
2014). Decision support systems (see, e.g., French et al., 2009) typically
include powerful methods for retrieving relevant information about the
decision situation (applying the strategy Access Information and Ex-
perience); performing computations on such information to yield sum-
maries, diagnoses, and predictions (Combine and Compute); and pre-
senting the results to decision makers in a way that facilitates the
necessary thinking (Represent the Choice Situation).
6.3.2 Examples Involving Computing Technology
In connection with the everyday use of computing technology, situa-
tions tend on the whole to be less complex and rapidly changing than
in the domains just mentioned. Also, users are less able to devote at-
tention to heavyweight situation assessment tools. Still, there are many
cases where it is worthwhile to consider how situation assessment can
be supported, such as the following:
• A mobile user is wondering whether to dictate an email message
using the iPhone’s Siri agent or to type it in with a virtual key-
board. She may want to consider situational factors such as how
favorable the current conditions for successful dictation are (e.g.,
in terms of ambient noise, movement by the user, and the quality
of the available microphone).
• A driver is wondering whether and how to respond to a voice
message that he has received on his smartphone. He should take
into account factors such as the current traffic situation, the state
of the road ahead of him, and the urgency of the message (i.e.,
what will happen if he does not respond to it right now).
• A user of a social networking site is considering communicating
some sensitive personal information. She ought to take into ac-
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count features of the situation that influence the likelihood of
various types of privacy violation (see 12.2.1).
6.3.3 Support Opportunities
The discussion of the last example just mentioned in the section
on privacy-related choices (12.2.1) illustrates some of the typical ap-
proaches and issues in this area. Although modern computing technol-
ogy offers many opportunities for supporting situation assessment, the
following general points should be borne in mind:
• The strategy Access Information and Experience needs to be com-
bined with the strategies Combine and Compute and Represent
the Choice Situation.
The amount of more or less relevant information that can be pre-
sented about a given situation typically exceeds the capacity and
motivation of users to attend to and make sense of it. Think, for
example, of the information that is presented in a website’s pri-
vacy notice or in the “blue screen of death” that appears when
your computer has just crashed. It is therefore in general neces-
sary to determine carefully what sort of representation will really
support a relevant situation assessment and to apply whatever
techniques of information retrieval, computation, and represen-
tation are needed to create it.
• Even a clear understanding of the current situation will not nec-
essarily enable the chooser to make a good choice. Support for
the other steps in the consequence-based pattern, such as gener-
ating options and anticipating consequences, is likely also to be
required.
6.4 Deciding When to Choose
One of the less-studied approaches to supporting choice is to enable
the chooser to make the choice at a favorable time and in a favorable
situation. This approach is especially worthy of attention in the HCI
context, because designers of interactive systems can often strongly
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influence when choice opportunities arise and when they have to be
dealt with.
Here are some reasons why one situation (“Situation 2”), may be
more favorable for making a given choice than another situation (“Sit-
uation 1”):
1. In Situation 2, the user will have had a chance to acquire more
relevant knowledge of the choice situation.
Suppose, to take an extreme case, that a user of a new appli-
cation is forced to decide about all of the configuration settings
before starting to use the application. He is likely to have nei-
ther the required knowledge nor enough interest to make good
choices. For this reason, Lederer et al. [2004] argued that users
ought to be enabled to set privacy-relevant parameters on the fly,
in the context of their use of the system, instead of in a separate
configuration session (cf. the discussion in 12.5.2).
2. In Situation 2, contextual factors such as the amount of available
time and the extent of distraction (e.g., by noise or by competing
tasks) are more favorable than in Situation 1.
For this reason, a driver may be well-advised to decide, before
getting into her car, what sort of electronic communication he
will engage in while driving. Outside of the car, she is likely to
be in a better position to consider all of the available options
and to take into account possible consequences such as having an
accident. (Note that the previous consideration would by itself
suggest the opposite conclusion.)
To be sure, the question of what contextual factors are most fa-
vorable for the choice process is in general more complex than it
may seem at first glance, partly because of the possibility of ap-
plying choice patterns other than the consequence-based pattern,
such as the experience-based pattern. For example, Klein [1998,
chap. 16] argues that the presence of factors that cause stress
does not have as much impact as we might expect on the choices
of decision makers like experienced firefighters. Dijksterhuis and
colleagues have reported on counterintuitive results of studies in
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which people appeared to make better choices when they were
distracted (see, e.g., Dijksterhuis et al. [2006]).
Interaction designers often have an opportunity to apply the strat-
egy Design the Domain either (a) to ensure that the situation in which
the chooser has to make the choice is favorable or (b) to give the chooser
freedom to decide when and where to make the choice. Examples of
methods enabling on-the-fly configuration were given above in 6.2. The
discussion of commitment mechanisms below in 9.6 will suggest how it
is possible to enable a user realistically to make a choice long before it
is time to execute the chosen option.
6.5 Identification of Options
In order to apply the consequence-based pattern, the chooser needs to
be aware of at least one possible action whose consequences can be
anticipated. Identifying possible options can take various forms, de-
pending on the nature of the available options. We can distinguish four
types of option space:
6.5.1 Small Number of Predefined Options
This situation often arises in HCI contexts, since artificial interactive
systems often offer the user a small, predetermined set of possible ac-
tions. For example, a user of a flight reservation website will probably
have no more than three methods available for entering the desired de-
parture date. The issues involved in making users aware of the existence
of (some of) these options were discussed above (6.2) in connection with
the problem of recognizing the existence of a choice opportunity.
6.5.2 Large Number of Predefined Options
In connection with the attribute-based pattern, we discussed situations
in which a user is initially confronted with a very large number of
options, such as products in a store or documents in a library. We
noticed that a typical first step is to winnow the options down to a
manageable subset.
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A similar situation can arise within the consequence-based pattern
even where there is only one type of action that the user can perform,
if this action can be applied to any of a large number of objects. For
example, a user who feels like proofreading a Wikipedia article can
in general choose from a huge number of articles to work on (cf. 11.3).
And a member of a social networking site who wants to share some
content with friends and acquaintances can choose any of the numer-
ous subsets of his contacts as targets of his sharing action (cf. 12.3).
As the discussion of these two cases in the later chapters will show, it
can be natural to represent the possible objects of the user’s actions in
terms of their attributes, to enable the sort of winnowing that we saw
in connection with the attribute-based pattern. Once the number of
possible objects of the action has become manageable, the chooser can
switch back to the consequence-based pattern, anticipating and evalu-
ating the consequences of applying the action to each of the possible
objects.
6.5.3 Open-Ended Set of Options
In this situation, the set of possible options is open and in principle
unlimited, because the chooser can generate any number of actions.
Examples involving the use of computing technology include (a) com-
posing a lengthy contribution to an online community forum and (b)
designing your web homepage. Generating options in this situation can
involve problem solving, creativity, and domain-specific methods (e.g.,
methods for generating possible web page designs)—topics which fall
largely outside of the scope of choice architecture for HCI.
One general theme from research that is relevant in all of these
cases is the concept of value-focused thinking. When introducing this
concept, Keeney [1992] argued that all too often decision making is
alternative-focused: The chooser focuses on a limited set of options
that have come to her attention somehow (e.g., job offers that a college
student has received shortly before graduating), even though many
other options are in principle available (e.g., job opportunities that the
student could find if she searched for them actively and creatively). The
problem is essentially that the chooser’s evaluation criteria are being
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used only in the phase of evaluating anticipated consequences (which
will be discussed below). If these criteria were used also to generate
options in the first place, the generated options would tend to have
greater overall evaluations for the chooser.
Though the techniques for supporting value-focused thinking which
Keeney presents in his book are mostly too elaborate for the support of
everyday decisions about computing technology, a few simple strategies
are worth considering:
• Represent the Choice Situation: Represent the choice situation in
such a way that it is clear that the set of options is open-ended
and that it is not necessary to restrict attention to any preselected
or obvious options.
• Advise About Processing: Encourage the chooser to think about
his currently relevant goals and values while generating options.
The “Guidelines” page4 of the community weblog MetaFilter
(also discussed in Section 11) can be seen as encouraging value-focused
thinking in these ways: To a large extent, it prescribes to users particu-
lar values that should guide the generation of posts to the weblog, under
headings like “What makes a good thread post to MetaFilter?”. But
since a lot of different possible goals of posting and commenting are
mentioned, the effect can be to encourage users to consider what their
own goals are before they start generating options for action.
6.6 Anticipation of Consequences
We now turn to the question of how to help users of computing technol-
ogy anticipate the consequences of a possible action. One complication
here is the fact that there exist qualitatively different types of conse-
quence that can be taken into account, which can be illustrated with
the example of a driver who is considering listening to and dictating
email messages while driving, using a smartphone app that she has not
tried before.
4http://www.metafilter.com/guidelines.mefi
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• The significant objective consequences of executing the action:
How long will it take? Will the result be satisfactory? Might I
cause an accident because of being distracted by this task?
• The experience of executing the action and the experiences
brought about by the consequences: What will it feel like to dic-
tate the message? Will it be fun, stressful, . . . ? How will I feel if
I manage to respond to all of the messages in my inbox?
• Feelings about the choice process: How will I feel about my deci-
sion to dictate messages if it leads to an accident?
We will consider each of these types of consequence in turn.
6.6.1 Objective Consequences
Users’ actions typically have some consequences that can be evaluated
largely independently of the associated experiences: the extent to which
the goal of the action was achieved, the costs of executing the action
(e.g., the time taken), and side effects.
Straightforward Provision of Information About Consequences
As is the case with situation assessment (6.3), decision support sys-
tems for supporting complex decisions often apply sophisticated com-
binations of the first three Arcade strategies to help decision mak-
ers predict the consequences of actions (see again French et al., 2009).
Analogous tactics can be applied on a smaller scale to everyday choices
about computing technology.
The strategy Access Information and Experience can often be ap-
plied straightforwardly with text messages (e.g., “Estimated download
time: 3 minutes”) or graphical means such as a familiar icon indicating
that clicking on a given link will take the user to an external website.
The FatBatt application for managing a laptop’s battery5 features
an indication of the impact that dimming the screen will have on the
amount of time that the user can work before having to recharge the
5https://fatbatt.com
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battery; it thereby helps the user to decide whether it’s worthwhile to
dim his screen at any given moment.
It remains to be seen to what extent more sophisticated combi-
nations of the first three Arcade strategies such as those that are
found in decision support systems will be developed to support con-
sequence anticipation in connection with everyday choices. Section 12,
on privacy-related choices, provides several examples of a trend in this
direction.
Designing to Make Consequences Inherently Easy to Anticipate
The general HCI principle that an interactive system should be de-
signed so that its behavior is simple and predictable can be seen as an
application of the strategy Design the Domain: In contrast to the real
physical world, where the consequences of an action are largely outside
of any designer’s control, the interaction designer can often create an
artificial world in which consequences are inherently easy to anticipate
and evaluate. Typical ways of achieving this goal are adherence to fa-
miliar design conventions, use of easily understandable metaphors, and
use of other means to support the formation of accurate mental models.
6.6.2 Experience of Executing an Option
In some cases, as with games and entertainment, the experience of
executing an option is the most important consequence and the reason
for choosing the option in the first place. With more utilitarian tasks,
such as booking a hotel room via an e-commerce website, the experience
can still be an important consequence that influences users’ willingness
to choose an option—a fact that underlies the growing emphasis in
recent years on the notion of user experience in HCI. Also, after an
option has been executed, its consequences can be experienced.
There is a line of research in psychology about the problems that
people have in anticipating what it will be like to experience something
if they haven’t experienced it in the past. One complication is caused by
people’s tendency to adapt their tastes and expectations on the basis
of new experience (see, e.g., Wilson, 2002, chap. 7; Gilbert et al., 2002;
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Schwartz, 2004, chap. 8); this adaptation is in turn hard for them to
predict. For example, you may initially be amused by the cute cartoon
character jumping around in the corner of the screen; but how are you
going to feel about it half an hour from now?
Even if the chooser has already had the experience in question, it
is not always straightforward for her to anticipate what the experi-
ence will be like the next time. Kahneman and colleagues (see, e.g.,
Kahneman, 2011, chap. 35) famously studied people who were sub-
jected to various sorts of unpleasant experience, such as holding their
hand in painfully cold water. They found that there was no one-to-one
relationship between the amount of pain a person actually experienced
and his later recollection of that pain: In some cases participants, when
given a choice about which of two experiences to repeat, chose the one
which had certainly caused more pain.
Several approaches to supporting the anticipation of experience are
already in more or less wide use:
1. In some cases, a straightforward form of support is to apply the
strategy Access Information and Experience by providing a sam-
ple of the experience in question, allowing the user to try out the
action before she decides whether to go through with it. This form
of support amounts to enabling the small-scale, local application
of the trial-and-error-based pattern. But often the experience in
question is not available to be offered on a trial basis (e.g., the ex-
perience of being admired by the members of your social network
after you have made a valuable contribution; or the experience
of being a skillful touch typist, if you are currently a novice typ-
ist). And even if it is, there may not be time for effects such as
adaptation to the new experience to set in.
2. Another variant of the strategy Access Information and Experi-
ence, which has been popular in the persuasive technology area,
involves using simulations to give a foretaste of experiences. A
well-known example that does not involve choices about comput-
ing technology is the Baby Think It Over infant simulator,
which helps teen-aged girls anticipate realistically what it is like
to take care of a baby (see, e.g., Fogg, 2003, chap. 4). Another
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example is the airplane emergency simulator of Chittaro [2012]
that was mentioned above in 4.1.3.
3. A less technically complex method of helping a chooser to antic-
ipate experiences is the use of narratives: stories about the expe-
rience of other persons (Hibbard and Peters, 2003; Klein, 1998,
chap. 11). Such narratives can evoke affective responses and stim-
ulate processing on the intuitive level (3.4). A familiar means of
providing such narratives is the provision of users’ reviews and
testimonials. A single harrowing description of another user’s at-
tempt to install a newly purchased software application—and of
its disappointing performance once installation was complete—
can enable a chooser to imagine vividly what the consequences
of purchasing that application might be, including the feeling of
regret about having chosen to make the purchase.
4. If the chooser has had similar experiences in the past, the ap-
plication of the strategy Access Information and Experience can
involve reminding him, maybe by means like those just listed, of
what the experience was like, so as to overcome the tendency for
recollections of experience to be distorted in memory.
6.6.3 Affective Responses to the Choice Process
In addition to the affective states that are caused by experience with the
consequences of an action, there are often affective states that consti-
tute responses to the choice process on a meta-level (see, e.g., Schwartz,
2004, chap. 7; Mellers, 2000; Isen and Labroo, 2003).
• Disappointment: The selected option is found to be not as sat-
isfying as the chooser had expected (maybe because of the sort
of unexpected adaptation to the new benefit that was mentioned
above).
A chooser who is sophisticated enough to anticipate this possi-
bility might think, for example: “If I pay for this expensive app
and it turns out not to be so great, I’ll be disappointed”.
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• Regret: The chooser ultimately concludes that a different option
would have been better than the one that she chose.
A chooser can anticipate this result by thinking something like:
“If I buy this app without checking out the alternatives, I’ll kick
myself if I find out later that one of the alternatives is much
better.”
There appears to have been little research about how to help
choosers anticipate affective responses of the sort, but one natural ap-
proach is to apply the strategy Advise About Processing by somehow
encouraging the chooser to think about how he will feel if particular
outcomes occur. And simply applying the strategy Access Informa-
tion and Experience to enable the chooser to imagine particular conse-
quences vividly can have a similar effect. Schwartz [2004, p. 231] takes
a different approach to choice support with regard to regret: He aims
to reduce the extent to which regret occurs in the first place by apply-
ing the strategy Advise About Processing—recommending, for example,
“Adopting the standards of a satisficer rather than a maximizer” and
“Reducing the number of options we consider before making a decision”.
Though this advice is aimed directly at readers of Schwartz’s popular
book, imaginative choice architects who aim to minimize choosers’ re-
gret may be able to think of ways of achieving the same effects via
tactics other than explicit advice-giving.
6.7 Evaluation of Anticipated Consequences
We have considered so far how users can be helped to anticipate the
consequences of their actions, but what about the ways in which they
evaluate these consequences?
6.7.1 Reference Levels
Even within prospect theory (6.1.2), where consequences are assumed
to be quantified in terms of money, the process of evaluating conse-
quences is far from trivial. One key insight, which has been found to
apply even in many situations in which the consequences are not so nat-
urally quantified, is that outcomes are evaluated relative to a
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level (see, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 274). For example,
consider a user who is accustomed to filling in a travel expense report
in about 5 minutes. If his company has installed a new expense report-
ing system that will require (at least at first) 10 minutes of work, then
the user is likely to view the use of the new system as causing a loss
of 5 minutes of her time (in addition to the less quantifiable disadvan-
tage of having to pay more attention while learning to operate the new
application). By contrast, another user who is accustomed to spending
15 minutes on this type of task will view the new system as saving him
5 minutes.
One reason why this use of reference levels is important is
that “losses loom larger than corresponding gains” (see, e.g.,
Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). All other things being equal, the “ex-
ecution time” consequence will have a bigger impact on the choice
of the user who loses time than on that of the user who saves time.
This tendency, called loss aversion, has been invoked to explain a
variety of phenomena in people’s money-related behavior (see, e.g.,
Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). In the HCI area, one implication is the
prediction that users will tend to stick with applications and methods
that they already use: If switching to another option would lead to
some sort of loss and some objectively equally large gain, the loss will
tend to have greater weight in the choice process.
It is not always obvious what the relevant reference level is. In the
previous example, the user might conceivably compare her expected
time for the first use of the new system with the time she spent long
ago when using the previous system for the first time. In principle,
each chooser can decide for himself which reference level to employ,
but there is often a reference level that is naturally suggested by the
way in which the problem presents itself to the chooser—for example,
by the verbal formulation of the choice problem.
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6.7.2 Framing
Research Results
This sort of influence has been studied in laboratory research un-
der the heading of framing (see, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1984;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). To cite the best-known example, peo-
ple tend to be influenced strongly by whether the consequences of
emergency-intervention options are described in terms of people be-
ing “saved” vs. people “dying”, even when the situations described in
these terms are objectively identical (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984).
To take another example, research results suggest that a person is more
likely to join a dating website if she is told that she has a 40% chance
of finding a partner than if she is told that she has a 60% chance of
failing to find a partner.
Although the best-known framing effects concern the distinction
between gains and losses, a more general point is that the way in which
a consequence is evaluated can be strongly influenced by the way in
which it is represented—a fact which underscores the importance of
the Arcade strategy Represent the Choice Situation.
Implications of Framing for Choice Support
When the choice architect’s goal is to persuade the chooser to select
a particular option, a natural tactic is to describe the options in ways
that influence the evaluations in the desired direction. When the goal
is not persuasion but choice support (1.2.2), the idea is to avoid in-
troducing unnecessary distortion via framing effects—even though it
is in general difficult or impossible to find a completely neutral fram-
ing of any consequence (cf. 4.7.1). For example, though it’s debatable
whether it’s more appropriate to characterize a dating site in terms of
its success rate or its failure rate, it is clear that two competing dating
sites should be described in the same terms if bias is to be avoided.
When options are being evaluated singly rather than jointly (cf. 5.4),
attempts to achieve neutrality normally have to be more cumbersome.
For example, Kahneman [2011] reports on a U.S. Department of Agri-
culture guideline which . . .
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. . . permits the inclusion of messages such as “90% fat-free”
on the label of meat products, provided that the statement
“10% fat” is also displayed “contiguous to, in lettering of
the same color, size, and type as, and on the same color
background as, the statement of lean percentage.” (p. 414)
6.8 Time Discounting
6.8.1 Research Results
Humans and animals alike tend to prefer a benefit that will come soon
to an equal benefit that will occur later in time. That is, they discount
future benefits.6 For example, a member of an online community may
be more willing to make a contribution if it appears on a web page
immediately, so that its positive consequences (which can take various
forms) occur without delay. As is the case with monetary investments,
there are various good reasons to discount temporally distant benefits.
When the choice architect’s goal is persuasion, there is a straightfor-
ward design implication: To encourage a user to choose a particular
option, arrange for its benefits to come sooner rather than later (an ap-
plication of the strategy Design the Domain). This tactic was applied
by McDowell et al. [2003] to encourage nontechnical users to annotate
HTML data for semantic web services.
Time discounting is often due at least in part to uncertainty about
whether and when the long-term benefit will really occur (see, e.g.,
McGuire and Kable, 2013). Accordingly, another strategy for avoiding
undue time discounting is to find a way of eliminating such uncertainty,
for example simply by reassuring the user about the time at which the
future benefit will occur.
Some of the most striking cases where time discounting plays a role
concern the frequent situation in which a person can choose between (a)
an option that will bring a small benefit soon and (b) another option
that will yield a larger benefit at a later time. If people’s discount
6Useful collections of articles on phenomena that arise when choices and/or their
consequences are distributed over time have been edited by Loewenstein and Elster
[1992] and by Loewenstein et al. [2003].
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Figure 6.2: Exponential time discounting functions for a “smaller-sooner” and a
“larger-later” benefit. (Each of the vertical line segments on the right represents the
value of a benefit at the point in time at which it occurs. Each curve represents the
discounted value of the anticipated benefit at an earlier point in time.)
Figure 6.3: Hyperbolic time discount functions that cross. (Compare with Fig-
ure 6.2. The larger-later benefit is preferred until shortly before the time at which
the smaller-sooner benefit will occur.)
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Figure 6.4: Visualization of a perceptual phenomenon that is analogous to the
hyperbolic discounting of benefits that are different distances away in time. (When
the perceiver is far away from the two trees, the taller tree looks taller; when the
perceiver is close, the shorter tree does. The heights of the points at which the
dotted lines intersect the “windshield” of the vehicle correspond to the values of a
hyperbolic time discounting function. This visualization was suggested by Figure
2.3 of Rachlin, 2000.)
curves were exponential—as is the case with typical discount rates for
financial investments and in early normative models of time discounting
(see, e.g., Read, 2004)—, people would always show time consistency in
their preference between the smaller-sooner and the larger-later option:
If, when asked on Monday, you prefer a larger benefit on Saturday
afternoon to a smaller benefit on Friday afternoon, then you will express
the same preference on Friday morning. As is illustrated in Figure 6.2,
the discounting curves in question never cross.
A large number of studies with humans and animals have shown,
however, that discounting curves are better described by a hyperbolic
function (Figure 6.3) than by an exponential one. One implication of
the mathematical form of a hyperbolic function (see, e.g., Read, 2004)
is that the curves in a problem like the one we are considering can
cross. Concretely, in our example, when Friday morning arrives and
the small benefit could be obtained almost immediately, the chooser
may change his mind and opt for the smaller benefit after all. This
particular type of preference reversal has been documented countless
times in studies with animals (e.g., pigeons) and humans (see, e.g.,
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Rachlin, 2000, chap. 2), and it corresponds to our everyday experience
that benefits that are tangibly near can loom disproportionately large
(see Figure 6.4 for a visualization that aims to make this type of reversal
of relative prominence plausible and memorable).
In some cases, such preference reversals can be explained in more
concrete ways than in terms of hyperbolic discounting: If a researcher
working on a journal manuscript receives an email containing some
amusing jokes, the action of continuing to read the jokes will have the
concrete advantage that its rewards are already being experienced right
now, whereas the benefits of sticking to the article writing can only be
imagined.
6.8.2 Support Tactics
People are often aware of the danger of a last-minute preference reversal
and are willing to avoid it by committing themselves at an early point
in time to the option with the larger-later benefit (Rachlin, 2000, chap.
3). Hence commitment strategies are an important support mechanism
in connection with choices where time discounting is a major issue.
Since the issue of commitment arises even more prominently in con-
nection with the policy-based pattern, its discussion will be postponed
to Section 9.
6.9 Dealing With Uncertainty
6.9.1 Relevant Research
The question of how choosers deal with uncertainty about possible
outcomes is one of the most thoroughly treated topics in research
on the consequence-based pattern (see, e.g., Hastie and Dawes, 2010;
Kahneman et al., 1982). For example, prospect theory, which assumes
that the probabilities are provided explicitly as numbers, improved on
normative models by taking into account some observed regularities in
the ways in which people process information about probabilities (e.g.,
the fact that the difference between a 0.00% probability of having an
accident and a 0.01% probability is more important than the difference
between a 1.00% probability and a 1.01% probability).
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A research paradigm of more recent origin (see Hertwig et al., 2006,
and 10.5.4 below) investigates how choosers process probabilities that
they assess by observing outcomes of multiple choices, which is a more
typical situation in the HCI context. The results contrast in part with
those from the gambling paradigm. For example, very low probabilities
are often in effect rounded down to .00 simply because the chooser has
not observed any positive example.
Overall, it is difficult to derive clear implications of research results
about dealing with uncertainty for everyday situations in which a user
of computing technology is dealing with a wide variety of consequences,
having only vague impressions of how likely they are—impressions
which she may have arrived at in various ways. The following state-
ments can serve as rough summaries:
1. All other things being equal, the more likely a consequence is
seen as being, the greater weight it will have in the chooser’s
evaluation of an action.
2. Outcomes with low probability and/or low importance are often
simply ignored.
3. Instead of systematically taking into account all consequences of
all options, choosers often apply integration strategies like those
discussed in connection with the attribute-based pattern (e.g.,
comparing several alternative methods only in terms of their ex-
pected execution time, ignoring all other consequences unless two
methods are expected to have equal execution times).
6.9.2 Implications for Choice Support
Researchers and practitioners in the areas of decision analysis and deci-
sion support systems (see, e.g., Clemen and Reilly, 2013; French et al.,
2009, chap. 8) have devised a vast and impressive arsenal of ways of
representing complex decision problems, eliciting realistic probability
judgments, and representing the uncertain outcomes of actions in ways
that help decision makers to evaluate competing options. Currently,
these techniques tend to require more effort and attention than users
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of computing technology are likely to want to invest in everyday situ-
ations. Maybe more lightweight versions of these methods can be de-
veloped that will fit better into a choice architecture for HCI. In the
meantime, simple tactics like the following may be worth considering:
1. Sometimes, a system or its designer will have access to reliable
information about the probabilities of particular consequences (e.g., the
probabilities of hard disk failure for different hard disks). In these cases,
it is natural to apply the strategy Access Information and Experience
by stating the probabilities; but even if this is done, it is probably
worthwhile to provide a representation of the problem situation that
will make it easy for the chooser to assign appropriate mental weights
to the consequences in question; providing the correct numbers cannot
be assumed to suffice in itself.
2. Where no precise probability information is available, means
such as graphical representations or verbal formulations can be ap-
plied within the strategy Represent the Choice Situation in an effort to
encourage an appropriate weighting of the various consequences.
7Experience-Based Choice
7.1 Introduction to the Pattern
The two choice patterns that have been considered so far can in prin-
ciple be applied even if the chooser has never made a similar choice
in the past—though in this case the chooser will have more difficulty
in making the required assessments and evaluations, being more re-
liant on external sources of information. In cases where a chooser has
repeatedly made similar choices in the past, his past experience can
serve as a valuable resource that makes it less necessary to consider
things like attribute levels and anticipated consequences. The idea is
simply that what you have done in similar situations in the past (with
some success) is likely to be a decent option now.
This idea appears in many different forms, and it has been studied
in various lines of research. In this section, we consider four subpatterns
of the experience-based pattern (see Table 7.1) which together cover
most of the relevant phenomena.
• With recognition-primed decision making, the chooser retrieves
from memory an option that she has used in a previous similar
situation.
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Table 7.1: Experience-Based Choice.
  Steps Support Tactics 
− C applies recognition−primed 
decision making 
  
  C recognizes the situation as one 
that has been encountered in the 
past 
Represent the Choice Situation: Ensure that the current 
situation is recognizably similar to relevant previous 
situations 
Access Information and Experience: Remind C of 
similar past situations 
  C’s experience suggests an option 
that C has applied successfully in 
the past 
Access Information and Experience: Remind C of what 
C has done in similar situations in the past (and whether 
the choices led to success) 
  C chooses this option   
− or C acts on the basis of a habit   
  C chooses the action that is 
triggered by this type of situation 
  
  (If the associations between 
triggers and actions are well 
adapted:) 
Design the Domain: Increase the occurrence of 
triggering situations 
Represent the Choice Situation: Make situations similar 
to the usual triggers 
Evaluate on Behalf of the Chooser: Propose or 
automatically execute actions that have been triggered 
by this situation 
  (If the associations between 
triggers and actions are not well 
adapted:) 
Design the Domain: Reduce the occurrence of 
triggering situations 
Represent the Choice Situation: Make situations 
dissimilar to the usual triggers 
Advise About Processing, Represent the Choice 
Situation, Design the Domain: Encourage C to apply a 
different choice pattern 
− or C chooses a previously 
reinforced response 
  
  C chooses the action that has been 
most effectively rewarded in the 
past in such situations 
Design the Domain: Prevent consequences that unduly 
reward basically undesirable options; and vice versa 
Design the Domain, Represent the Choice Situation: 
Try to ensure that situations in which actions have 
similar consequences resemble each other 
− or C applies the affect heuristic   
  C generates one or more options   
  C chooses an option that evokes 
positive affect 
Advise About Processing: Encourage C to try to 
distinguish between relevant and irrelevant affective 
responses to options 
Represent the Choice Situation: Present options in such 
a way that they evoke (only) choice−relevant feelings 
Design the Domain, Represent the Choice Situation: 
Avoid allowing options to become associated with 
feelings that do not correspond to actual value for C 
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• With habit-based choice, a frequently performed action is trig-
gered by particular features of a situation.
• With reinforcement-based choice, an action is chosen because in
the past it has had consequences that were in some way rewarding
to the chooser, even if he is unaware of the influence of these
consequences on his choices.
• With affect-based choice, an action is chosen which evokes posi-
tive affective associations, which may or may not reflect relevant
positive experiences from the chooser’s past.
Just as the six top-level Aspect choice patterns often occur in
combination, the same is true of these subpatterns. For example, a
teenager’s choice to write text messages while driving can be trig-
gered by particular situations, reinforced by particular consequences,
and associated with positive affect. Still, it is helpful to consider each
subpattern separately, since each one is associated with characteristic
phenomena and support opportunities.1
For each subpattern, we will first summarize some key concepts
and results from research and then consider possible support tactics in
terms of the Arcade model.
7.2 Recognition-Primed Decision Making
7.2.1 Key Points From Research
Origin in Research on Naturalistic Decision Making
One well-known line of research was conducted within the research
paradigm of naturalistic decision making (see, e.g., Klein, 1998; Maule,
2010). This type of decision making is typified by the situation of a fire
brigade arriving at the scene of a burning building: The problem situ-
ation is changing rapidly over time, even as the decision makers think
about how to deal with the fire; there is considerable stress because of
the high stakes and because of environmental factors such as noise and
1A variety of additional perspectives, organized in terms of the concept of routines
of decision making, can be found in the collection by Betsch and Haberstroh [2005a].
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heat; and on the positive side, the decision makers typically have long
experience in dealing with such situations, which makes it unnecessary
for them to analyze the problem from first principles.
Klein and collaborators developed the concept of recognition-primed
decision making in contexts like these. On the basis of previous re-
search on decision making, most of it in the laboratory, Klein had
expected that decision makers like fireground commanders would typi-
cally consider two possible courses of action before deciding which one
to execute—–in our terms, that they would apply the consequence-
based pattern. They were surprised to find that usually the “decision
makers” seemed not to be making decisions at all: Most often, they
would look at the situation confronting them, remember a course of
action that they had previously applied in one or more similar situ-
ations, and proceed to execute that action. As Table 7.2 indicates, a
somewhat more complex variant of this basic procedure was observed
in cases where a contemplated action was not obviously appropriate:
The decision maker would anticipate the consequences of the action by
a process called mental simulation and if necessary modify it until the
mental simulation produced a satisfactory result—in effect introducing
and evaluating alternative options that were based on the originally
considered option. In a small fraction of cases, the decision makers re-
ally did find it necessary to start with (and maybe modify) two or more
different options before arriving at a satisfactory course of action. In
terms of the Aspect model, the first procedure sketched in Table 7.2
instantiates the experience-based pattern, while the other two involve
an increasing number of elements of the consequence-based pattern.
Some of the characteristics that make recognition-primed decision
making ecologically rational (3.5) are: (a) the decision maker has a
great deal of experience with previous similar situations; and (b) there
is no time available for exhaustive generation and comparison of the
alternative options.
These two conditions often apply as well to users of computing tech-
nology, though the time pressure is usually due not to a dynamically
changing emergency situation but rather to a need to proceed briskly
with the activities that really interest the user.
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Table 7.2: Three forms of recognition-primed decision making. (Summarized on
the basis of Klein, 1998, chap. 3.)
Straightforwardly retrieve an action 
Experience the situation. 
Recognize it and identify a typical action for that situation. 
Execute that action. 
Retrieve, evaluate, and modify an action 
Experience the situation. 
Recognize it and identify a typical action for that situation. 
Evaluate that action via mental simulation. 
Until it seems likely to work in its familiar form, modify it and evaluate it again. 
When satisfied, execute it. 
Make sense of the situation and consider more than one action 
Experience the situation. 
Try to make sense of the situation until you have identified it as matching a 
familiar pattern. 
Generate one or more plausible actions for this type of situation. 
Evaluate each action via mental simulation, modifying it if necessary, until you 
have found one that seems likely to work. 
Execute the selected action. 
Example From HCI Research
The importance of reusing previous choices was discussed in an influ-
ential article by Carroll and Rosson [1987] on the problem of method
selection (cf. Table 2.1). The authors began with the observation
that computer users often persist in employing a relatively inefficient
method to perform a given task even when they have more efficient
methods available. One of the two explanations that the authors of-
fered was assimilation bias: The authors noted that, if users can imme-
diately think of an adequate method for performing a given task, they
are inclined to use that method instead of taking the trouble to search
for a better method.
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7.2.2 Support Opportunities
One step at which support can be provided is the one at which the
chooser recognizes the situation as being one that they have some past
experience with. One way to facilitate this recognition is to try to en-
sure that situations that are similar in terms of their choice implications
actually look similar to the user—an application of the strategy Repre-
sent the Choice Situation. This idea is related to the concept of encoding
specificity in connection with the psychology of episodic memory (see,
e.g., Tulving, 1983, for a psychological treatment and Gardiner, 1987
for a discussion of implications for user interface design): It is easier to
recall the answer to a question if the way the question is presented is
similar to the ways in which it was presented while you were learning
the material in question in the first place.2
For example, if a user has acquired particular privacy-related habits
while using photo-sharing sites, it will be helpful if situations that are
equivalent in terms of their privacy implications also look the same.
This point may be considered the preferential choice version of a point
that is more familiar in connection with skill acquisition (which largely
involves nonpreferential choice): When a new version of a software ap-
plication changes the layout of a user interface in such a way that
situations now look different from their earlier functional equivalents,
users will not be able to apply their acquired skills as fluently, partly
because the familiar triggers for their habitual behavior are no longer
available. This fact is one source of irritation that follows software ver-
sion upgrades that make major changes to the user interface (e.g., the
introduction in 2013 of Apple’s iOS 7). It is simply a bit less obvious
that preferential choices can likewise be triggered by superficial envi-
ronmental features.
A related application of the strategy Represent the Choice Situation
is to ensure that the key features of the current situation that should
cause it to be classified as a trigger for a choice are easily recognizable.
If a user is accustomed to taking a particular action when their hard
2For this reason, students tend to perform better on an exam if it is held in the
classroom in which they originally learned the material.
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disk is almost full, it should help if there is some easily perceivable
indication when this state has arisen.
7.3 Habit-Based Choice
7.3.1 Key Points From Research
A familiar way in which people’s choices are based directly on their past
experience is when they act out of habit. The topic of habits is one of the
oldest in psychology, but it continues to be an active area of research,
bringing forth new theoretical perspectives, many of which now make
use of neuropsychological concepts and research methods (see, e.g.,
Fu and Anderson, 2006; Bayley et al., 2005). For HCI researchers, a
useful synthesis is found in an article by Wood and Neal [2007],3 who
characterize habits as follows:
Habits are learned dispositions to repeat past responses.
They are triggered by features of the context that have
covaried frequently with past performance, including per-
formance locations, preceding actions in a sequence, and
particular people. Contexts activate habitual responses di-
rectly, without the mediation of goal states. (p. 813)
Though the ability to be triggered independently of any particular
goal is a characteristic feature, habits can also interact with goals in
various ways (Table 7.3), which are of particular interest to interaction
designers who wish to take into account—or influence—habit-based be-
havior. The ways in which goals control habits are relevant to attempts
to help users form appropriate habits or to leverage habits that they
already have. The ways in which habits can conflict with goals are rele-
vant, for example, to attempts to induce users not to act in accordance
with an existing habit.
The topic of habits has been attracting increasing attention in the
HCI field (see, e.g., Oulasvirta et al., 2012). From the point of view of
the Aspect model, focusing a great deal of attention on this particular
3Another useful compact discussion is given in the first few pages of
Verplanken et al. [2005].
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Table 7.3: Forms of interaction between habits and goals. (Formulated on the basis
of Figure 1 of Wood and Neal, 2007.)
Relationship Between Goals and 
Habits 
Example 
1. Goals control habits 
A person may intentionally form a 
habit. 
"I’ll back up my computer every evening 
just before leaving the office, so as to get 
into the habit of backing it up once a day 
...." 
A person’s goal−directed behavior 
may lead to the formation of a habit, 
without the person having any such 
intention. 
"I decided on several days in a row to start 
my day by checking Facebook messages; 
and it became a bad habit." 
2. Habits give rise to (inferences about) goals 
A person can observe his own 
habitual behavior and make 
inferences about his own goals. 
"I guess I assign high priority to good 
spelling and grammar: I always check the 
language of every email message carefully 
before sending it off." 
These inferences can in turn give rise 
to new goals. 
"... So I guess I should spend more time 
proofreading my scientific articles before 
submitting them." 
3. Habits can conflict with goals 
A person is sometimes aware that 
some habitual behavior of hers 
conflicts with a goal that she has. 
"I really have more important things to do 
at the beginning of each day than checking 
my Facebook messages." 
But this awareness is not in itself 
enough to overcome the habitual 
behavior; two strategies are often 
successful: 
A. Actively and effortfully resist 
performing the undesired habitual 
response. 
"I’m going to ignore the Facebook 
notification that just arrived!" 
B. Change the situation so that you 
are no longer exposed to the cues 
that trigger the behavior. 
Disable automatic notification about 
incoming Facebook messages; disable 
your entire Facebook account. 
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subpattern of the experience-based pattern—or indeed on any other
single pattern or subpattern—brings with it the danger that alternative
explanations and support opportunities will be overlooked (cf. 3.1).
7.3.2 Support Opportunities
Arranging for Appropriate Triggers
The tactic mentioned in connection with recognition-primed decision
making of making fundamentally similar situations look recognizably
similar is even more applicable in connection with habit-based choice,
because in the latter case the chooser typically spends even less time
classifying the situation and retrieving a relevant action. Within email
clients, one benefit of clearly representing a number of attributes of
each message using icons and colors is that this type of display makes
it easier for a user to form and execute habits concerning how to deal
with particular types of message: A particular combination of visual
features associated with a message on the computer screen can come
to serve as a trigger for a particular way of dealing with it.
System Automation of Routine Behaviors
The fact that habitual behaviors are relatively predictable makes it pos-
sible to automate them in some cases—an application of the strategy
Combine and Compute. For example, if a user habitually sorts email
from immediate family members into a folder called “Family”, she can
define a sorting rule in her email client that either sorts these messages
automatically or offers to do it on approval by the user. For users who
don’t want to take the time to define rules of this type, or who lack the
knowledge of how to do so, a reasonably intelligent email agent (see,
e.g., McCreath et al., 2005) can automatically learn the rules.4
This type of support is different from most we have seen so far in
that it doesn’t necessarily help the chooser to make a better choice; the
result is after all supposed to be the same as if the chooser had done
the sorting manually. Still, there is some choice support in the sense
4See Jameson and Gajos [2012, p. 434–435] for a brief overview, with further
references, of systems that help users to automate routine tasks.
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that the effort required from the user to make the choice is reduced
or eliminated. In some cases, the automated procedure can make the
choices more consistently than the person whose behavior the choices
are based on, but the opposite may also be true, depending on how
easily automatable and learnable the chooser’s habitual behavior is. In
either case, if we recall (from 3.6.1) that one of the characteristics of
a good choice process is that it makes effective use of the chooser’s
resources, then even simply reducing choice effort can be considered
worthwhile.
Helping the User to Avoid Undesirable Triggers
Whereas so far we have discussed ways of supporting processes of rou-
tinization, we should also note that the most helpful approach can
sometimes be to help a chooser overcome routines. The most familiar
examples involve bad habits that a person would like to break but has
difficulty breaking. A good deal of the research done in the persuasive
technology area aims at helping people to abandon unsatisfactory be-
havior patterns like these and replace them with new ones. This work
will be discussed in a bit more detail in Section 9.
One general approach is to encourage and facilitate the use of other
Aspect choice patterns, which are likely to lead to different choices.5
An example is the sort of calorie counter mentioned later in 9.3.1, which
essentially aims to replace experience-based eating with policy-based
and consequence-based eating by making it easier to apply the latter
two patterns.
7.4 Choice Based on Instrumental Conditioning
A form of experience-based choice that has most famously been stud-
ied in animals is instrumental conditioning (sometimes called operant
conditioning).6 This pattern was brought to wide attention in the first
5This approach can be seen as a subtle application of the strategy Advise About
Processing.
6Accessible treatments of instrumental conditioning, which provide more detail
about all of the points made in this subsection, can be found in psychology textbooks
such as those of Lieberman [2012, chaps. 4–6] and Gluck et al. [2014, chap. 5].
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half of the 20th century by behaviorist psychologists like Edward Lee
Thorndike and B. F. Skinner. The basic idea is that, when a chooser
acts in a particular way in a particular situation (e.g., responding to
a message that he has received while driving) and the behavior has
consequences that are in some sense positive, the probability increases
that he will act the same way the next time this situation arises (and
vice versa if the consequences are negative, though the relationship is
not entirely symmetric).
7.4.1 Key Points From Research
An important point here is that it is often not obvious what conse-
quences of an action serve to increase its probability. Intuitively, we
might think that these would be pleasant or otherwise rewarding con-
sequences; but concepts like these are too vague to be useful. Instead,
the concept of a reinforcer is used: A consequence of behavior is a re-
inforcer if it increases the probability that the same behavior will be
shown in similar situations in the future. (Similarly, a punisher is a con-
sequence that tends to decrease the probability.) This conception does
not make the idea of instrumental conditioning circular: Once it has
been determined what consequences function as reinforcers for a given
person (or animal) in a given situation, the falsifiable prediction can
be made that these particular consequences will increase the likelihood
of that behavior in similar situations in the future.
Though this conception conforms with common sense, its implica-
tions and applications are less obvious than you might think, for several
reasons:
1. Consequences that do and do not function as reinforcers and
punishers are not always the ones that we might intuitively expect.
To give a frequently cited example: A teacher who thinks that she is
punishing a particular undesirable behavior of a child by scolding him
is often actually reinforcing the behavior by devoting more attention
to the child than he would receive otherwise. Hence one general lesson
from instrumental conditioning is that we often need to be careful to
find out what reinforcers and punishers are really operating in a given
context.
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2. A chooser is often completely unaware of some of the contingen-
cies of reinforcement (i.e., relationships between behaviors and rein-
forcements and punishments) that shape his choices; and when these
influences are brought to his attention, the chooser often says that he
would not want to be influenced by any such consequences of his be-
havior. This fact implies that particular reinforcers and punishers are
in some cases best viewed as sources of bias or noise that should be
eliminated if possible (cf. 4.7.1).
3. The effects that reinforcers have on behavior can depend strongly
on their exact placement in time. Every dog owner knows that an imme-
diately presented reward or punishment will generally be more effective
than one that is delayed. But less intuitively understandable relation-
ships have also been uncovered. For example, reinforcement that is in-
termittent and unpredictable (such as that which occurs in gambling)
has a surprisingly powerful effect relative to constant or predictable re-
inforcement, often causing the chooser to keep exhibiting the behavior
even when the rate of reinforcement has become very low. Research on
schedules of reinforcement, most of which was conducted with animals
like pigeons, has yielded a wealth of knowledge that is sometimes useful
in connection with human choices.
7.4.2 Support Opportunities
When the goal of the choice architect is persuasion rather than choice
support (1.2.2), it’s pretty obvious how instrumental conditioning can
be put to use: Arrange for the computing technology to provide rein-
forcement and punishment in such a way as to encourage or discourage
particular behaviors. This type of intervention falls under the strategy
Design the Domain, since it involves changing the consequences that
particular actions have. And indeed, instrumental conditioning is a fre-
quently applied tactic in persuasive technology (see, e.g., Fogg, 2003,
chap. 3) and educational computing (where students are rewarded in
various ways for achieving learning goals). More generally, one rea-
son why designers of interactive applications try in so many ways to
create rewarding user experiences is that they (whether explicitly or
not) expect these experiences to serve as reinforcers that will increase
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the likelihood of people choosing to use their applications. Efforts of
these sorts sometimes make skillful use of principles of instrumental
conditioning. Interaction designers who are not aware that they are
applying instrumental conditioning should be able to benefit from ac-
quiring more knowledge about the relevant principles and application
methods.
But since in this publication we are focusing on the goal of helping
users choose for themselves, it is more relevant here to consider how
bias and distortion can be reduced (4.7.1) through careful attention to
processes of instrumental conditioning.
One approach is to look out for cases where a user action has a
reinforcing or punishing consequence that plays more of a role in influ-
encing the user’s choices than it deserves to play. Suppose, for example,
that a mobile application offers two virtual keyboards for text entry,
each of which is well suited for a particular situation (e.g., mobile ver-
sus stationary use). Suppose also that the use of Keyboard A has an
immediate and consistent reinforcing consequence—due to its pleasing
visual appearance—that causes people systematically to prefer it to
Keyboard B even in cases where B is superior in terms of important
consequences such as text entry speed and error avoidance. We might
determine that the pleasing appearance of A is having more influence
on users’ choices then they would probably want it to have on reflec-
tion, because its effectiveness as a reinforcer is out of proportion to its
actual importance. In this case, we could consider applying the strategy
Design the Domain to make A less visually appealing, since doing so
would tend to level the playing field for the choice between A and B.
(Less controversially, we could make an extra effort to improve the vi-
sual appeal of B for the same purpose, even if it didn’t seem worthwhile
to do so otherwise.)
A different way in which an option can be more reinforcing than it
deserves to be is because of schedules of reinforcement. Activities like
gambling, playing computer games, and participating in social networks
are addictive partly because of the schedules on which they offer rein-
forcement. If our goal is to help people make satisfying choices between
such activities and other available activities, it may be justifiable to ap-
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ply the strategy Design the Domain by avoiding or prohibiting sched-
ules of reinforcement that incline people strongly to repeat a given
behavior. Note that we need not have the goal of biasing people away
from choosing a particular option; we simply want to prevent an unde-
sired bias from occurring. If the users in question choose to continue to
play a particular game or to participate in a social network even after
its addictive character has been eliminated, we will have no reason to
object to that outcome.
7.5 Affect-Based Choice
Past choices can influence subsequent choices somewhat less directly
than by suggesting specific options that can be executed: They can
lead to the formation of affective associations with options, which can
in turn suggest which option should be chosen. For example, consider
a user who has purchased software products from a vendor X and has
had unpleasant experience with them: When she sees the logo of vendor
X in a display of possible software products, she is likely to experience
some sort of negative feeling. Especially if the bad experience lies far in
the past, the user may have no recollection of the specific experience;
the negative affective response constitutes a compact summary of the
previous experience, which guides the user away from choosing the
same software vendor.
7.5.1 Key Points From Research
Making a choice on the basis of affective responses like these is known
in common parlance as deciding on the basis of “gut feelings”. A more
scientific account (Slovic et al., 2002) characterizes this subpattern as
the affect heuristic, which the authors explain as follows:
. . . representations of objects and events in people’s minds
are tagged to varying degrees with affect. In the process
of making a judgment or decision, people consult or refer
to an “affect pool” containing all the positive and nega-
tive tags consciously or unconsciously associated with the
representations.
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Another well-known line of research on this topic was initiated by
Antonio Damasio (Damasio, 1994), who introduced the concept of a
somatic marker to denote affective responses of this type.
Although the affect heuristic immediately suggests processing in
an intuitive mode (3.4), note that it is also possible for a chooser to
reason analytically about the signals provided by his gut feelings (“I
don’t know why, but my gut tells me . . . ”).
7.5.2 Support Opportunities
The affect heuristic works best when the feelings evoked by the avail-
able options reflect relevant past experience with those options. Unfor-
tunately, affective responses can be due to factors other than relevant
previous experience. The most obvious example is the way in which
advertisers repeatedly associate attractive stimuli with their products,
so that a presentation of the product will evoke positive affect even
if the prospective customer has had no direct experience—or negative
experience—with the product (see, e.g., De Houwer, 2009).
Here again, the interaction designer who aims to support choice
can try to do the opposite thing: Avoid creating irrelevant affective
associations with options before the time of choice; and at the time of
choice, present options in such a way that they tend to evoke choice-
relevant feelings and tend not to evoke choice-irrelevant feelings. In
other words, the goal is to maximize the signal-to-noise ratio as far as
the evoked affect is concerned.
In some ways, avoiding the evocation of irrelevant feelings is the eas-
ier task: Although it is sometimes tempting to present items at choice
time together with attractive stimuli such as beautiful smiling young
people, unless such stimuli are well suited to evoke relevant responses,
they are likely just to add affective noise—especially if the stimuli are
distributed unequally among the various available options. Note that
stimuli like these can create noise even for choices that the user will face
only later, at a time at which the irrelevant stimuli are not present. In
fact, in this situation the user may have greater difficulty in appropri-
ately ignoring her positive affective response, because the recognizably
irrelevant stimulus that evokes it is not currently present. To avoid this
112 Experience-Based Choice
type of affective noise is to apply the strategy Access Information and
Experience with the goal of reducing bias (4.7.1).
With regard to the complementary strategy of trying to increase the
strength of relevant affective associations, the same basic idea can be
applied as for reminding the chooser of relevant previous experiences:
Choose a presentation of the option that is likely to be strongly asso-
ciated with the user’s previous experiences. For example, the feeling of
frustration or pleasure that the user experienced while using a particu-
lar application is more likely to be invoked by a typical screenshot of the
application than by a mere textual listing of its name (strategies Access
Information and Experience and Represent the Choice Situation).
8Socially Based Choice
8.1 Introduction to the Pattern
In another important choice pattern, the chooser is guided by the so-
cial context—specifically the examples and expectations established by
other people and the advice that they explicitly give. Like the other
choice patterns, this one is more applicable in some contexts than in
others. For example, a person who has acquired a new computer for
home use might decide using one of the three patterns already dis-
cussed what applications to install, what privacy and security settings
to choose, and how to communicate with friends. When the same person
works at the office, many of these decisions are likely to be influenced
by written or unwritten rules, conventions, or social examples.
Socially based choice is the one of the six choice patterns that seems
to have benefited most dramatically from recent advances in computing
technology. People are connected to other people via technology to
an extent that would have been hard to imagine even 10 years ago.
This connectivity has the potential to amplify all of the forms of social
influence that are discussed in this section. So it might be claimed
that improved support for this choice pattern is not needed—or indeed
that this choice pattern is currently being facilitated excessively at
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Table 8.1: Socially Based Choice.
  Steps Support Tactics 
− C considers examples of the choices 
or evaluations of other persons 
Access Information and Experience: Provide examples 
from relevant people−and/or information that enables C 
to judge their relevance 
Combine and Compute, Represent the Choice Situation: 
Summarize the examples in ways that facilitate their 
interpretation 
Evaluate on Behalf of the Chooser: Provide a 
recommender system that makes use of social 
information 
− or C considers the expectations of 
relevant people 
Access Information and Experience: Provide explicit 
information about expectations 
Evaluate on Behalf of the Chooser: Provide tools that 
take relevant expectations into account (e.g., by 
eliminating from consideration options that do not 
conform to them) 
− or C considers explicit advice 
concerning the options 
Represent the Choice Situation: Avoid the (intentional 
or unintentional) introduction of factors which would 
tend to bias C’s response to the offered advice 
Access Information and Experience, Represent the 
Choice Situation, Combine and Compute: Derive and 
represent information about the credibility of the advice 
giver(s) 
Evaluate on Behalf of the Chooser: Bring C into contact 
with persons who can provide reliable advice 
the expense of other patterns, thereby diminishing people’s inclination
and ability to make choices for themselves. Still, if we carefully consider
how social influence works, we can see some opportunities for improved
support that have not yet been considered as much as they deserve to
be.
8.2 Overview of Forms of Social Influence
The fact that the social environment often exerts a powerful influence
on people’s choices and decisions is known from everyday experience,
and the mechanisms of social influence have been analyzed thoroughly
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Table 8.2: Reasons why people can be influenced by social examples, expectations,
and norms.
Reason to Choose in Accordance With 
Social Influence 
Example: Using the Company’s Social 
Network 
If others set an example (without necessarily expecting you to follow it): 
Their experience is a useful source of 
information. 
"If these coworkers have acquired 
experience with this social network 
and are still using it, their experience 
must have been positive." 
You want to enjoy practical benefits of 
conformity. 
"There will be direct practical benefits 
to being in the same network as my 
coworkers, such as being able to 
exchange information with them 
conveniently." 
You want to feel that you belong to 
their group. 
"If I use the social network, I will feel 
more like a typical employee of this 
company." 
If others expect you to make a particular choice: 
They can reward or punish you. "If I don’t use it, I may be subject to 
disapproval or even concrete 
disadvantages." 
They have a legitimate reason for their 
expectation. 
"The managers in my company have a 
right to expect me to do things like 
this." 
The expectation seems likely to be 
grounded in some sort of insight or 
experience. 
"They wouldn’t expect me to use this 
social network if it were not in my 
own interest." 
in theories from social psychology and sociology. The diverse perspec-
tives are associated with different concepts and terminology.1
1Useful summaries, with references to primary literature, are provided by
Cialdini and Goldstein [2004], Fishbein and Ajzen [2010, chap. 4], and Schultz et al.
[2008]. More popularly written discussions, which include ideas about how to use
social examples and expectations to influence or support people’s choices, are pro-
vided by Ariely [2008, chap. 3]; Cialdini [2007, chap. 4]; and Thaler and Sunstein
[2008, chap. 3].
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The summary in Table 8.2 summarizes in everyday terms some com-
monly accepted ideas, which will be discussed in the rest of this section.
The key message of this table is that there are several distinct reasons
why choosers might want to take into account what other people do
and think. To fail to recognize these different reasons for social influ-
ence is to miss out on opportunities to enable users to make effective
use of social information.
8.3 Social Examples
8.3.1 Key Points From Research
We can speak of social examples in cases where the chooser takes into
account what other people do or think without being concerned about
what these other people think that the chooser himself ought to do.
1. The most obvious reason why it makes sense for a chooser to
take social examples into account is that these other people are likely
to know something that she doesn’t know. For example, the ratings
that other users have provided of a given software application are sup-
posed to be based on their experience in using it. This information
can therefore serve as a surrogate for experience that the chooser could
in principle acquire for herself by applying the trial-and-error-based
pattern—though it differs in important ways from such experience.
Other types of social example, such as the number of downloads or
purchases of the application, reflect experience with the options less
directly, since these actions tend to have occurred before the persons
in question had acquired much experience with the options.
2. A second reason why social examples can be relevant is that it
can be practically useful to do the same thing that other people do.
For example, by using a video editing tool that many other people
use, you will in general be more likely to find people with whom you
can exchange software extensions and ideas about how to use the tool.
Where the chooser is interested in this type of consequence, he is ac-
tually applying the consequence-based pattern (Section 6) and using
social information as a cue for making a prediction about a particular
type of consequence.
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3. On a more subjective level, following the social examples provided
within a particular group can increase a person’s sense of identification
with that group—a consequence that is sometimes more important
than the objective consequences (as when the choice concerns a ringtone
for your smartphone).
As can be seen in Table 8.2, these three reasons for following social
examples can all be relevant at the same time, a fact which helps to
explain why the influence of social examples is often strikingly strong.
But it is still worthwhile to distinguish these cases, just as we found
it worthwhile to distinguish four subpatterns of the experience-based
pattern, because the reasons for following social examples are not al-
ways applicable at the same time and they are associated with different
support opportunities.
8.3.2 Support Opportunities
Contemporary websites and applications often offer a great deal of
information about what other users have done and/or how they have
evaluated their experiences. Commercial websites show distributions of
product ratings and reviews. Media exchange websites show how often
an item has been downloaded or viewed and how many others have
“liked” it. Providing this information involves applying the strategies
Access Information and Experience, Represent the Choice Situation,
and Combine and Compute to help the chooser answer the question
“What choices or evaluations have the relevant people made in this
situation?”
Although this form of support is now ubiquitous, there are still
types of choice to which it has yet to be applied For example, there
appears to have been little follow-up on the suggestion made more
than two decades ago by Mackay [1991] on the basis of her study of
customization that “users want information about their own use and
that of other people with similar job responsibilities and attitudes [on]
which they can base their customization decisions” (p. 159). Given
that choosing among different possible configurations for a software
application is inherently more complex than choosing among competing
products that are clearly described on a website, it is regrettable that
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socially based choice support for configuration decisions has not been
explored more thoroughly.
In contexts where the goal of the choice architect is persuasion—
for example, encouraging people to save energy—the provision of social
examples has become a widely used technique. For example, house own-
ers may be informed about how much energy other comparable house
owners consume. As long as the information presented is accurate and
unbiased, it can be seen as a form of choice support rather than per-
suasion. And in fact, it is sometimes observed that the recipients of this
type of information adapt their choices in the “wrong” direction: Peo-
ple who have been consuming less energy than their peers sometimes
increase their consumption.
From the point of view of choice support, the goal is not to shift
choices in a particular direction but rather to enable choosers to make
good use of social information. The discussion above suggests several
ways in which this type of information can be made more useful than
it often is.
A step in this choice pattern which is less frequently addressed but
which is important in connection with the one just mentioned is the
step where the chooser in effect wonders “What people should I con-
sider to be relevant to this choice?”. The types of information just men-
tioned often come from some sample of people that has limited and/or
unknowable relevance to the current chooser’s choice. A positive ex-
ception is found in e-commerce sites, like booking.com, which enable a
user to view reviews and ratings that have been supplied by members
of a particular subpopulation, such as “business travelers”. Here, in ad-
dition to applying the strategy Access Information and Experience, the
system is applying the strategies Combine and Compute and Represent
the Choice Situation to make the social information available to users
in an easily interpretable form.
In principle, this idea could be generalized to other types of in-
formation about social examples: A user of a video sharing site could
be allowed to specify that information about downloads and ratings
should be shown only for persons who are especially relevant to the
current user, for example because they share demographic characteris-
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tics or have exhibited similar choice patterns in the past. To offer this
sort of option would involve borrowing some relevant techniques from
the field of recommender systems, mentioned below in this subsection.
Where this sort of person sampling is impractical, a simpler alterna-
tive would be to supply some sort of indication of the characteristics of
the sample of persons whose responses are being summarized. A report
such as “233 likes” could be accompanied by a hyperlink to a graphic
showing the distribution of age and nationality of the 233 respondents.
Note that the relevant reference group does not necessarily comprise
people who are similar to the chooser. If a chooser desires to identify
with or become part of some new group (as in the case of a new user of
a complex application who wants quickly to become an expert), then
that group may be the most relevant one.
Similarly, if one reason why the user is interested in what other
people have chosen is that the user wants to collaborate with these
other people (cf. the second row in Table 8.2) then the relevant reference
group is the group of potential collaborators, regardless of how similar
they may or may not be to the current chooser.
Instead of presenting this type of information to choosers and al-
lowing them to interpret it, a system can use this information itself
as a basis for recommending particular options, using algorithms from
the recommender systems field that make use of social information in
sophisticated ways (see, e.g., Ekstrand et al., 2011). Instead of taking
the task of interpreting social information entirely out of the chooser’s
hands, the recommender system can take over only the winnowing
phase (5.3), proposing a number of options and accompanying them
with summaries of the relevant social information, maybe together with
other information. In this way, the chooser is enabled to evaluate the so-
cial information herself regarding the most promising candidates—and
also to apply other choice patterns (e.g., the attribute-based pattern)
when making the final choice.
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8.4 Social Expectations
8.4.1 Key Points From Research
Note that most of the social information discussed so far does not di-
rectly reflect social expectations. The fact that 2 million people have
downloaded a particular smartphone application does not necessarily
imply that anyone would think ill of you if you chose a different appli-
cation instead.
By contrast, we speak of social expectations when it is of interest to
the chooser what other people think that he ought to do (even if they
will not necessarily find out what he chooses to do). One important
class of social expectations comprises norms that specify what forms
of behavior in a given culture are considered desirable or acceptable.
But there also exist innumerable (often unstated) norms within smaller
groups, such as online communities (11.4.2) or working groups.
There are several reasons why it is worthwhile to distinguish social
expectations from social examples:
1. It is possible for a chooser to be aware of social expectations even
in the absence of social examples. A company’s management can make
it clear that they expect employees to refrain from accessing social net-
works during working hours without providing any information about
the current prevalence of this behavior (which might in fact deviate
strongly from the expectation).
2. The reasons for conforming to social expectations are in part
different from the reasons for following examples. As is noted in the
second part of Table 8.2, the chooser can fear negative consequences
of failure to conform to expectations, for example in the form of dis-
approval by others; or she may simply consider the expectations to
be legitimate and therefore consider it natural to conform to them
even in the absence of any particular anticipated benefit. There are
sometimes more specific reasons than these two that apply in particu-
lar contexts. When, for example, the expectations in question concern
privacy-related behavior (cf. 12.4), a chooser may decide to conform to
a disclosure-limiting norm in order to avoid upsetting others, even if he
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is not concerned about any negative consequences of violation of the
norm for himself.
8.4.2 Support Opportunities
Here are some ways in which social expectations are sometimes reflected
in current systems, which thereby address the question “How would the
relevant people want me to choose?”:
• Explicit statements of norms that are intended to govern behavior
in a given domain.
For example, discussion forums often describe explicit norms that
the forum owner expects to be fulfilled (see 11.4.1).
• More specific explicit statements in reviews or blogs reflecting
social expectations (e.g., “Anybody who uses this app must be
weird”).
• Social feedback about a particular choice or behavior.
If a user of a social network receives negative feedback about a
contribution that she has made—even only in the form of ratings
such as “likes” and “dislikes”—then this feedback can be inter-
preted as reflecting an expectation that the type of contribution
that she has made is socially desired or disapproved of.
• Often, only social examples are presented, and it is left to choosers
to judge for themselves whether corresponding expectations exist.
(“Most people seem to be using App A; do they expect me to use
it as well?”)
Given the importance of social expectations in some contexts, the
practice of providing explicit information about expectations may be
worth considering even in contexts in which it is not commonly applied.
For example, instead of providing information on how other people have
rated an item themselves, a system might provide information about
how people evaluate the choice of an item when it is made by someone
else (e.g., by summarizing answers to questions like “What do you think
of people who buy this app?”).
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A relatively easy-to-convey type of social expectation is the kind
that corresponds to an explicit policy of a group to which a user be-
longs. For example, a company may explicitly encourage its employees
to use particular software products or to apply particular security prac-
tices. Straightforward methods for making people aware of such expec-
tations include explicitly reminding the users of the expectation (e.g.,
“Please don’t print this email unless it is really necessary”; “Use the
train for your business trip unless there is some special reason to use
your car”). But if the users also make use of other forms of choice sup-
port (e.g., a travel website for planning a business trip) such statements
of expectations may be hard to integrate with other considerations. A
more ambitious possibility is to include the policies and expectations in
question as part of the overall choice support procedure. For example,
a travel website can be adapted to take a company’s travel policies into
account, either eliminating incompatible options from consideration or
explicitly marking them as such.
8.5 Explicit Advice
A type of “social influence” that is studied in other areas of social psy-
chology concerns recommendations by individual persons (or in some
cases, by institutions such as professional associations). In contrast to
more diffuse social expectations, such recommendations are explicit
messages concerning the advisability of adopting some option that are
provided by a more or less identifiable individual and that may (or
may not) be directed specifically at a particular chooser. In connection
with the use of computing technology, typical recommendations would
be (a) reviews of software available on the web or in app stores or (b)
advice given by a member of a user group on a web forum about how
best to use a given application.
8.5.1 Key Points From Research
The most relevant psychological research here is research on persuasion
(see, e.g., Cialdini, 2007; Johnson et al., 2005; and Bohner et al., 2008
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for useful syntheses).2 It would be impractical to summarize even briefly
this vast research literature, but we can mention a couple of especially
relevant topics.3
Part of this literature covers empirical phenomena and associated
tactics that are mainly relevant in the case where the goal of the advice
giver is to induce a person to comply with the advice, with little regard
for whether doing so is in that person’s own interest. Examples of such
compliance tactics, as discussed in the popularly written and widely
used compendium of Cialdini [2007], include:
• Liking: Make the advice giver appear likable.
• Scarcity: Create the impression that the recommended option will
be available for only a limited time.
• Reciprocation: Create a sense of obligation in the advice taker by
doing something nice for him.
• Commitment and consistency: Create the impression that the ad-
vice taker would be acting inconsistently with her own previous
behavior or commitments if she didn’t follow the advice.
A related line of research that has special relevance to choice ar-
chitecture for HCI concerns the credibility of an advice giver. To what
extent is the advice giver perceived as being knowledgeable and unbi-
ased? Studies of the credibility of entire websites (see, e.g., Fogg, 2003,
chap. 7) have revealed a number of specific cues that people use to
judge a site’s credibility, including some cues whose relevance is not
intrinsically obvious, such as the presence of typographical errors and
the recency of the last update.
2A different line of research, which concerns situations in which there
is interaction between a professional advisor and a client, is exemplified by
Jungermann and Fischer [2005].
3The interested reader is referred for deeper discussion to the literature on per-
suasive technology, where authority figures and simulated social agents constitute
important means of persuasion; see, for example, Fogg [2003, chap. 5].
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Figure 8.1: Partial screenshot from amazon.com showing information relevant to
the credibility of a product reviewer.
8.5.2 Support Opportunities
One way to exploit knowledge about manipulative compliance tactics
is to try to ensure that they are not unintentionally introduced in a
way that biases the choice toward one option over others (cf. 4.7.1).
For example, if two or more persons are presented who offer conflicting
advice concerning the available options, we can try to ensure that the
advice givers are represented as being about equally likable and that
the other compliance-inducing factors, if present at all, are present to
an approximately equal extent across the advice givers. This general
approach can be seen as an application of the strategy Represent the
Choice Situation with the goal of minimizing bias.
With regard to the credibility variable, the situation is more com-
plex, since it is in general more difficult to equalize true credibility
among advice givers. Here, the goal is to enable a chooser to judge
credibility accurately: neither underestimating credibility and thereby
neglecting a potentially useful source of information nor overestimating
it and potentially falling for a biased sales pitch. A number of methods
for enabling credibility assessment of individuals have been developed,
some of which can be found in conjunction with product reviews, such
as: the number of reviews contributed, the possession of any special sta-
tus such as that of an expert reviewer, and information as to whether
the person has actually purchased the product about which advice is
being given (see, e.g., Figure 8.1).
An alternative to the provision of credibility information is to help
users get in touch with people who are especially likely to be credi-
ble. Systems called (among other things) expert finders can help with
8.5. Explicit Advice 125
both preferential and nonpreferential choices (see, e.g., the summary
in Jameson and Gajos, 2012, p. 444). Since they take over some of the
work of evaluating potential advice givers, they can be seen as realiz-
ing the strategy Evaluate on Behalf of the Chooser with regard to the
subproblem of finding a good source of advice.
With some social networks, such as LinkedIn, helping people to
find credible sources of advice is one of the core functions offered.
9Policy-Based Choice
9.1 Introduction to the Pattern
The discussion so far has presupposed implicitly that a chooser is mak-
ing one choice at a time. But it often makes sense for a chooser to think
ahead and plan a number of interrelated choices (Table 9.1): A user who
has just installed new backup software might decide in advance that
he will make an incremental backup every evening just before leaving
work. A Facebook user may decide once and for all to ignore all noti-
fications of the form “X has uploaded a new photo”. In cases like these,
the choices in question are essentially instantiations of the same choice
problem occurring at different times.
We will refer to this type of advance plan concerning multiple future
choices as a policy, even though this term is more frequently used in
connection with organizational decision making, where the policy-based
pattern is especially important.
9.2 Research on Time Bracketing
The most directly relevant research has been conducted under the head-
ing of choice bracketing (see, e.g., Read et al., 1999b). Choice bracket-
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Table 9.1: Policy-Based Choice.
  Steps Support Tactics 
− [Earlier:] C arrives at a policy for 
dealing with this type of choice 
Design the Domain: (If policy−based choice is clearly 
desirable:) Make it easy (or even necessary) to specify a 
policy that the system will execute 
Access Information and Experience: Make C aware of 
social expectations that suggest possible policies 
Evaluate on Behalf of the Chooser: Recommend an 
appropriate policy 
Advise About Processing: Encourage C to test possible 
policies against relevant examples 
− [Now:] C recognizes which policy 
is applicable to the current choice 
situation and applies it to identify 
the preferred option 
Evaluate on Behalf of the Chooser: (If C has 
communicated the policy to the system:) Apply the 
policy on C’s behalf to determine the preferred option 
− C determines whether actually to 
execute the option implied by the 
policy 
Design the Domain: Enable C to change the 
environment so as to make deviation from the policy 
impossible 
Design the Domain: Enable C to arrange to be rewarded 
for adherence or punished for deviation 
ing in its general form involves considering a set of choices rather than
individual choices; the set does not necessarily have to be distributed
over time, but for concreteness we will focus on this case, which is
called time bracketing. A type of choice for which policy-based choice
is especially practically important involves maladaptive behaviors such
as unhealthy eating and drug use, where there is typically a contrast
between the action that is most attractive in the short run and the se-
quence of actions that is most beneficial in the long run. Rachlin [2000,
chap. 3] analyzes choices of this type.1
9.2.1 Benefits of Broad Time Bracketing
Taken together, this research has brought to light several typical bene-
fits of what Read et al. [1999b] call broad time bracketing (Figure 9.1).
1Situations where broad bracketing is possible often also involve time discount-
ing (6.8): The benefits of healthy eating appear later than the appealing taste of
the unhealthy snack. But the issues just discussed cannot all be reduced to time
discounting. Rachlin [2000] uses the terms complex ambivalence and simple ambiva-
lence, respectively, to distinguish between the two cases.
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Figure 9.1: Visualization of the distinction between narrow and broad time brack-
eting. (Discussion in text.)
These can be illustrated with the example of a user of a new smart-
phone who can choose between two virtual keyboards each time she
enters text: the traditional QWERTY keyboard or an unfamiliar key-
board that has been optimized for one-handed text input. If she em-
ploys narrow time bracketing (see the top of Figure 9.1), she will make
this choice every time she has a bit of text to enter. With broad time
bracketing (bottom of Figure 9.1), she will adopt a policy such as (a)
“Always use the QWERTY keyboard”; (b) “Always use the alternative
keyboard”; or (c) “Use the alternative keyboard when you have a lot
of text to enter”.
One benefit is that a sequence of choices can have important prop-
erties that the chooser cannot see when contemplating the individual
choices. For example, if the user consistently employs the alternative
keyboard, she will initially enter text more slowly and with greater
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mental effort than with the QWERTY keyboard; but if she persists
long enough, the alternative keyboard will eventually become easier
and faster to use than the QWERTY keyboard. Similarly, the user’s
tastes can change: After a while, she will probably find the appearance
of the alternative keyboard less strange and distracting.
Another emergent property of a sequence of choices is the amount
of variety associated with it: A user might prefer to alternate between
the use of a trackball and the use of a mouse in order to avoid one-sided
use of his hand and arm muscles. In general, when bracketing broadly,
choosers opt for more variety than they do when bracketing narrowly
(see, e.g., Read et al., 1999a).
A more obvious benefit of establishing a policy is that, once it has
been established, the process of making each individual choice is in
general simpler, since the chooser needs only to see which option is
implied by the policy. In HCI contexts, this benefit is often magnified
by the possibility of specifying the policy in such a way that it can
be (semi)automatically executed by the computer; this form of choice
support will be discussed below.
Finally, the application of a policy tends to lead to behavior that is
more predictable, both by the chooser and by others. A user who files
away email according a to a consistent policy will probably have an
easier time refinding messages than a user who thinks about each filing
action separately. And a user who always uses the same word processor
to produce documents makes it easier for collaborators to know what
type of material to deliver to her.
9.2.2 Limitations of Policy-Based Choice
Despite these potential benefits of broad time bracketing, policy-based
choice also has its limitations, which will be illustrated in passing in
the discussions of this pattern below. Most obviously, it is not always
possible or practically feasible to specify a policy that regularly yields
satisfactory choices (though advances in the use of machine learning
in interactive systems are creating new possibilities; cf. 12.5.2). Even if
it is possible, the effort required to come up with a policy or perhaps
to specify it for the computer may not be justified by the benefits—
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especially if the policy needs to be updated regularly because of changes
in the environment or in the chooser’s goals.
9.3 Dimensions of Variation Among Policies
As used in the Aspect model, the term policy covers a rather wide
and partly unfamiliar range of phenomena. To give a clearer idea of its
scope, we discuss two dimensions along which policies can differ.
9.3.1 What Is the Content of a Policy?
1. In some cases, a policy takes the form of a rule that specifies what
particular option will be chosen each time the choice situation in ques-
tion arises, possibly as a function of particular parameters of the situa-
tion (e.g., “Ignore any photo notification unless it comes from a family
member”).
2. In other cases, the policy doesn’t refer to any particular option
but rather specifies a procedure that is to be applied to make the choice,
along with specific criteria (e.g., “When deciding what email messages
to reply to first, give priority to work-related messages and especially
those written by high-level managers”).
3. Some policies specify neither options nor procedures but rather
goals that are to be met repeatedly. Some of the clearest examples come
from the myriad of applications, whose popularity has been increasing
rapidly over the past year or two, that allow users to monitor their
achievement of goals such as eating more healthily or getting more
exercise.2 A policy could specify that the chooser should consume no
more than 1800 calories or take no fewer than 10,000 steps each day. A
benefit of this type of policy is that it replaces a long-term goal, whose
achievement will not be noticeably influenced by any particular action
that the chooser takes, with a concrete, short-term goal that can guide
individual choices.
2Related phenomena involving financial choices have been studied under the label
of mental accounting (see, e.g., Thaler, 1999).
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9.3.2 Does a Policy Necessarily Concern Separate Choices?
Although a policy normally covers separate choices, as in the examples
given above, sometimes a chooser will formulate a policy for dealing
with individual parts of a larger choice task. Consider, for example,
a user who is considering buying a new type of smartphone. He may
decide to look at one smartphone each day for several days, each time
deciding whether or not to buy the phone in question. He may decide
in advance on a policy for evaluating each smartphone (e.g., in terms
of attribute importances or desired levels of attributes; cf. Section 5).
Even though the multiday decision process can be seen as concerning
a single decision—that of which smartphone to buy—the issues that
arise with this type of policy are mostly the same as those for policies
that concern distinct choices.3
Finally, it is sometimes helpful to view as examples of policy-based
choice even situations in which only one choice is being made, if the
option resulting from that choice is going to be executed in the future
(as when a person decides today that she is going to participate in
a particular webinar in 2 weeks). What this type of situation has in
common with other policy-based choice is that the time of forming the
intention and the time of executing the option are separated consid-
erably in time, a circumstance that raises the question of whether the
chooser will actually execute the option in question when it’s time to
do so.
9.4 Support for the Generation of Possible Policies
Consider a new Twitter user who says to himself: “Now that I’ve
joined Twitter, I’d better come up with some rules for deciding what
types of tweet to write, when to write them, when to read tweets sent by
other people, . . . ”. One problem is that the number of possible policies
3Interrelated choices can also concern different questions, as when a user plans
a sequence of qualitatively different actions to migrate their old PC to a newly
purchased one. In these cases, we would normally speak of a plan rather than of a
policy. These cases will not be considered in this work, since the topic of planning
is too large to fit into the scope of this publication.
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with regard to each of these questions can be very large, even if there
are just a few options for each individual choice.
Fortunately, choosers don’t always have to start from scratch when
generating possible policies. Here are some things that they can often
start with:
1. Related policies that the chooser already has: A user who joins a
new online community may already have developed a policy in a
previous community that determines what sorts of contribution
she makes or what sorts of personal information she discloses.
She can then adapt this policy to fit the new community.
2. Social expectations and advice: As will be discussed later in
connection with online communities (11.4.1) and privacy-related
choices (12.5), people like managers of social networking sites of-
ten explicitly recommend or require particular policies. In cases
where these policies are not sufficiently accessible to users, a form
of choice support is to apply the strategy Access Information and
Experience to help advertise the policies or to give feedback on
the extent to which a given user is conforming to them.
3. Policy specification interfaces: Where a system offers a user in-
terface for specifying a policy that is to be executed (semi)auto-
matically, this interface will in general make it easy to specify
some types of policy, more difficult to specify some others, and
impossible to specify anything else. By deciding which types of
policy to support and encourage, the interaction designer is ap-
plying the strategy Evaluate on Behalf of the Chooser, probably
making more use of experience with different policies than any
single user is likely to have (cf. 12.5.2).
4. Experience-based patterns of choice: Section 7 presented four ways
in which recurrent patterns of similar choices (sometimes called
routines) can arise. If the chooser becomes aware of a pattern
like this (e.g., that he always proofreads an email message before
sending it off), he may decide to adopt this routine as a policy (cf.
Table 7.3). Alternatively, if he identifies the routine as an undesir-
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able one, he may formulate a policy with the goal of abandoning
the routine.
A possible form of support here is to enable the chooser to become
more aware of the routines that he has acquired (Access Informa-
tion and Experience). This sort of support is already offered by
innumerable mobile and web-based applications for monitoring
activities like eating and exercising.
9.5 Support for the Evaluation of Possible Policies
Once the chooser has in some way thought of a possible policy (e.g.,
“Always proofread an email message before sending it off”), she may
want to evaluate it somehow before adopting it.
One possibility is to generate example choice situations in which
the policy would apply. This in turn can be done in two ways:
1. Remember relevant choice situations from the past: “If I had
proofread that message to the CEO, it would have saved me a lot
of embarrassment.”
2. Generate hypothetical (perhaps borderline) cases: “What if I’m
writing under great time pressure and the message isn’t so im-
portant?”
As an alternative to this sort of mental evaluation, the chooser can
apply the trial-and-error-based pattern: Start applying the policy, see
how well it works in practice, and where necessary adjust it on the
basis of experience (e.g., after it has yielded a bad result). An example
of a system that explicitly supports this sort of trial and error is the
Locyoution system discussed in 12.6.2. A limitation is that it can
require a good deal of feedback on individual cases to get a reliable
idea of how well a particular policy works.
9.6 Support for the Execution of a Policy
When a policy specifies a goal that the chooser is supposed to achieve on
a regular basis, one simple but effective form of support is to remind
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the chooser of the goal and help him to monitor his achievement of
it. For example, a calorie tracking app will help the user to see how
many calories remain for him to consume today, applying the strategies
Access Information and Experience, Combine and Compute, and maybe
also Evaluate on Behalf of the Chooser (if the system offers specific
recommendations about how to achieve the daily goal). This sort of
self-monitoring is often viewed as a tactic of persuasion (see, e.g., Fogg,
2003, chap. 3), but it can equally well be viewed as a form of choice
support: Even the most highly motivated dieter has to decide somehow
what food to eat each day, and adhering to a particular policy is one
effective way of doing so.
Often, even after a chooser has explicitly adopted a sensible policy,
she can have difficulty in executing the individual choices specified by
the policy when the time comes to do so. Even a user who has resolved
to ignore a particular type of Facebook notification may find it dif-
ficult to resist the temptation to click on a notification of this type if
it arrives while he is engaged in a tedious activity. The key problem is
that the perspective of the chooser faced with an individual choice is
quite different from the perspective of a chooser who is contemplating a
policy—which is in fact an important reason why policies are valuable
in the first place.
One way around this dilemma is to delegate the execution of the
policy to another person or to the computer, a form of support that
was mentioned above.
Another important approach is to set up some sort of commitment
mechanism that will increase the likelihood that the chooser will stick
to a policy. The classic example is Odysseus’ request to be tied to the
mast of his ship so that he would not succumb to the temptations
created by the calls of the Sirens. As this example illustrates, commit-
ment mechanisms are relevant not only for the enforcement of policies
but also as a way of enforcing one-time decisions to perform a partic-
ular action later in time, as was discussed in 6.8.2 in connection with
preference reversals involving smaller-sooner and larger-later benefits.
The implementation of commitment mechanisms constitutes a ma-
jor part of persuasive technology. The fact that we are now consid-
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ering commitment mechanisms as a form of choice support illustrates
once again how choice support and persuasion are often best applied
together. From the point of view of choice support, a commitment
mechanism is a way of enabling a chooser to implement policy-based
thinking, which might otherwise be infeasible and which offers many
potential benefits in terms of the quality of the resulting choices.
Here are two types of commitment mechanism (discussed in Rachlin
[2000, chap. 2]):
• Elimination of the options ruled out by the policy: Often, the
most effective mechanism involves the general strategy Design
the Domain: Build in an opportunity for the user to change her
environment in such a way that it is impossible for her to deviate
from her policy. For example, the highly immersive game World
of Warcraft provides a flexible set of parental controls, which
some adult users apply to constrain their own use of the system.4
• Punishment for noncompliance: When it isn’t feasible to prevent
deviations from the policy entirely, an alternative is to arrange
for deviations to be punished (or adherence rewarded). Although
people and systems sometimes arrange for financial or material
punishment, the threat of social disapproval is often easier to
arrange. When the chooser’s policy was derived from social ex-
pectations, no special action may be needed to get the social envi-
ronment to supply the necessary punishments and rewards: If an
active Wikipedia user doesn’t adhere consistently to the policies
concerning editing behavior that are enforced by the Wikipedia
community, he is likely to suffer negative consequences, possibly
including eventual exclusion from the community. Where the pol-
icy has been devised by the chooser herself and adherence is not
expected by anyone else, the chooser can create the necessary so-
cial expectations by announcing her policy to relevant people. A
drawback of the punishment-based approach is that sometimes
the chooser will ultimately find it more attractive to accept the
punishment than to stick to the policy. In this case, she fails to
4http://www.wowhead.com/forums&topic=178118/balancing-real-life-and-wow
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derive the benefits of the policy and in addition suffers the dis-
advantage of the punishment.
10
Trial-and-Error-Based Choice
10.1 Introduction to the Pattern
Despite their ability to apply all of the five choice patterns that have
been discussed so far, people often find while making a choice that they
don’t really know what option to choose. In many cases, an appropriate
procedure is simply to start by trying out one of the options, especially
if you are reassured by the knowledge that you can switch to another
option if the first one doesn’t seem satisfactory.
Trial and error is especially applicable as a choice pattern in HCI
contexts, partly because computer users are constantly being con-
fronted with new options and partly because it is possible to design
interactive systems in such a way that trial and error can be conducted
effectively and without some of the costs and drawbacks that it often
has in the natural world.
10.1.1 Dimensions of Variation
There are a number of ways in which instantiations of this choice pat-
tern (summarized in Table 10.1) can differ. The first three dimensions
concern the very question of what we mean by “trial and error”:
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Table 10.1: Trial-and-Error-Based Choice.
  Steps Support Tactics 
− C selects an option O to try out, 
either using one of the other choice 
patterns or (maybe implicitly) by 
applying an exploration strategy 
Advise About Processing: Explicitly recommend an 
exploration strategy 
Access Information and Experience: Make available 
information that is relevant to exploration strategies 
(e.g., about the reversibility of actions) 
Design the Domain, Represent the Choice Situation: 
Design and/or arrange the options in a way that 
facilitates various exploration strategies and avoids bias 
in favor of particular strategies 
Evaluate on Behalf of the Chooser: Recommend an 
option to try next 
− C executes the selected option O   
− C notices some of the consequences 
of executing O 
Access Information and Experience: Provide 
information about consequences that are otherwise not 
immediately perceivable, avoiding bias toward 
favorable or unfavorable consequences 
Access Information and Experience, Represent the 
Choice Situation, Combine and Compute: Provide a 
representation of the resulting situation that helps C to 
evaluate its desirability 
Evaluate on Behalf of the Chooser: Suggest an 
evaluation of the resulting situation 
− C learns something from these 
consequences 
Represent the Choice Situation: Represent information 
about consequences (perhaps including those of 
previous trials) so as to facilitate interpretation and 
evaluation of them 
Combine and Compute: Provide a diagnosis of reasons 
for observed consequences (if feasible) 
− (If C is not yet satisfied:) C returns 
to the selection step, taking into 
account what has been learned 
  
1. To what extent is the chooser intentionally engaging in trial and
error?
In the most obvious instantiations of this pattern, the chooser
has no idea in advance which of several available options should
be chosen, so he tries out one or more options with the explicit
goal of learning about the option(s) before making a choice.
At the other end of the spectrum, the chooser arrives at a choice
using one or more of the other five Aspect patterns and has no
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reason to doubt in advance that the chosen option is a good one.
It is only when negative feedback is obtained that the chooser sees
a need to try a different option. And even on the second attempt,
the chooser may think that he now knows what will be best. As
long as the chooser does not see in advance a need to learn from
feedback, he cannot be said to be intentionally engaging in trial
and error; but if he does learn from the feedback that he receives,
he is in effect applying the second part of the trial-and-error-
based pattern. Accordingly, we view this situation as a special
limiting case of the trial-and-error-based pattern.
In between these two extremes, the chooser believes to some ex-
tent that a particular option will be better than others but is
prepared to learn from feedback and maybe try different options
later.
2. To what extent do the trials of options accomplish a single task?
The attempts using different options can accomplish completely
separate tasks (as when different text entry methods are tried
on different occasions); or they may be seen as accomplishing
one task (as when a user switches text entry methods midstream
while entering a particular block of text).
3. How extensive is the experience that the chooser acquires with
the option that she tries out?
Let’s refer to as the full experience of an option all of the expe-
rience with the option that the chooser would consider relevant
when judging retrospectively whether it was a good idea to select
that option. For example if it’s a matter of selecting a website
for acquiring audiobooks, the full experience might be that of
subscribing to the service for a year, acquiring and listening to a
number of audiobooks, and making use of the website’s customer
service when the user encounters a technical problem. When try-
ing out such a website, each user is likely to acquire only partial
experience, such as browsing the site for a while and downloading
and listening to a free trial audiobook. Even simply visiting the
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site for a few seconds to get a first impression of it before moving
on to the next competing website can be seen as an example of
trying a site out, on the grounds that a bit of relevant partial
experience is being acquired (for example, how much fun it is to
look at the site).
By contrast, if all that the chooser does is acquire information
about an option (e.g., by reading a textual description of it or
reviews by other users), we would not speak of “trying the op-
tion out”. Instead, we would say that the chooser is acquiring
information about one or more options before choosing.1
10.1.2 Favorable and Unfavorable Conditions
We can also distinguish four dimensions that concern the question of
how favorable the choice environment is for application of the trial-
and-error-based pattern:
• How much cost is involved in switching between different options
as opposed to sticking with one option?
In some situations, it is difficult or impossible to return to an
option that the chooser has tried in the past and not immediately
accepted.
• How serious are the negative consequences when an option yields
an unsatisfactory result?
Trying out an option can sometimes have significant negative
consequences like having to pay a high price for something that
is not going to be used or disclosing sensitive personal data (see
12.6.1). In more favorable situations, either negative consequences
cannot occur at all or they can be “undone” by the chooser.
1Even in this latter case, some of the points made in this section apply—for
example, concerning the question of the order in which particular options should be
investigated. Despite this more general applicability of the discussion, we will focus
for concreteness on cases where a chooser is acquiring at least partial experience
with one or more options.
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• In particular, to what extent will any benefits obtained through
the use of an option be lost once that option has been abandoned?
When an option is abandoned in favor of another one, it is possi-
ble that something useful that was achieved with the abandoned
option can be retained even after the switch; or the results of us-
ing that option may disappear soon as the option is abandoned.
An example of the latter case would be when a user tries out a
new password management application, entering some passwords
into it, only to discover that (a) he is not satisfied with the ap-
plication and (b) there is no way to export the passwords that he
has entered so that he can access them in some other password
management application.
• To what extent is the choice environment changing over time in
such a way that an option that was desirable at one point in time
may not be desirable at a later time?
Consider a user who is configuring a newly purchased mouse using
the configuration screen shown in Figure 2.1: If she experiments
with different configurations while working on a technical drawing
that is continually getting more complex, then the answer to the
question of which configuration is best may change even as the
user is engaging in trial and error.
10.1.3 HCI Examples
Some instantiations of the trial-and-error-based pattern from the wide
range just defined can be seen in the following examples:
An application selection choice: A user in an app store sees 10 apps
that allegedly have the functionality that he requires. Being unable to
judge on the basis of the descriptions and reviews which one is most
suitable for him, he downloads one app at a time and tries it out (if
possible using a free trial version) until he has found a satisfactory app,
has given up, or has run out of money. The time spent using a given
app may result in some lasting benefit, or everything that was done
with it may have to be discarded.
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A method selection choice: A user is not sure which method of text
entry will work best in a given situation. She starts using Method A,
sees how it goes, switches to Method B, and then maybe switches back
to A if it seems to have been better after all. In this case, the user will
presumably have been entering some text with each method, so the
cost of trial and error need not be very high.
A configuration choice: A user starts with the default configuration
of a new application, tweaks the configuration when some unsatisfac-
tory experience occurs (or some possibility for improvement suggests
itself), and continues to do so, perhaps over a long period of time. The
main difficulties in this case are likely to be that the consequence of a
configuration change are often hard to evaluate, since they depend on
future actions and situations; and (b) the space of options is in princi-
ple huge, since each specific combination of parameter values may have
to be treated as a separate “option”, if the effects of the individual
configuration parameters are not independent of each other.
As can be seen in Table 10.1, there are two main parts of this
pattern, which we will discuss separately:
1. What exploration strategy should the chooser employ?
2. How should the chooser make use of feedback about the conse-
quences of options that he has tried out?
10.2 Research on Exploration Strategies
Exploration strategies have been investigated in various lines of re-
search in different disciplines:
10.2.1 Research on the Relationship Between Exploration and Ex-
ploitation
A fairly recent trend in laboratory research on judgment and decision
making (see, e.g., Rakow and Newell, 2010; Hertwig et al., 2006) con-
cerns decisions from experience:2 It looks at variants of the gambling
2This paradigm is sometimes labeled experience-based choice in the relevant liter-
ature, but we have appropriated that term here as the name of an Aspect pattern.
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paradigm (cf. 6.1.2) in which the probabilities of particular outcomes
are not explicitly provided; instead, the chooser has to infer them by
observing the outcomes of individual choices (made by herself or some-
one else). For example, instead of being told that Option A offers a
10% chance of winning $12 while Option B guarantees a win of $1, a
participant is allowed to click repeatedly on two buttons corresponding
to the two options and to observe the resulting rewards. An important
issue in this sort of situation is the tension between exploration and
exploitation: In order to learn efficiently which of the two options is
preferable, a chooser should in principle systematically “explore” both
of them, trying them out until it is clear which one is better—a process
that may take some time, as in the example just given. But in practice,
once a chooser has the impression, say, that Option B is better, there
is a temptation to “exploit” this insight by consistently choosing B.
Another example of the exploration/exploitation tension is the pro-
duction bias that was described by Carroll and Rosson [1987]: the ten-
dency of computer users to stick with procedures that they already
know instead of experimenting with new ones that might turn out to
be better. Whether or not you want to call it a “bias”, computer users
have to assign some priority to getting things done as opposed to learn-
ing new things.
The exploration/exploitation relationship has attracted a good deal
of attention from neuropsychologists, who have identified brain regions
associated with exploration and exploitation, respectively (see, e.g.,
Cohen et al., 2007, for a review; and Hills et al., 2010).
In the field of machine learning, the question of how to allocate
resources to exploitation of known solutions vs. exploration of new
solutions has been analyzed carefully because of its inescapable im-
portance in this area, especially in the area of reinforcement learning
(see, e.g., Russell and Norvig, 2010, chap. 21). No completely general
solution appears to exist, but interesting results have been achieved
in environments characterized by particular assumptions, such as the
stationary multi-armed bandit environment, in which each of a num-
ber of slot machines yields rewards with some particular probability
distribution.
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10.2.2 Studies of Exploration and Interactive Search in HCI
Some types of exploration behavior in information environments show
characteristics of trial and error. For example, a user searching for
information on a particular topic may read a web page and start fol-
lowing links to subpages from that web page. At some point, the user
may determine that the current line of exploration is unlikely to lead
to success and abandon it, returning to a choice point visited earlier
(e.g., clicking on a different search result to visit a different website).
The best-known model of this general sort of behavior is the informa-
tion foraging model of Pirolli and collaborators (see, e.g., Pirolli, 2007;
Pirolli, 2003; Fu and Pirolli, 2007). For other studies along these lines,
see Young [1998], and Brumby and Howes [2008].3 One recurrent idea
in this area is that the explorer continually reevaluates the promise of
the current line of exploration by processing cues in terms of their in-
formation scent. A frequent recommendation to interaction designers is
that they should try to provide easily interpretable and valid informa-
tion scent. Increasing information scent can involve either applying the
strategy Design the Domain by making options inherently more assess-
able in terms of their potential—for example designing web pages so
that their content immediately reveals what they are about and what
sorts of other pages they lead to—or it can involve the strategy Access
Information and Experience, as when thumbnail previews of webpages
are displayed next to the hyperlinks that lead to them. More generally,
the idea of providing valid cues about the potential of particular op-
tions is one way of helping to support trial and error, in that it makes
it easier for the chooser to see which option is best tried next.
10.2.3 Studies of Decision Making in Organizations
In studies of organizational decision making, it has been noted that
decision makers often engage in a process of conservative exploration
called muddling through (Lindblom, 1959; Lindblom, 1979), in which
they incrementally adapt a policy, often in response to environmental
3Broader overviews of exploratory search in information retrieval are given by
Wilson et al. [2010] and White and Roth [2009].
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changes, whereas they could in principle more systematically and boldly
explore the space of possible policies.
10.2.4 Studies of Sequential Search
One frequently studied type of problem is sometimes called the secre-
tary problem, because it is typified by the task of testing a sequence of
candidates for a secretary position. An example of a specific formula-
tion of a problem of this type is the one given by Zwick et al. [2003]:
Alternatives are inspected in a random order, one at a time,
and only the rank order of the current alternative relative
to the ones that have already been observed can be ascer-
tained. At each period, the consumer may either accept the
current alternative, continue to search and pay a fixed cost,
or recall an alternative that has already been inspected. A
recalled alternative is assumed to be available with a known
probability. The consumer’s goal is to select the overall best
alternative from the fixed set. (p. 503)
Making particular assumptions, it is possible to specify how long
the chooser ought to search and what an optimal exploration strategy
is.
10.3 Support for Exploration
10.3.1 Encouraging Particular Exploration Strategies
Not surprisingly, because of the wide variety of situations that fall un-
der the trial-and-error-based pattern, it is not possible to derive general
recommendations concerning particular exploration strategies from the
research just summarized. But this research does show that the ques-
tion of what is a good exploration strategy is in general not an easy
one and that consequently the selection of an exploration strategy is a
step at which choice support can be especially valuable. An interaction
designer who thinks about possible exploration strategies for a particu-
lar situation can often think of a strategy which (a) is suitable for that
situation but (b) would probably not readily occur to a busy computer
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user. The designer can then either build support for the strategy into
the system (Design the Domain) or recommend it to the user (Evaluate
on Behalf of the Chooser).
Consider, for example, an app store that offers 10 applications that
serve a particular purpose (e.g., the French-English dictionaries from
3.3). Suppose we can assume that the user wants to try applications
in turn until he has found one that exceeds a given threshold of satis-
factoriness; and that a priori all applications have an equal chance of
being satisfactory for him. Under these assumptions, the best explo-
ration strategy is to try out the applications in increasing order of their
cost, since in this way the amount of money the user has to pay before
finding a satisfactory application can be expected to be minimized. A
user might well think of such a strategy without any support, but con-
sider a slightly more complex case, where the more expensive apps have
higher probabilities of being satisfactory (as reflected, for example, in
their higher user ratings). Then the best exploration strategy should
take into account these probabilities, so the determination of the best
order of trying out the options is more complex than in the previous
situation.
An example in which an exploration strategy is recommended to
new users of an online community is given in 11.6.1.
10.3.2 Creating Favorable Conditions for Exploration
An alternative to encouraging a particular exploration strategy is to
create generally favorable conditions for exploration. The favorable and
unfavorable conditions listed above (10.1.2) for trial and error situ-
ations may be partly under the control of the choice architect: For
example, applying the strategy Design the Domain, the designer may
be able to minimize the costs of unsuccessful trials and make it easy
for the chooser to switch from one option to another without a large
cost or loss of intermediate results.
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10.4 Research on Learning From Feedback
10.4.1 Types of Feedback That Can Be Obtained
In connection with the consequence-based choice pattern, we considered
several qualitatively different types of consequence that a computer
user may want to anticipate and evaluate. Similarly, it is worthwhile
to consider what sort of information a user can acquire by trying out
an option and what sort of thing she can learn from it. As we did in
6.6, we will consider the example of a driver who is experimenting with
listening to and dictating email messages.
1. “To what extent did the consequences that I anticipated actually
occur?”
For example, the driver may note that he didn’t enjoy processing
email as much as he had expected but at least he didn’t cause an
accident. This sort of feedback can (a) help the chooser update the
subjective likelihoods that he associates with particular consequences;
(b) make him aware of consequences (e.g., unexpected side effects) that
he had never thought of; and (c) more generally help him to update
his mental model of the causal relationships in the situation.
2. “Do I now evaluate the consequences that occurred in the same
way that I would have evaluated them while anticipating them in ad-
vance?”
Even if the driver processes just as many email messages as he
had expected to, he may end up with a different assessment of how
important it was to get these messages processed quickly.
3. “Did anything happen that was not especially important in itself
but that gives me clues about whether the option I tried was a good
one?”
The driver might notice that he had driven less steadily than normal
and had noticed a stop sign only just in time to stop. Though these
are not consequences that have much weight in themselves, they do
serve as hints that the chooser might well cause an accident in the
future if he continues to execute the same action. Especially when the
consequences that are of primary interest are improbable, temporally
distant, or hard to perceive, this sort of feedback about intermediate
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results can be more informative than feedback about the significant
consequences.
4. “How did other people respond to my action?”
Trying something out is one way to find out about relevant social
expectations (e.g., those of the driver’s family members) that may not
otherwise be knowable.
10.4.2 Norman’s Model of Action
The model of action introduced by Norman [1986], which is well known
in the HCI field, is worth bearing in mind in this context, even though
it was not specifically intended to illuminate processes of preferential
choice. In his discussion of the gulf of evaluation, Norman distinguishes
the phases of perceiving, interpreting, and evaluating the results of an
action. Each of these phases can be seen as a way in which a chooser
may have difficulty in learning from experience in making a certain
type of choice. For example, a person who has acted on a decision to
contribute one paragraph to a Wikipedia article will probably never
know how many people have read the paragraph or how much they
benefited from it. The author may well notice the changes that other
Wikipedia contributors make to the paragraph, but she may interpret
them unrealistically and thereby arrive at an inappropriate evaluation
of her original decision to contribute the paragraph. The following sub-
sections will look in more detail about such difficulties and ways dealing
with them.
10.4.3 Models of Learning From Feedback
A good deal of the psychological research that is relevant to trial-and-
error-based learning has aimed to model in great detail how particular
types of feedback are processed in the human mind and brain (see, e.g.,
Newell et al., 2007, chap. 11; Glimcher and Fehr, 2014, chaps. 15–18).
This research has yielded a remarkable convergence of insights from
theoretical work about learning algorithms, psychological observations
in the laboratory, and neuropsychological research into the neural sub-
strates of learning (e.g., the role of the neurotransmitter dopamine). So
far, though, it is hard to derive from this research implications about
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how to help people learn from feedback when making everyday choices.
The most important difficulties that people have in this context ap-
pear to come not from subtle aspects of the ways in which they process
feedback but rather in the properties of the feedback itself, which have
been studied in a largely separate type of research.
10.4.4 Research on Properties of Feedback
Hogarth [2001] introduced the influential notion of an unfavorable, or
wicked learning structure as opposed to a kind structure when call-
ing attention to differences among environments in terms of the ease
of learning by trial and error.4 On a more general level, research on
problems with the information samples that people have to deal with
has shown that many of the difficulties that people have in dealing
with feedback (and other types of information sample) are due to
limitations of these samples (see especially the collection edited by
Fiedler and Juslin, 2006).
Some specific ways in which a learning environment can be “wicked”
are considered in turn in the following subsection, along with ideas
about how to help choosers deal with these difficulties by applying
support tactics suggested by the Arcade model.
10.5 Combating Typical Problems With Feedback
The first few typical difficulties in processing feedback involve some
kind of difficulty in perceiving the feedback; the remaining ones concern
factors that make it difficult to interpret the feedback and derive lessons
from it with regard to future choices.
10.5.1 Invisible Consequences
Examples of events that the chooser may simply be unable to perceive
are: (a) damage caused by a computer virus as a consequence of an
unwise decision to open a malicious email message; and (b) favorable
or unfavorable subjective responses of other persons to an action by a
4A shorter exposition can be found in Hogarth [2008].
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member of an online community that are not expressed in communica-
tions to that member.
A natural way of combating this difficulty, which corresponds to
general HCI guidelines, is to ensure that the relevant feedback is per-
ceivable. Doing so can involve straightforward provision of information
(e.g., about damaged files), via the strategy Access Information and
Experience or more complex approaches such as giving members of an
online community an opportunity to provide feedback about perceived
inappropriate behavior of other members (Design the Domain).
Another way of applying the strategy Design the Domain is to try to
ensure that there exist no consequences that users should know about
but that are inherently hard to perceive. Consider, for example, a com-
pany firewall that is known to have succeeded in completely blocking
viruses from the company’s computers: Users could then choose which
emails to open and which websites to visit without even thinking about
possible damage from viruses.
10.5.2 Consequences Not Clearly Related to Actions
Sometimes, the observed events are not clearly related to the action of
the chooser that caused them. For example, a user who notices that his
computer has run out of available RAM may have no idea what caused
the problem. Here, what is needed is some indication that relates the
consequence to the action that caused it. Methods of diagnosis that
can be applied to support situation assessment (6.3) may be applicable
in these cases.
10.5.3 Small Differences Among Consequences of Different Op-
tions
Sometimes, the consequences of different options differ in subtle ways
that can be noticed only through careful comparison.
For example, Text Entry Method 2 may be 10% faster than
Method 1, but the user may not be able to notice this consequence
of switching to Method 2; after all, she is not conducting a controlled
experiment. An extended example of this point comes from the re-
search of Bhavnani and colleagues: Bhavnani and John [2000] studied
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in depth expert users of computer-aided design systems who persisted
in using inefficient methods: Among other things, they tended not to
take advantage of the opportunity that their systems offered to perform
an operation on multiple objects at one time. For example, when they
needed to create three identical objects, they would draw them sepa-
rately instead of drawing one object and making two copies of it. One of
the authors’ explanations for the persistent use of inefficient methods
concerned the fact that the users did not obtain clear feedback that
revealed the inefficiency: The quality of the resulting drawings was in
general identical, and the difference in execution times was not easy to
notice from experience.5 In view of this and other obstacles to spon-
taneous learning of the more efficient procedures, Bhavnani and his
collaborators concluded that explicit training was required (see, e.g.,
Bhavnani et al., 2008).
By contrast, Gray and Boehm-Davis [2000] showed that, under
more favorable learning conditions, users can sometimes take into ac-
count a difference between alternativemicrostrategies that involves only
milliseconds of execution time.
The interaction designer who wants to ensure that differences of this
general sort are recognizable might apply the strategy Combine and
Compute to provide summary feedback that accumulates over time,
somewhat like the results of a controlled experiment. For example, the
system might summarize the text entry rates with two different text
entry methods in a way that made even small differences noticeable.
This type of feedback is already provided by many applications in the
health and well-being domains, such as the one shown in Figure 4.3.
10.5.4 Low-Probability Consequences
Sometimes, feedback consists in information about whether a partic-
ular low-probability event has occurred or not, such as a major hard
disk failure, identity theft due to inadequate security measures, or an
accident due to texting while driving. As studies of “decisions from
5Some users never tried the more efficient method in the first place, which is a
problem concerning their exploration strategy (10.2) rather than the perception of
consequences.
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experience” (mentioned in 10.2.1) have confirmed (e.g., Hertwig et al.,
2006), since a large amount of feedback is required to arrive at an
accurate estimate of a low probability, it is in general infeasible for
any individual chooser to learn very low probabilities from experience.
So it makes more sense to support other choice patterns, such as the
consequence-based pattern (providing probability information derived
from other sources) or the socially based pattern (calling attention to
relevant social examples and expectations).
Another approach is to provide feedback not about the low-
probability consequence itself but about more frequent (though less
significant) consequences that are correlated with it (cf. the third type
of feedback listed in 10.4.1 above) For example, a multitasking driver
can be given feedback whenever he drives in a way that increases the
likelihood of an accident (e.g., occasionally moving out of his lane or
moving too close to the driver in front of him). Or an imaginative
choice architect, applying the strategies Access Information and Expe-
rience and Combine and Compute, could invent a new type of feedback
of this nature (e.g., a dangerous driving index), which need not cor-
respond to any naturally occurring consequences of a driver’s actions.
In a similar vein, in 12.6.2 we will discuss how it can be more feasible
to give feedback about situations associated with privacy risks than
about actual privacy violations.
10.5.5 Biased or Distorted Feedback
For example, feedback from members of a social network on the appro-
priateness of contributions is often distributed in an unrepresentative
way: Maybe only inappropriate contributions elicit any feedback, in
which case a contributor is likely to underestimate the benefits that
others are deriving from her contributions. Similarly, a user who reads
reviews on an e-commerce site may wonder whether extreme evalu-
ations are being overrepresented. Where this pattern arises, a choice
architect may want to consider how to balance the distribution of feed-
back. For example, in some situations buttons labeled “Like” and “Dis-
like” might require so little effort to use that the distribution of the
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responses received is more representative of the actual distribution of
responses.
Of course there are limitations to efforts like these, and some
amount of bias is likely to remain. One possible response is to make
choosers aware of the bias in the feedback (e.g., by explaining or visu-
alizing the source of the bias). A problem with this approach is that,
even if a person is aware of bias in a sample, he may have no way of
knowing with any precision what the feedback would be like if it were
not biased. (“If there were a ’Dislike’ button beside the ’Like’ button,
how many ’Dislikes’ would I be getting?”) If the system or its designer
has some reasonable way of correcting for the bias (e.g., by exploiting
information collected in the past with other users), it might be reason-
able to try to present a debiased sample of feedback in some way—at
the risk of introducing bias of another sort.
11
Choice in Online Communities
11.1 Introduction
One of the most thoroughly discussed and studied types of choice
and decision made by computer users concerns their decisions about
whether and how to contribute to an online community.1
Online communities (see, e.g., De Souza and Preece, 2004;
Kraut and Resnick, 2012b; Preece, 2000) come in many forms, includ-
ing: those devoted to the sharing of media such as photos (e.g, Flickr);
those whose goal is to maintain an artifact of common value (such as
Wikipedia); those devoted to creating online social networks (e.g.,
Facebook); and those which aim to exchange ideas and information
about a given topic (e.g., the Stack Overflow site2 for asking and
answering questions about programming).
Common choices that a user faces with regard to a particular online
community concern: whether they should participate in it at all; if
so, whether they should actively contribute to it; and, if so, the form
of their contribution, such as its type (e.g., a text or a photo), its
1The principal authors of this chapter are Federica Cena, Cristina Gena, and
Fabiana Vernero.
2http://stackoverflow.com
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Figure 11.1: Explicitly presented choices that new contributors to Wikipedia
encounter.
content (e.g., supportive or critical), and its quality (e.g., thoughtful
or shallow). Figure 11.1 shows a page that presents new Wikipedia
contributors with choices of some of these sorts.
Online communities presuppose that at least some members will
contribute media, knowledge, and/or other resources to the commu-
nity. Since typically no particular amount or type of contribution is
required for any individual member, there is a good deal of free choice.
According to one way of looking at this type of situation, the optimal
behavior of any given member is not to contribute at all but simply
to benefit from the contributions made by others, as a “free rider” or
“lurker”. But in general a community could not survive if too many
members took this attitude. So it is not surprising that a good deal
of research in this area has focused on users’ motivations, bringing to
light a large variety of reasons why a user may or may not contribute
(see, e.g., Ames and Naaman, 2007; Bishop, 2007; Beenen et al., 2004;
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Preece et al., 2004; Wang and Fesenmaier, 2003) and often explicitly
embracing a persuasion perspective, sometimes resulting in guidelines
for community designers who want to encourage contribution (see,
e.g., Kraut and Resnick, 2012a) or participation (see, e.g., Kraut et al.,
2012).
Taking a choice support perspective, however, shifts our focus from
persuading users to supporting them in choosing when, where, and how
to participate and contribute. This perspective takes into account the
fact that there may be occasions when not participating or contributing
is the best option, for the individual member and/or for the community
as a whole. But even for people (e.g., organizers of online communities)
who are primarily interested in increasing the volume of contribution,
this perspective is relevant, because of one of the general relationships
between choice support and persuasion that were mentioned in 1.2.2:
One way of encouraging someone to do X is to help her successfully
make the specific preferential choices that are involved in doing X.
For example, if some particular types of contribution are especially
rewarding for a particular community member, helping him to identify
those types of contribution is a way of making community participation
more rewarding for him.
We will illustrate how choices made within online communities can
be understood in terms of the Aspect choice patterns and supported
via the Arcade strategies.
11.2 Choices About Whether to Participate
Before considering individual choice patterns, we will consider a type
of community-related choice that can be addressed naturally with all of
these patterns: the choice of whether to participate in a particular com-
munity at all. Some interesting examples of support for this particular
choice are found in efforts of online communities to recruit new mem-
bers. Even though the goal of recruitment is by definition to acquire
new members, the goal is not in general only persuasion but at least in
part choice support. After all, a community does not in general want
just anyone to join; people whose goals are unlikely to be fulfilled and
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who are unwilling to conform to the community’s social expectations
do not represent particularly desirable members. Kraut et al. [2012]
give a number of examples of how communities provide combinations
of persuasion and choice support to potential members, including the
following:
• Advertisements or FAQ lists that provide information about the
community, such as its mission statement, the functionality of-
fered, and data about its members
This method instantiates the strategies Access Information and
Experience, Represent the Choice Situation, and sometimes Com-
bine and Compute. When processing this type of communication,
a reader can apply the consequence-based pattern, anticipating
what it would be like to participate in the community; the socially
based pattern, taking into account any social examples that are
offered; and maybe even the attribute-based pattern, if they are
comparing a number of alternative communities in terms of at-
tributes such as number of members or the cost of participation.
• Showing endorsements from credible sources
A video or text message from a well-known person likewise instan-
tiates the strategy Access Information and Experience, though
here the main information being offered is that the well-known
person endorses the community, which is intended to trigger the
advice-taking variant of the socially based pattern.
• Functions that make it easy for existing group members to invite
other members whom they know personally to join
Here, the community is encouraging its members to apply the
strategy Evaluate on Behalf of the Chooser by giving person-
alized recommendations to their friends and acquaintances. The
underlying assumption is that an existing member should be able
to do a pretty good job of evaluating the community on behalf
of a person whom she knows, on the basis of her familiarity with
both the community and the person. The recipient of such a mes-
sage is being encouraged to apply the subpattern of the socially
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based pattern that involves taking advice, though the fact that
the inviting member is already a member can be seen as a social
example.
• Making it easy for existing group members to share artifacts from
the community with nonmembers (e.g., by emailing a link to a
blog post)
To the extent to which this method is interpreted as an implicit
invitation to join the community, it is similar to the previous
method. But primarily it instantiates the strategy Access Infor-
mation and Experience by providing a small sample of what it is
like to be a member of the community and thereby supporting
consequence-based choice.
• Advice to potential members about how to decide whether to join
For example, the “About” page of the community weblog
MetaFilter3 includes the following advice (as of August 2014):
If you’re new to the site, I’d suggest taking a look
around, checking out the archives, and getting a feel
for the place. You might also consider registering as a
member. Members can post comments, customize the
look and behavior of the site.
After becoming a member, check out some of the links
and think about leaving a comment or two. If you stick
around for a while, you’ll get a feel for what types of
things are posted as links, and if you find something
amazing and/or enlightening, please post it.
The “New User” page of the same site makes it clear that the
site owner wants people to think carefully before joining and par-
ticipating in the community so that inappropriate members and
behaviors will be minimized. Barriers such as the one-week wait-
ing period for particular types of contribution can be seen as
3http://www.metafilter.com/about.mefi
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a forceful form of procedural advice that prevents people from
joining and contributing without careful deliberation.
• Provision of previews of what it’s like to be a member
As Kraut et al. [2012] point out, the way in which many online
communities archive past contributions and interactions among
members makes it relatively easy for them to offer potential mem-
bers a preview of what it is like to be a member: The commu-
nity merely has to grant nonmembers access to (some of) these
records, which may be seen as a low-cost instantiation of the
strategy Access Information and Experience. The processing sup-
ported on the part of the chooser lies somewhere in or near the in-
tersection of the trial-and-error-based and the consequence-based
patterns, depending on the extent to which the potential mem-
ber can be seen as trying out the community or simply acquiring
information about the consequences of joining it.
• Requiring a potential member to perform a separating task (e.g.,
editing material written by other community members) that will
help him and the community determine how well he fits into the
community.
The tactic instantiates the strategy Advise About Processing by
encouraging (or perhaps even forcing) the potential member to
apply the trial-and-error-based pattern in an efficient way.
We will now turn to choices concerning specific contributions to
online communities, organizing the discussion in terms of the choice
patterns based on consequences, social influence, policies, and trial and
error, giving examples of the experience- and attribute-based patterns
in passing.
11.3 Consequence-Based Choices in On-Line Communities
In just about every case where a community member can decide
whether to make a contribution, we can identify some aspects of the
platform or context that can be seen as supporting (or at least in-
fluencing) the choice. In this section, we will take as a representative
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Figure 11.2: Example of a table with which SuggestBot rec-
ommends editing tasks to a regular Wikipedia contributor. (See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:SuggestBot.)
example the SuggestBot recommender for Wikipedia editors, which
grew out of research of Cosley and colleagues (see, e.g., Cosley et al.,
2006; Frankowski et al., 2006; Cosley et al., 2007). The basic idea is
to present to community members well-organized overviews of possible
contributions along with information about the nature of the contri-
butions, the cost of making them, and maybe also the likelihood that
other members could make the same contributions.
The table of recommended articles in Figure 11.2 can be seen as fa-
cilitating consequence-based choice, though it also has features typical
of support for attribute-based choice.
• With regard to the step of identifying options (Table 6.1): For
a Wikipedia contributor, the total set of options is in principle
the huge set of all Wikipedia pages—and in fact for each page,
the contributor can decide which aspect(s) of it to work on. Sug-
gestBot applies the strategy Evaluate on Behalf of the Chooser
to winnow this vast set of options down to a much smaller con-
sideration set. The recommendation algorithms used to generate
the options are described only vaguely on this page: “SuggestBot
picks articles in a number of ways based on other articles you’ve
edited, including straight text similarity, following wikilinks, and
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matching your editing patterns against those of other Wikipedi-
ans.”4 Publications (cited above) by the group that developed
SuggestBot, which has expertise in the recommender systems
field, have described a variety of recommendation algorithms that
they have experimented with over the years, including one that
favored items that the contributor was relatively uniquely able to
handle.
• With regard to the anticipation and evaluation of consequences:
The strategy Access Information and Experience is applied to
provide information about two very different types of conse-
quence: (a) what the experience of editing the page will be like
(which can be inferred to some extent from the title of the page,
the current quality rating, and the types of change that are re-
quired); and (b) what the benefits for readers will be if a given
page is edited (e.g., to what extent the quality can be improved,
which particular aspects of the quality will be improved, and how
many viewers are likely to read the improved page).
• With regard to the step of making a final choice, the table instan-
tiates the strategy Represent the Choice Situation by representing
the information about consequences in a way that makes it rela-
tively easy to apply various of the integration strategies discussed
in 5.4 (which, as was noted in 6.9, can sometimes also be applied
to the integration of evaluations of consequences). Note that the
integration subtask is still not trivial: The representation does
not help to distinguish between the two different types of con-
sequence mentioned above; nor does it help the chooser devote
more attention to the specific consequences that she considers
most important—except that the contributor can sort the table
by one of the columns if she considers its content to be espe-
cially important. (This example table has been sorted so that
all pages requiring improvement to the images are in the upper
rows, which might be appropriate for a contributor who either
4The contributor to whom the recommendations in this table are being offered
has apparently edited guitar-related pages in the past.
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enjoys contributing images or thinks that images are especially
important parts of an article).
11.4 Socially Based Choices in On-Line Communities
Online communities have an inherently social dimension. So it is not
surprising that considerations regarding social examples and expecta-
tions are often highlighted in the literature.
11.4.1 Explicit Social Expectations
Online communities provide some of the clearest examples of social
expectations that are formulated explicitly. Many communities have
standards that determine what counts as desirable and undesirable be-
havior and publish these as explicit guidelines or etiquette rules. To
give just one example: The “Welcome” page of Stack Overflow,5
like that of other Stack Exchange communities, explains that “This
site is all about getting answers. It’s not a discussion forum. There’s
no chit-chat.” It also lists types of question that members should and
should not ask. Guidelines like these may at first glance appear to be
straightforward attempts at persuasion, but they can also be seen as
applications of the Arcade strategy Access Information and Expe-
rience with regard to social expectations: A community member who
sincerely wants to conform to the expectations of the community would
otherwise lack important information.
As Kiesler et al. [2012] note, informing community members about
norms is not as straightforward as it may seem. Their “Design Claim
19” reads as follows: “Prominently displayed guidelines may convey a
descriptive norm that the guidelines are not always followed.” In our
terms, such guidelines, though intended to convey positive information
about social expectations, can convey negative information about social
examples. The more general point is that any attempt to apply the
strategy Access Information and Experience should take into account
the fact that the chooser may not take the presented information at
face value but rather engage in inference and interpretation.
5http://stackoverflow.com/tour
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We noted in 8.4 that one motivation for people to conform to social
expectations is the anticipation that they will suffer negative conse-
quences otherwise. Here again, online communities offer some espe-
cially clear examples, in the form of regulatory mechanisms for dealing
with those who violate explicit community norms. Kiesler et al. [2012]
discuss sanctions that communities impose, ranging from reputation
penalties to outright bans. Here again, informing members about spe-
cific sanctions can be seen as an application of the strategy Access
Information and Experience. Note that a community member who re-
frains from performing an undesirable action only because of concern
about sanctions can be seen as applying the consequence-based pat-
tern, which here shows some overlap with the socially based pattern.
But often, community members see sanctions as just one reason to con-
form to expectations, alongside a perception of the legitimacy of the
norms or a feeling of identification with the community.
11.4.2 Implicit Social Expectations
Of course community members can also perceive and interpret social
examples and expectations even when these are not described explicitly.
In these cases, it is often hard to know which particular variant(s) of
the socially based choice pattern is (or are) being applied.
Representative examples of this range of possible interpretations
are provided by two studies reported by Sukumaran et al. [2011], which
examined a particular type of choice that contributors to online com-
munities often have to make: whether (a) to provide a contribution
that is quick and easy to make or (b) to take the time to work out a
potentially more valuable contribution.
In their first study, two variants of a simulated news website were
presented to two groups of participants (in a between-participant de-
sign). In the first site, each news story was followed by mostly “thought-
ful” (i.e., relatively long and carefully formulated) comments provided
by fictitious users; the second site was the same except that the user
comments were mostly not thoughtful (i.e., short and simple-minded).
Participants who used the first site tended to write more thoughtful
comments of their own than those who used the second site; and they
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were more inclined to predict that other users of the site would provide
thoughtful comments.
Considering what was said in Section 8, we can see two possible
types of explanation for these results, both of which might be valid at
the same time:
1. Users of the first site may have inferred from the prevalence of
thoughtful comments that there was a general expectation on the part
of other users that comments on this site ought to be thoughtful. If
so, they may have been motivated to conform to this expectation for
either of the following two reasons discussed in Section 8:
• They could be rewarded or punished for conformance or non-
conformance (e.g., in the form of supportive or critical feedback
about their comments).
• They considered the expectation to be legitimate (e.g., “If I am
going to benefit from using this news site, I ought to respect
the expectations that members of the site have concerning my
behavior”).
Whether this explanation is valid could have been tested, for ex-
ample, if the investigators had asked participants in some appropriate
way whether they thought they were expected to provide thoughtful
comments and whether they were motivated to conform to any such
expectation.
2. The participants may simply have viewed the comments of others
as examples of how other people behave on the site in question. As was
discussed in Section 8, there are several reasons why they might be
inclined to follow these social examples even if they did not assume
that there was any expectation that they would do so. For example,
perhaps people have been making thoughtful comments because they
have found it rewarding to do so on this particular site (e.g., because
such comments elicited equally thoughtful responses from other users
on the site).
Note that these two possible explanations for the effect of the pro-
vided social examples suggest different ideas about how to support
choice in this situation: For example, applying the strategy Access In-
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formation and Experience, we could inform users about either the pre-
vailing expectations about behavior or the reasons why people find it
worthwhile to provide thoughtful responses on the first site.
The second study by Sukumaran et al. [2011] admits an even wider
range of possible interpretations. Here again, two simulated news sites
were used that differed in the extent to which they seemed to encourage
thoughtful comments. In this second study, no social examples were
provided, but the first site differed from the second one in terms of
variety of features: how serious the visual style of the site was; whether
the words used in the Captcha form were semantically related to
thoughtfulness; what specific texts were used to encourage users to
comment; and whether the commenting box made it easy to enter a
long, thoughtful comment.
As in the first study, users of the first website tended to produce
more thoughtful comments; but in contrast to the first study, they did
not tend to predict that other users would make relatively thoughtful
comments.
In this study, an interpretation in terms of social expectations or
examples is less plausible than in the first study, because of the absence
of any social information. But there are possible explanations in terms
of other choice patterns:
1. The effects of the visual style of the website and of the words
used in the interface can be seen as illustrations of the point made
in 5.2 about how a person’s evaluation criteria in a particular situa-
tion can be influenced by subtle aspects of the representation of the
choice problem, some of which are logically irrelevant (recall, for ex-
ample, the study of Mandel and Johnson, 2002, on the influence of the
background pattern of a commercial website). In the news site situ-
ation, there is probably no compelling consideration that determines
how much importance a person should attach to the goal of provid-
ing a thoughtful answer relative to the goal of getting through the task
quickly, so contextual factors like these can have a large influence. Note
that, if a designer manipulates factors like these with the intention of
influencing a user’s evaluation criteria, they are applying the strategy
Represent the Choice Situation.
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2. The fact that the commenting box in the first website made it
easier to enter a thoughtful comment can be understood in terms of the
consequence-based pattern: It changed the consequences of attempting
to enter a thoughtful comment by reducing the associated cost. De-
signing the commenting box in this way with the goal of encouraging
thoughtful comments can be seen as an instance of the strategy Design
the Domain, one which is biased in the direction of a particular choice.6
Note that neither of these two explanations is specifically related
to social contexts; they can be applied even when no other people are
involved.
A broad understanding of choice patterns can help us with the
interpretation of studies like these by reminding us of the full range of
possible explanations for observed phenomena; and it can help us to
narrow down the set of possible explanations in advance by designing
the studies in such a way that the results allow us distinguish among
different explanations.
11.5 Policy-Based Choices in On-Line Communities
We noted in 9.4 that one simple way of acquiring a policy concerning
a particular type of choice is to adopt a perceived social expectation as
a personal policy. For example, a community member does not need to
deliberate about whether to criticize another member in a contribution
if he has adopted for himself the community’s expectation that personal
criticisms are to be avoided.7 The explicit formulations of behavioral
norms just discussed can be seen as support for not only socially based
but also policy-based choice: In particular, if the community norms are
designed in such a way that members can easily understand, learn, and
apply them, they are more likely to be adopted as individual policies.
6The tactic of encouraging people to do something by making the thing simpler
or easier to do is referred to in the persuasive technology literature as reduction; see
Fogg [2003, chap. 3].
7Note that he may actually adopt a policy which is related to the norm but is
not identical to it, such as: “When you feel like criticizing someone, instead praise
them in a recognizably exaggerated way.”
170 Choice in Online Communities
A very different type of example of support for policy-based choice
can be found in the study of Ames and Naaman [2007], which looked
at (among other things) how people used a mobile app called Zone-
Tag for annotating photos with tags before uploading them to Flickr.
Choosing tags for each photo before uploading it can be impractically
time-consuming, especially if the user is on the move. The functionality
of ZoneTag made it possible, when making multiple photos of a given
event, to specify some tags for the first photo and then reuse these
tags with minimal effort for all subsequent photos of the same event. A
user who thinks ahead a bit can decide to proceed in this way even if
she would be unwilling or unable to tag each photo individually. This
example illustrates again one of the general benefits of policy-based
choice: the fact that applying a policy typically requires less time and
effort than most other ways of making a choice, especially if the appli-
cation of the policy has been at least partly automated. In cases where
the user would otherwise not bother to tag the photos at all, the sup-
port offered for policy-based choice presumably tends to lead to better
choices (i.e., one or more meaningful tags vs. none at all), even though
tagging of individual photos might yield better choices if users had
time for it. From the point of view of design support for policy-based
choice, we should note that the “tag stickiness” feature just mentioned
was apparently not explicitly designed or presented to users as a form
of support for policy-based choice of tags. In consequence, users had
to discover this way of using the function themselves, and it was not
well suited for all situations (e.g., those in which a user wants to make
an occasional photo that does not belong to the main event that he is
photographing repeatedly). The design of functionality like this with
the explicit goal of supporting policy-based choice could make use of
some of the other ideas discussed in Section 9.
One interesting consequence of policy-based choice in the context
of online communities is that it can lead to relatively high predictabil-
ity of an individual’s choices, which can be helpful to other persons
(e.g., those who want to identify all of the photos that a user took of
a particular event). On the other hand, strict adherence to a policy
sometimes yields choices that seem wrong or even incomprehensible in
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isolation, at least if the perceiver is not aware of the policy being ap-
plied (as when a user employing the strategy sketched above takes a
picture during an event that is unrelated to the event while still using
the tags for the event).
11.6 Trial-and-Error-Based Choices in On-Line Communities
Especially people who have not yet joined a community or have only
recently joined it sometimes have only a vague or inaccurate notion
of what it is like to participate in the community and to make spe-
cific types of contribution—even if the community offers the sort of
preview that was discussed in 11.2. In these cases, applying the trial-
and-error-based strategy is a natural approach that can be supported.
As was discussed in Section 10, we can distinguish between support
for exploration and support for the interpretation of consequences of
actions.
11.6.1 Support for Exploration
An example of explicit advice concerning an exploration strategy, from
the MetaFilter weblog, was already given in 11.2.
A different tactic is to apply the strategy Design the Domain to
create an environment that generally facilitates exploration. An exam-
ple is provided by the “Sandbox” pages of Wikipedia.8 One function
of these pages is to enable people to acquire skill in using Wikipedia’s
markup language and related functions; but these pages also support
preferential choice by enabling a user to experience some aspects of
what it’s like to edit a Wikipedia page (e.g., whether she finds the
use of the markup language cumbersome or distracting). This example
illustrates an interesting complication that often arises in connection
with exploration: Note that, even as a user is deciding whether he en-
joys using the markup language, he is also getting more skilled at using
the language, and this increase in skill is likely to influence his level of
enjoyment. In cases like this, it is desirable to encourage and facilitate
exploration that is extensive enough to enable the chooser to arrive at
8http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Sandbox
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a reliable assessment of what the consequences will be like in the long
run.
Another variant of the same tactic is to encourage and facilitate
what are sometimes called microcontributions (Frankowski et al., 2007)
or peripheral contributions (Bryant et al., 2005), such as rating, tag-
ging, and commenting on items. Although these are genuine contribu-
tions (unlike actions in a sandbox), they are associated with smaller
consequences (e.g., in terms of the effort required and the responses of
other members). Although microcontributions can benefit a community
in various ways, one function is to enable members to experience what
it is like to contribute to the community—at relatively low cost and
risk to themselves and to the community. A limitation of this func-
tion is that the experience of making microcontributions is unlikely
to be wholly representative of the more general experience of mak-
ing contributions (cf. Bryant et al., 2005). This nonrepresentativeness
is one reason why encouraging microcontributions has been found to
be effective as a compliance tactic for getting people to make larger
contributions (see, e.g., the discussion of the foot-in-the-door technique
by Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004, pp. 602–604), but from the point of
view of choice support it is a drawback. Note that the procedural ad-
vice given by MetaFilter (quoted in 11.2) encourages the prospective
member to progress from small to larger contributions, presumably so
as to require more representative experience.
11.6.2 Support for Interpretation of Consequences
Both published research and everyday experience confirm that the con-
tribution choices of contributors to online communities are influenced
by the consequences of the contributions that they have made in the
past. For example, Preece et al. [2004] found that unpleasant past ex-
perience resulting from contributions was named by lurkers as a reason
for not actively contributing to a community. The negative experiences
named ranged from difficulties with the operation of the platform to
unsatisfactory interaction with other group members (e.g., “Received
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a rude response to a past post”, p. 215).9 Especially in the case of
strongly negative experiences, it seems likely that the users not only
became aware of negative consequences but also formed negative af-
fective associations with the actions in question, which could lead to
experience-based choices not to contribute (cf. 7.5).
Experiencing consequences can also influence the particular form
that a contribution takes. For example, in their study on motivations for
tagging, Ames and Naaman [2007] report an example of learning from
experience that resulted from positive feedback that one user received:
After having observed that photos with (particular) tags tended to
receive more views, this user decided always to add tags to his/her
public photos, as a way to promote their content and gain reputation.
In this case, the photo sharing platform was designed so as to make
consequences related to feedback from other users (e.g., the number of
views) easily noticeable.
Experience with the consequences of contributions can be helpful
even to experienced community members in cases where the community
environment changes in ways that ought to be taken into account in fu-
ture choices. Velasquez et al. [2014] found that changes and transforma-
tions in the community environment (e.g., concerning content-related
policies and shared goals) can cause some users to become “latent”—
that is, no longer to contribute content in the same quantity and fashion
as they used to. For example, some participants in the user-generated
Everything2 encyclopedia who were interested in building new re-
lationships and getting to know other community members decreased
their level of contribution when they saw that their posts containing
mainly subjective thoughts and personal discussions were being ac-
cepted less frequently and might even be deleted by editors, as a result
of a new content policy.
Designers of online communities have a great many opportunities
to control both the consequences of members’ choices and the ways
9Sometimes the negative experiences observed were those of other community
members, which illustrates that people can also learn from the “trial and error” of
other persons.
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in which the consequences are perceived and interpreted by members,
using several of the Arcade strategies:
• Applying the strategy Design the Domain: Since feedback is in
general generated by other users, various features of a community
platform can influence how much feedback other users provide
and what the content of the feedback is. Note that other users
who provide feedback are themselves making choices about what
feedback to provide. So here we have a case where platform sup-
port for one type of choice (“What sorts of contribution should
I make?”) takes the form of support for (or persuasive influence
of) another type of choice by other persons (i.e., “What sort of
feedback should I provide?”).
• Applying one or more of the strategies Access Information and
Experience, Represent the Choice Situation, and Combine and
Compute: The platform can influence how any feedback provided
by other users is perceived by the contributor: Whether the con-
tributor can perceive it at all and how it is represented to the
contributor (e.g., in its original raw form; as a histogram showing
the distribution of the expressed evaluations, . . . ).
Tactics based on these strategies can be used in various ways to try
to overcome some of the typical pitfalls of feedback interpretation that
were discussed in 10.4:
• Ensuring that an adequate amount of feedback is available (e.g.,
by making it easy and/or motivating for other members to pro-
vide feedback).
• Minimizing bias in the feedback (e.g., by aiming to ensure that
the interaction design does not introduce bias and maybe even
counteracts bias, for example by encouraging members to supply
neutral as well as positive or negative feedback).
• Ensuring timeliness of feedback and a clear relationship to the
contribution that it refers to (e.g., by ensuring that both the
original contribution and any feedback to it are made available
without unnecessary delay).
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• Ensuring that the feedback given is diagnostic rather than simply
evaluative (e.g., by providing not only an evaluation scale but also
an opportunity to express more specific ideas).
11.7 Concluding Remarks on Choice in Online Communities
One of the purposes of this section has been to show that designers of
online communities can fruitfully take a choice support perspective in
addition to the currently more widespread persuasion perspective. The
domain of online communities does not merely offer a wealth of exam-
ples of interesting opportunities for choice support; it also illustrates
the point made in 1.2.2 that persuasion is often most effective when
combined with choice support, and vice versa.
As we’ve mentioned, even a community that uses persuasive tech-
niques to increase its membership will not in general want just anyone
to join; a member who fits well is one whose decision to join the com-
munity is a decision that she will be satisfied with in the long run. In
the other direction, supporting trial-and-error-based choice by ensur-
ing that members receive enough useful feedback on their contributions
may require applying persuasive methods to encourage other members
to provide feedback.
We hope that this section will encourage community designers to
view choice support and persuasion as being best used in combination,
like the white and black keys of the piano.
12
Choices Concerning Privacy
12.1 Introduction
Whereas in connection with online communities the persuasion per-
spective has been much more prominent then the choice support per-
spective, in our second example domain—privacy-related choices—
researchers often explicitly state that they are interested in un-
derstanding the choices that people make and helping them to
make better choices (see, e.g., the comprehensive survey article by
Iachello and Hong, 2007).1 On the other hand, this research literature
on the whole makes little reference to the psychology of choice and
choice support. Instead, we often see conceptions of choice that are
hard to relate to any well-founded psychological concepts. In particu-
lar, a lot of the relevant discussion in this area refers to the concept
of privacy preferences, which is more misleading than helpful, as we
will discuss in 12.5.1. One aim of the present section is to show how a
clearer understanding of privacy-related choices can be achieved when
concepts like this one are replaced with psychologically grounded ones
such as those from the Aspect model.
1The principal authors of this chapter are Bettina Berendt and Silvia Gabrielli.
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We also wish to call attention to the often underestimated complex-
ity of privacy-related choices relative to most other types of preferential
choice in the HCI area. For example, a popular conception is that the
quintessential privacy choice is the question of whether to make a photo
available to friends or friends-of-friends on a social networking site. We
believe that much of the current confusion and concern about poor
privacy practices arises from a lack of a principled understanding of
privacy-related choices. We therefore dedicate some space to an analy-
sis of this type of choice before showing in subsequent subsections how
the Aspect and Arcade models can be applied to them.
12.1.1 Three Scenarios for Privacy-Related Choice
We will refer to three scenarios, which can be illustrated as follows with
examples:
1. The social networking site scenario: A chooser is in possession of
a (self-made) photograph of himself, his partner, and their child. The
chooser wants to share the photo with some recipient(s) on a social
networking site. In the course of this transaction, personal data and
information get created and/or transmitted.
2. The e-commerce scenario: The chooser wants to purchase some
product or service online. The chooser can or has to supply some in-
formation in addition to the information required for this basic trans-
action.
3. The ubiquitous computing scenario: This scenario covers the
main privacy choices of users interacting with ubiquitous and location-
enhanced technologies, including sensors (e.g., RFID sensors). The
chooser is, for example, an urban traveler who needs to decide whether
a particular (group of) people should be allowed to find out her loca-
tion.
12.1.2 Goals of Choice: What Is Privacy, and What Are “Good”
Privacy-Related Choices?
Throughout time and across cultures, people have shown patterns of
interacting with others and withdrawing from them. Altman [1976, p.
7] has described these behaviors as boundary regulation processes, in
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which privacy is “a selective control of access to the self or to one’s
group”. These boundary regulation processes have two essential fea-
tures. First, privacy involves both closedness and openness: The seeking
and the avoiding of social interaction are mutually contingent. Second,
the “ideal level” (however one might define that concept) of social in-
teraction or privacy changes with time and context. The ideal level
also varies because of individual and cultural differences. These con-
trol processes for boundary regulation involve the sharing or disclosing
of information vs. the withholding of information, as was investigated
in detail in the work of Petronio [2002]. Westin [1967] offers a related
notion of information privacy: “the claim of individuals, groups or in-
stitutions to determine for themselves when, how and to what extent
information about them is communicated to others” (p. 7). Definitions
such as Westin’s (and also their codification in legal regulations on data
protection and privacy rights) emphasize that privacy is not only or al-
ways about “being let alone” and “disclosing as little data as possible”’
(see Berendt [2012] for a detailed discussion).
We will distinguish between three types of “others” and the forms
of privacy associated with them:2
1. Other people, usually peers. The corresponding form of privacy
is called social privacy.
2. Commercial entities or other institutions, which raise issues of
institutional privacy.
3. Governmental entities, which raise issues of protection from
surveillance.
We define a privacy-related choice of a chooser as any choice that re-
sults in the granting of access to data about a person to one or more (po-
tential) knowers—or withholding access from them. The person whom
the data concerns is usually the chooser himself, but it can also be
someone else.
2These classifications have been discussed by many authors and with different
names; we use the terminology introduced in Raynes-Goldie [2012] and Phillips
[2004]. Information privacy is often associated with “others” of types 1 and 2.
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The central privacy goals, in the sense of a good outcome for the
person (cf. 3.6), are to achieve the level and/or form of privacy de-
sired by the person. As with other choices, not only considerations of
outcome play a role.3
Design choices that have privacy implications are determined not
only by end users’ goals but also by the goals of site operators. Often,
the underlying business model rests on users paying for a free service
with their personal data. Our examples will illustrate support for both
types of goals.
12.1.3 A Key Characteristic of Privacy-Related Choices: Multiple
Interrelated Choices in Several Dimensions
One key characteristic and challenge of privacy-related choices is that
they rarely come alone. Instead, a privacy-related choice is often bun-
dled with another choice, often one that is more important to the
chooser. Hence a privacy-related choice will often receive less attention
than it deserves simply because of limits on attention and time—or
it may even be neglected completely. A narrow focus on only one of
the bundled choices can also be encouraged by site operators who are
mainly interested in obtaining data, as well as by cultural factors.
The first form of bundling concentrates attention on what may be
called a main choice, which makes at least part of the privacy-related
choice a secondary choice:
• The main choice in the e-commerce scenario is how to execute
a commercial transaction effectively: The user wants to buy a
winter jacket, not make decisions about his privacy.
• The main choice in the ubiquitous computing scenario may be
how to reach your destination quickly and safely.
3Even this simple definition is faced with a number of challenges. The person’s
desires may be unknown or unclear, and they may change over time. If the person
is not the chooser herself, then the person’s desires may conflict with the chooser’s
wishes. Other people may decide which levels are applicable for the chooser/person,
for example when the chooser is below the age of consent or where privacy is regarded
as a public good. In the following discussion, we will abstract away from these
additional complications.
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• The main choice in the social networking site scenario is a choice
related to social privacy (e.g., how to show a photo to a particular
relative and whom else to show it to). The choices related to
institutional privacy—what information should be shared with
the site or provider—are often not even perceived.
In all three scenarios, surveillance (i.e., the sharing of information
with a governmental entity) generally remains invisible. And although
the outcomes of the privacy-related secondary choices may be highly
relevant for the chooser, they are often invisible and drawn out over
time, and they may be caused by people other than the chooser (see,
e.g., Gürses and Diaz, 2013).
A second form of bundling is that one person’s privacy-related
choices constrain other people’s privacy and privacy-related choices,
now or in the future:
• In the example given for the social networking site scenario, pub-
lishing the photo also discloses information about the other two
persons depicted. Interface options for letting the affected per-
sons co-decide are not straightforward and rarely available; and
some persons (such as the child in the photo) may not even be
able to voice or enforce their decisions.
• Norms of social reciprocity and ease of handling strongly suggest
that reactions to a privacy-relevant action should be delivered
over the same channel (e.g., social networking site)—which in
effect requires people to register and communicate on the same
platform.
• Professional norms or concrete activity decisions (such as a deci-
sion to teach a class using Google Hangout) can also enforce
membership in and activity on certain platforms.
• Choices in e-commerce scenarios may also be constrained by the
simple nonexistence of privacy-friendly providers or options, by
an excessive price exacted for protecting one’s privacy, or by many
other factors that make reality differ from an ideal market in
which demand for a service can always be met by supply and
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no participant is more powerful than any other in determining
prices.
• Some constraints on privacy-related choices arise from the joint
workings of individual and collective behaviors and technical fac-
tors. For example, in order for a system to generate real-time
information for ride sharing, multiple parties have to provide
location-based data. Another example is the safe encryption of
messages with public-key cryptography: This practice requires
all participants in an exchange to generate, manage, exchange,
and use keys.
• All of these behaviors can also give rise to social examples and
expectations (see Section 8) and to habits (7.3) that in turn in-
fluence future privacy-related choices in the direction of increased
disclosure.
12.1.4 How to Support Privacy-Related Choice? “Nudges” Vs.
Awareness Support
In this section on privacy-related choices, we will describe a number
of choice support tactics, some embodied in entire tools for supporting
privacy-related choices, with reference to the Aspect and Arcade
models. Many of these tactics can be supported by two categories of
tool that currently constitute foci of development and investigation:
privacy nudges and data-based privacy awareness tools. Since tools in
both of these categories can support all of the Aspect choice patterns,
we will introduce the basic distinction between them here.
Privacy Nudges
The concept of a privacy nudge is nicely illustrated by the three ex-
amples presented by Wang et al. [2013]. Although the term nudge is
commonly associated with influencing choices in a particular direction
(cf. the discussion of this concept in 1.2.2), these interface elements can
be interpreted naturally within the Arcade model as forms of choice
support. The context is one in which a user of Facebook is about to
post some content.
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The picture nudge shows the user five randomly chosen pictures of
members of the set of people who will see the post. This method in-
stantiates the strategy Represent the Choice Situation by augmenting
an abstract representation of the set of recipients (e.g., “anyone on the
internet”) with a more concrete representation in terms of particular
individuals. This type of representation presumably encourages think-
ing about how the various possible viewers of the post will respond to
it.
If the five pictures presented were not selected at random by the
system but rather chosen so as to be representative of the set of people
who were actually likely to view the post, this nudge would also instan-
tiate the strategies Access Information and Experience and Combine
and Compute.
The sentiment nudge of Wang et al. [2013] alerts the user if the
content of the post seems likely to be perceived as “negative”, as de-
termined by analysis of its words by a sentiment analysis module. This
nudge both evokes the consequence-based pattern and applies the strat-
egy Combine and Compute to help the chooser predict a particular type
of consequence of her action.
Finally, the timer nudge explicitly introduces a delay of 10 seconds
after the user has submitted the post, during which he can cancel the
post. This method is similar to simply advising the user to “think for 10
seconds before sending off your post”, the difference being that the user
is almost forced to take the advice (since he has little else to do during
the 10 seconds). Hence the nudge implicitly instantiates the strategy
Advise About Processing. It also illustrates once again (cf. 4.4) that
in interactive systems, as opposed to human-human dialog, procedural
“advice” often takes the form not of verbal advice but (also) of inter-
action design that makes it especially convenient or even necessary to
take the advice.
Data-Based Privacy Awareness Tools
Data-based awareness tools (see, e.g., Gao and Berendt, 2011;
Berendt et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2013) are software tools that apply
the strategy Access Information and Experience, often in conjunction
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with Combine and Compute and Represent the Choice Situation, in any
of various ways to make users aware of potential privacy threats. For
example, in support of the consequence-based pattern, the “awareness”
can concern the need to make a choice, the assessment of the current
situation, and the possible consequences of particular actions (see 12.2
below). In support of the trial-and-error-based pattern, users are made
more aware of the consequences of actions once they have performed
them (12.6). Data-based awareness tools may—but need not—include
privacy nudges.
After this introductory discussion, we will consider each of the As-
pect choice patterns in turn (except for the experience-based pattern),
in each case looking at examples of how the concepts associated with
that pattern apply to some types of privacy-related choice.
12.2 Consequence-Based Choices About Privacy
It is natural for people to apply the consequence-based pattern to pri-
vacy choices, since poor choices can often lead to unfortunate conse-
quences. But this choice pattern raises special challenges for several of
the steps in this pattern (see Table 6.1).
12.2.1 Situation Assessment and Recognition of Choice Opportu-
nities
In an ideal world, users would always know when some sort of privacy-
related choice was called for and what the relevant features of the
current situation were (6.2, 6.3).
In some cases, interface elements indicate straightforwardly where
a privacy-related choice does or does not have to be made, as in the
following examples, which instantiate the strategies Access Information
and Experience and Represent the Choice Situation:
• Checkboxes for opting out of or into the transfer of information
to particular third parties alert the user to a need to choose who
will or will not receive particular data.
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• A red asterisk in front of a mandatory data field indicates that
there is no choice about whether to provide this information.
• The conspicuous provision of telephone contact numbers on the
screen signals to the user that she can choose an alternative
method of transferring information to the institution in question.
It would in general be infeasible, however, to alert users in a conspic-
uous way about every privacy-related choice opportunity—even aside
from the fact that organizations and individuals who are interested
in acquiring personal data often have no interest in increasing users’
situation awareness.
For example, in principle, whenever a user visits a website that is
going to make use of his personal data in one or more ways, the user
might want to choose whether to allow those uses of the data. But often
users have no idea what use (if any) is going to be made of their data,
and they can hardly take the trouble to find out every time they visit
a website. One well-known approach to this problem was the Privacy
Bird (Cranor et al., 2006, discussed in 12.5 below), which automat-
ically checked for possibly undesirable consequences and alerted the
user to cases where an explicit choice appeared to be worthwhile.
As is discussed by Iachello and Hong [2007, p. 55–57], users of web
browsers regularly encounter cues that are provided with the goal of
improving situation assessment, such as “lock” icons and warnings that
data may be intercepted by third parties. One problem with such cues,
which is typical of attempts to support situation assessment via the
strategies Access Information and Experience and Represent the Choice
Situation, is that users have only a limited capacity to attend to them,
especially since the cues in general do not concern the user’s primary
task. Even if such a cue is noticed, the user may not be able to make
any of the inferences that situation assessment is supposed to support,
concerning what will happen if the chooser takes no action and what
the consequences of particular actions will be—because of a problem
that is mentioned repeatedly in this section: the incomplete mental
models that most users have of privacy-relevant factors. For example,
if you are informed that data that you enter into a web form might
be intercepted by a third party, you probably have little idea of how
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likely this event is to occur, who might do the intercepting, or what
use they might make of the data. Warnings of this sort are often best
seen not as helpful applications of choice support tactics but rather as
steps taken to protect a stakeholder from criticism or legal challenges
(“Don’t blame us; we warned you!”).
In the ubiquitous computing scenario, we have the additional chal-
lenge that it tends to be more difficult than with graphical user in-
terfaces to provide useful cues to support situation assessment (see,
e.g., Nguyen and Mynatt, 2002; Iachello and Hong, 2007, pp. 55–57).4
In connection with older devices such as audio recorders, warnings such
as flashing red lights and regularly spaced beeps have long been used to
instantiate the strategy Access Information and Experience to support
situation assessment. A current challenge is to find analogous methods
to provide adequate awareness of the much larger range of sensors that
now exist even in an ordinary smartphone (including, e.g., GPS, motion
and orientation sensors, and video cameras). The Privacy Mirrors
framework of Nguyen and Mynatt [2002] takes into account the broad
range of things that users of ubiquitous computing technology in prin-
ciple ought to be aware of: not only the technical properties of the
systems that they are dealing with (cf. Edwards et al., 2001) but also
relevant aspects of the physical and social environments.
Many of the specific methods that have been developed for increas-
ing users’ situation awareness can also serve to provide feedback in the
context of the trial-and-error-based pattern (see 10.5 above and 12.6
below.)
12.2.2 Deciding When and Where to Make a Choice
The question of when a particular choice is best made (6.4) has been
discussed especially often in the privacy domain. One key question is
whether users can be expected to make configuration choices at one
point in time that will relieve them of the need to make a large number
of specific choices later on. For example, Lederer et al. [2004, p. 447–
448] argue that “Emphasizing Configuration Over Action” is one of
4Bellotti et al. [2002] discuss related issues with “sensing systems” on a more
general level.
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the typical pitfalls associated with the design of interactive systems
that have personal privacy implications. Since having users choose pri-
vacy settings is essentially a matter of asking them to select a policy
that will be implemented (semi)automatically by the system, this issue
is discussed below in the subsection on policy-based privacy choices
(12.5).
12.2.3 Making an Appropriate Set of Options Available
One source of difficulty in choosing is when an unnecessarily restricted
set of options is available that forces the chooser to deal with negative
consequences or difficult tradeoffs that would not arise if a more suitable
option were available. An illustration of this point is provided by the
efforts made within a ubiquitous computing scenario by Iachello et al.
[2005] to determine empirically what set of options would be found
suitable by users of an application that enables people to disclose their
locations to each other. Options that were considered by the study
participants to be useful to have included (a) sending a vague, evasive
response such as “I am busy”; and (b) sending an inaccurate indication
of the user’s location (e.g., “on the way home” vs. “still at the office”).
On a more general level, Lederer et al. [2004, p. 448] argued that
failing to provide “an obvious, top-level mechanism for halting and
resuming disclosure” is another of the pitfalls in the design of privacy-
relevant systems. They noted as an example that, at the time of their
writing, there was typically no simple way for the user of a web browser
to block all cookies during part of her browsing session. In the interven-
ing years, many web browsers have filled this gap in the set of available
options by introducing a “Private Browsing” mode that can be turned
on and off easily.
Judiciously expanding the set of options in this way is an application
of the strategy Design the Domain, which can be favorably compared
to the alternative of using other Arcade strategies to help users to
choose among less desirable options.
188 Choices Concerning Privacy
12.2.4 Holistic Representations of Privacy Choices
One reason for the difficulty of privacy-related choices is that it is often
unclear to choosers what the consequences of the various options will
be. As we saw in Section 6, there can be many reasons for difficulty in
anticipating consequences. One difficulty that seems relatively charac-
teristic of privacy choices in current web-based and ubiquitous systems
is due to the way in which options are represented to users—that is, to a
problematic application of the strategy Represent the Choice Situation
(cf. the discussion of framing in 6.7.2): Options are often represented
to users in what may be called a holistic way that makes it relatively
hard to perceive individual consequences clearly. After discussing this
type of representation, we will argue for the benefits of more specific
representations of individual consequences.
A privacy-related choice situation is often represented by the sys-
tem’s designers as one in which it is desirable to disclose information.
This representation can induce users to disclose more information than
they otherwise would. In these cases, the strategy Represent the Choice
Situation is being used with a persuasive intent (cf. 1.2.2) to push the
user toward an option that is desirable from the point of view of those
who run the system.
One frequent representation is that of information disclosure as part
of an exchange. This representation draws on real-life characteristics of
information disclosure and privacy, especially in e-commerce scenar-
ios. In many commercial and other public transactions, a participant
needs to disclose private—or even sensitive—data in order to enable the
transaction to occur: In the clothing store, you need to state your size
in order to obtain clothes that fit; in the doctor’s office, you need to talk
about your ailments in order to receive diagnosis and treatment. Many
online stores and services promise personalization advantages in return
for data. The perception that personalization is occurring can lead peo-
ple to disclose more information about themselves, even if everyone is
in fact being given the same recommendations (Kobsa and Teltzrow
[2004]). The assumption that questions are asked because they are rel-
evant in the given context may lead people to answer even questions
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that would be considered illegitimate outside of the context suggested
by the representation (Berendt et al., 2005; Berendt, 2009).
In the social-networking-site or ubiquitous computing scenarios,
options that involve information disclosure are often described as in-
volving an exchange of data from the user for a free service from a
provider—though the relevant formulations are generally to be found in
relatively hard-to-reach documents such as terms-and-conditions pages.
By contrast, the fact that data are being exchanged among peers is
made salient by the interface design: Interactive elements for reacting
to a new piece of content are placed right next to that content. The fact
that such exchanges also feed data to the service provider remains in
the background. Facebook typically frames choices made when using
the social-networking site as choices about communication with peers
and empowering internet users.
Outside of the HCI context, similar framing has been used in the
“interfaces” of questionnaires about surveillance choices. For example,
in a large-scale survey after the 2013 leaking of details about the PRISM
surveillance programme in the U.S., Pew Research5 asked questions
such as “Should the government be able to monitor everyone’s email
to prevent possible terrorism?” and obtained widespread acceptance.
Another type of representation that may have a persuasive intent
involves representing multiple privacy-related choices as if they were
basically the same—encouraging broad choice bracketing (9.2)—even
if the choices differ quite a bit in terms of their consequences for the
user. Figure 12.1A shows the beginning of an explanation of choices
about providing location information in iOS 7. Note that the choices
are framed as whether to provide location information in order to ben-
efit from a service offered via the iPhone. It is only by reading con-
siderably further that the user can learn that some of the services in
question benefit not the individual user who is providing the data but
rather users in general—for example, by contributing to a crowdsourced
road traffic database. Similarly, in the screen that lists system services
(Figure 12.1B), there is no visual distinction between services of the
first type (such as “Setting Time Zone”) and those of the second type
5Public Says Investigate Terrorism, Even If It Intrudes on Privacy, 10 June 2013.
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Figure 12.1: Two screens from Apple’s iOS 7 that illustrate how significantly dif-
ferent privacy-related choices can be bundled together in a manner that encourages
the chooser to deal with them in the same way.
(e.g., “Traffic”). Finally, there is a switch for turning off all location
services but no such switch for turning off only services of the second
type. If we assume that the distinction between the two types of system
service is decision-relevant, a natural form of choice support is to make
the difference easily recognizable (Represent the Choice Situation) and
to provide controls for conveniently handling the two types of service
differently (Design the Domain).
12.2.5 Challenges and Approaches for Predicting Specific Conse-
quences of Privacy-Related Choices
To put it simply, the consequences of privacy-related choices will be
that someone will know something and/or that actions affecting the
chooser or others will occur, both of which may inflict harm or bring
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benefits (Berendt, 2012). Privacy-related choices face just about all
of the general challenges (discussed in Section 6) raised by the pre-
diction and evaluation of possibly uncertain future consequences (e.g.,
hyperbolic time discounting, as was argued by Acquisti and Grossklags
[2004]). They also face a number of specific challenges, most notably
the general impossibility of undoing choices (12.6) and the often un-
predictable consequences of data processing.
A piece of data that is disclosed does not only get recorded and
retrieved; it also gets processed. It is hard if not impossible to predict
what knowledge (and actions) a piece of data—or even the fact that
a piece of data is missing—can contribute to after it has undergone
(perhaps repeated) linking to other information and processing such as
data mining.6 Cumulative risk assessment—understanding how small
pieces of data disclosed over time can be combined to contribute to a
profile of a person—is even more difficult.
Choices in ubiquitous computing scenarios face a number of spe-
cific challenges related to the fact that the ultimate consequences of
particular choices tend to be hard to predict without the benefit of
specialized knowledge or experience. In a study of people’s responses
to five methods for obfuscating GPS trace data collected from them,
Brush et al. [2010, p. 7] found that their study participants largely
understood the basic operation of the obfuscation methods—but that
they had a hard time understanding what the consequences would be
of applying a given obfuscation method to data collected over a period
of time. For example, participants considered the subsampling method
of systematically leaving gaps in the collection of data to be basically
acceptable, evidently not noticing that its application for an entire day
would normally reveal the user’s home location—a consequence which,
in other contexts, they judged to be unacceptable.
Nguyen et al. [2008, p. 189] asked a broad variety of shoppers in
U.S. shopping malls about the possible dangers of six tracking and
recording technologies: credit cards, store loyalty cards, electronic toll
collection systems, web server records, store video cameras, and RFID
6For a seminal HCI perspective on this issue, see Dix [1990]; for a recent overview
of challenges and technical solution approaches, see Berendt [2012].
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sensors. Whereas respondents showed a clear understanding of the ben-
efits of these technologies, “they had difficulties articulating possible
costs or threats of these technologies” (p. 186). For example, though
they could easily enough anticipate a straightforward possible conse-
quence of divulging their credit card information—that someone might
use their data to make an unauthorized purchase—they did not mention
the consequences of allowing organizations to build long-term records
of their purchases.
In sum, the interrelatedness of privacy-related choices and the invis-
ibilities, indirections, delays, and nondeterministic consequences of the
multiple actions that stakeholders perform with personal information
(see also 12.1.3) make it hard for a user to predict what may happen
as a result of any given privacy-related choice: A very wide or even un-
knowable range of knowing and action consequences could result from a
privacy-related choice. On the other hand, alerting choosers to this wide
range of consequences and the difficulties of predicting them could lead
to information overload and also fear. This fear, in turn, could lead to
inactivity or otherwise ineffective choice. Support approaches therefore
tend to focus on specific consequences.
One general difficulty with anticipating the consequences of config-
uration choices is that a given configuration option can have a large
number of consequences for different situations (e.g., adopting a high
velocity for a mouse can work out differently from one type of task to
the next). One interesting approach to this difficulty, which can be real-
ized with some types of configuration problem, is to give the chooser an
overview of the consequences of a given configuration for a wide variety
of situations. PViz (Mazzia et al., 2012) helps a user of Facebook to
answer questions about the visibility of elements of his profile, such as
“With my current privacy settings, which people will be able to see my
cell phone number?” PViz generalizes the idea realized in Facebook’s
Audience View, which enables a user to see how her profile will look
to a particular individual. To provide an overview of visibility for all
possible viewers, PViz does some automatic clustering of people and
labeling of clusters, as well as graphical visualization that enables the
user to see which proportion of members of each cluster will be able
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Figure 12.2: Facebook audience selector tool to alert and support who choices
about possible recipients when posting information on social media.
to see the profile element in question. It therefore instantiates all of
the first three Arcade strategies. The results of user studies can be
interpreted broadly as showing the promise of this approach for helping
people anticipate the consequences of policy decisions.
12.3 Attribute-Based Choices About Privacy
Privacy-related choices are occasionally represented to users in a way
that encourages attribute-based choice.
A frequent type of choice faced by members of social networking
sites is the social-privacy choice of whom (among the other members
and the public at large) to share some particular content with. The per-
sons in question may be identified in different ways, such as by their
names and/or by their attributes. The basic problem being tackled is
the difficulty that users have in perceiving and managing the intended
and actual “audiences” of posts given their typically long and undiffer-
entiated sets of contacts.
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The answer to this problem is sought in various forms of access
control that have been derived from models established in the security
field, as described in the survey by Sayaf and Clarke [2013]. For exam-
ple, in Facebook today, users are by default alerted to the possibility
of making a who decision when posting something. This is done via a
choice box placed right next to the post-input field (see Figure 12.2).
When opened, it provides information about possible recipients and
also arranges these options hierarchically, so that the number of choices
remains manageable.7
In view of the challenging nature of this choice task, which is a
type of configuration problem, it is understandable that tools have
been developed which aim to make it tractable by applying several
of the Arcade strategies in conjunction. We will use as an example
the tool FreeBu (Gao et al., 20128), which helps people create lists of
their Facebook contacts.
Figure 12.3 shows one of Freebu’s several modes that largely sup-
ports attribute-based choice: Contacts are grouped on the screen in
terms of attributes such as home country, university attended, and
whether they know a particular language. The user’s choice task is not,
as would be typical of attribute-based choice, to select one or more in-
dividuals who are in some respect desirable but rather to compose a
new list of friends that is likely to be useful in future choice situations
(e.g., when the user is deciding whom to share a particular media item
with).
This column mode applies Arcade strategies as follows:
• Represent the Choice Situation: The most salient contribution of
the interface is the way in which it organizes the relevant items
(here: persons) on the screen in a way that facilitates a partic-
ular way of generating options (here: possible lists of contacts).
Given that members of a useful contact list are often similar with
respect to particular attributes, organizing the contacts by at-
7The top-level option “custom”, which appears to be rarely used, allows for ar-
bitrarily complex combinations of the basic elements.
8http://people.cs.kuleuven.be/~bo.gao/freebu
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Figure 12.3: An image from the Freebu interface for organizing Facebook friends
into lists. (This image, which obfuscates the friends’ names for privacy reasons, offers
users advice about how to use the interface to create a list.)
tribute makes it relatively easy for the user to see promising ways
of grouping contacts.
• Access Information and Experience: Though it is not the primary
purpose of this visualization to convey new information to the
user, it can happen that the user becomes aware of relevant facts
about his friends that he had not previously noticed (e.g., the
fact that one or more of them comes from a particular town).
• Combine and Compute: Creating a particular arrangement of
items on the screen requires a certain amount of computation—
which is quite straightforward in the column mode but more so-
phisticated in other modes of Freebu, such as the one that clus-
ters friends on the basis of their relationships to each other.
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• Advise About Processing: The user interface includes some textual
hints as to how to go about creating a friend list. In principle,
these hints could be formulated without reference to specific user
interface elements (e.g., “Look for sets of friends that resemble
each other with respect to two or more attributes . . . ”). In the
Freebu interface, as in many other such interfaces, procedural
advice of this sort is blended with instructions and hints about
how to operate the user interface: “You can also first create an
intersected column by dragging multiple columns into the ’inter-
section’ box at the bottom of the screen; only the friends who
share the common attributes of these columns will stay in the
intersection box. Then drag the intersection box into the target
list.”
12.4 Socially Based Choices About Privacy
Given that privacy-related actions in essence involve more than one
person, it is natural that social expectations and examples play an es-
pecially important role (see, e.g., Greene et al. [2006]). The importance
of social norms is underscored by the often striking differences that ex-
ist among cultures with regard to particular types of disclosure (see,
e.g., Petronio, 2002, pp. 40–42). Palen and Dourish [2003] note that
“privacy management . . . involves combinations of social and technical
arrangements that reflect, reproduce and engender social expectations,
guide the interpretability of action, and evolve as both technologies and
social practices change” (p. 133).
These examples and expectations may concern either the disclosure
of personal content (e.g., the revelation of intimate personal details in
a blog post) or the accessing of such content that belongs to others
(e.g., “shoulder surfing” to look at the email inbox of a colleague that
is displayed on her screen).
In the social networking site scenario, privacy-related social expec-
tations can be expressed explicitly, as through a community policy
statement, or implicitly through the behavior of individual members
(cf. 11.4). An example of the former case is provided by the “Com-
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munity Guidelines” page of the popular diet and fitness community
myfitnesspal,9 which includes, for example, precise rules (i.e., articu-
lated social expectations) concerning what may and may not be shown
in photos that are posted by members who want to show off their
progress in improving their physique.
As was discussed in connection with online communities (11.4),
when the only available evidence is community members’ behavior, it
can be hard for a member to know whether what they are dealing with
is an expectation or merely examples that are not necessarily considered
appropriate. The behavior of other persons that a chooser interprets
can consist of (a) examples that are not causally related to his own
behavior or (b) responses to his own choices (in which case the chooser
can be seen as applying the trial-and-error-based pattern to acquire
knowledge about social examples and expectations).
Both cases are illustrated in a lengthy message board thread on
myfitnesspal10 in which members have contributed more or less re-
vealing and embarrassing sequences of “before and after” pictures of
themselves to illustrate their progress in losing weight. These contribu-
tions often evoke evaluative comments (e.g., “I love these! It’s amazing
how people change”). The pictures and the comments that they evoke
can be seen to influence the subsequent contributions of other mem-
bers (e.g., “Wow these are awesome! Great job everyone! I feel ready
to do a new fat face comparison pic!”). Note that it’s not clear in
these examples to what extent the evaluative comments refer to (a)
the weight-losing progress shown in the photos or (b) the contributor’s
willingness to display these photos. This fact illustrates again the point
made in 12.1.3 about how privacy-related choices are often “bundled”
with other aspects of a person’s behavior.
12.5 Policy-Based Choices About Privacy
Although the term policy is relatively seldom applied in the privacy
area in the sense of the Aspect model’s policy-based choice pattern,
9http://www.myfitnesspal.com/welcome/guidelines
10Specific reference omitted here for privacy-related reasons.
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it is of course possible for a user to have a privacy-related policy in the
sense of Aspect: one or more rules or principles that specify (directly
or indirectly) what privacy-related choice will be made in each of a
set of situations, possibly as a function of particular parameters of the
situation. For example, a user could have one of the following rules:
(a) She will never give her birthday to any website. (b) She will never
give her birthday when it is possible that it might be used for direct
marketing. (c) She will give her birthday to a social networking site
but will allow only her friends to access this information.
To be sure, arriving at a set of meaningful policies can be a challenge
for the individual user in such a complex domain. This difficulty is
presumably one reason for the abundance of privacy-related advice that
can be found on the internet—such as the brief article titled 7 Things
to Stop Doing Now on Facebook (Consumer Reports Magazine, June
2010), which in effect suggests seven rules that a Facebook user might
adopt as part of his privacy-related policies. Personal policies can also
be derived from social expectations of the sort discussed in 12.4.
One advantage of policy-based choice in this domain is that it makes
it unnecessary for the user to think continually about all of the various
privacy-related problems that might arise—which, as we have seen, can
be hard (and possibly unpleasant) to anticipate and evaluate. Instead,
she can focus on sticking to her policies, assuming that if she does so
everything will probably be all right.
Another advantage of policies is that it is sometimes possible to del-
egate their execution to some sort of automated agent, which involves
applying the strategy Evaluate on Behalf of the Chooser (cf. Section 9).
This prospect is especially attractive in the privacy domain, since in
principle privacy-related choices can arise at the rate of one every few
seconds, as when a user is surfing the web or moving around the city
with a location-aware app. It is therefore understandable that many
interactive systems provide forms in which a user can in effect spec-
ify policies for making choices such as those about what personal data
should be exposed in particular situations.
An example of such a form in a well-known privacy protection agent
is shown in Figure 12.4. This web-based form (to be discussed in more
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detail below) differs from most forms of this sort in that the user does
not specify what the system is supposed to do autonomously but rather
when the system is supposed bring the user into the loop by warning
him of the danger of a privacy violation.
Before discussing research on this type of policy specification, we
should digress a bit to analyze a frequently used concept that tends to
obscure understanding in this context: that of privacy preferences.
12.5.1 Note on the Concept of “Privacy Preferences”
As can be seen in Figure 12.4, forms that allow a user to specify a
policy of this sort are often labeled with the word “privacy preferences”.
This term, which is widely used in the HCI privacy literature in other
contexts as well, is more misleading than helpful, because the term
preferences can be interpreted in at least three ways:
1. As the specific choices that a person makes in particular situa-
tions (e.g., “I can make my medical information available to this
website now, but I prefer not to”).
2. As a chooser’s more general predispositions that influence her
choices (as in “My general preference is not to make my medical
information available to websites”).
3. As the choices that a person makes about how to fill in a form of
this type (as in “I could have checked the box asking whether my
medical information should be made available to websites, but I
preferred not to”).
When the term “privacy preferences” is used in interactive systems
or scientific discussions, it is rarely made clear which of these meanings
is intended. A consequence is that the general impression is created
that these three concepts are tightly correlated:
• A. that a user’s specific privacy-related choices are (largely) de-
termined by general predispositions.
• B. that these predispositions are accurately captured by forms
that ask about “privacy preferences”.
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With the background of the Aspect model, we can see that neither
of these implicit assumptions is even approximately accurate:
Regarding assumption A: The choices that people make are not
always determined primarily by general predispositions of these sorts.
For example, within the experience-based pattern the chooser may sim-
ply repeat a previous choice that the current situation reminds her
of. Within the socially based pattern, she may imitate a momentar-
ily salient social example. When applying the consequence-based pat-
tern, she may anticipate specific consequences that can arise because
of unique aspects of the current situation; and her evaluation of these
consequences can depend on temporary factors such as the relative
momentary salience of her various goals.11
Regarding assumption B: Where more general predispositions are
involved, they can take qualitatively different forms, some of which are
not naturally captured by preference forms. Here are some examples in
terms of three of the Aspect choice patterns:
• Within the policy-based pattern: a personal policy that applies
to some class of choices (e.g., “I will never associate my photo
with a social network profile”).
• Within the experience-based pattern: a habit of declining any
opportunity to upload a photo to a profile; or a strong negative
affective association with this action, which may have been ac-
quired through bad previous experience.
• Within the consequence-based pattern: A general belief that per-
forming this action can lead to serious negative consequences.
11In the relevant psychology literature, the term construction of preference is
sometimes used to refer to phenomena like these. See Lichtenstein and Slovic [2006]
for an influential collection of articles that are relevant to the question discussed
in this section. But even in this literature, terms like preference and construction
are rarely explicitly and clearly defined. See also the book by Hausman [2012] for a
thorough discussion of the concept of preferences from the perspectives of economics,
psychology, philosophy, and everyday language. The very existence of a book like
this should discourage anyone who employs this term from assuming that readers
will have a clear and accurate idea of what he is talking about.
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By suggesting a tight correlation among points 1–3 above, the use
of the term privacy preferences serves as a sort of smoke screen in
discussion of privacy-related choices, preventing us from seeing clearly
how these choices come about and what we can do to support them.
Researchers and practitioners in this area would do well to adopt the
policy of never using this term—even though applying this policy may
at first require a great deal of self-control and investment of the effort
required to figure out what is really being referred to. It might help to
remember the following slogan:
People don’t “have preferences”; they make choices.
12.5.2 Studies of Policy Specification
Returning to the more specific topic of “privacy preferences” forms, we
can see that, when a user fills in such a form, she cannot in general
be assumed to be reporting straightforwardly on a policy that already
exists in her mind. Rather, she is being asked (or required) to choose,
from among a set of possible policies that the system can enforce on
her behalf, the policy that seems best suited for automatically making
choices that she would find appropriate. This task is similar to the
subtasks of formulating and evaluating a policy that were discussed in
9.4 and 9.5, the main difference being that in this case a set of possible
policies is being provided from which the user has to choose.12
Against this background, the question of how natural and useful a
given “preferences form” is found by a given user is always an empirical
question. A number of studies have looked at questions of this type.
One of the best-known and most realistically tested systems for au-
tomatically applying users’ privacy policies is the Privacy Bird of
Cranor and colleagues (see, e.g., Cranor et al., 2006), which was al-
ready mentioned in 12.2.1. This system took advantage of the fact that
many websites made their own “privacy policies” concerning their use
of personal data available in a formal XML-based language defined by
the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P).13 The Privacy
12For more general discussions of the question of the subtleties involved in eliciting
people’s “preferences” and values, see Fischhoff [2006] and Fischhoff [1991].
13http://www.w3.org/P3P
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Figure 12.4: The screen used by the Privacy Bird to elicit
a user’s policy with regard to privacy-related choices. (From
http://www.privacybird.org/tour/1_3_beta/tour.html.)
Bird created a similarly formal representation of the privacy policy
that a user had specified via the form shown in Figure 12.4. The Pri-
vacy Bird could then automatically determine, whenever the user
visited a website with a formalized privacy policy, whether the user
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should be warned (by a red bird) about possibly undesirable disclosure
of personal data.14
P3P is an interesting case for the current discussion because, de-
spite its elegant technical design and high hopes and extensive support
in its early stages, it was not widely adopted by websites and users and
was ultimately suspended by the relevant W3C working group. A vari-
ety of explanations have been offered, some of which serve to remind us
of the challenging context that confronts attempts to support privacy-
related choices (e.g., insufficient support by browser implementers, the
ease of circumventing the Privacy Bird with invalid site policies, the
lack of enforcement through legal or self-regulation, and user interface
problems).15 The problem most directly relevant to choice architecture
is the difficulty that users have in specifying their personal privacy
policies. As Cranor et al. [2006, pp. 7–9] explain, the user may want
information disclosure decisions to depend on considerations that can-
not be expressed in the policy specification form that is provided (e.g.,
the branch of industry to which the website belongs or the specific com-
panies with which information will be shared). They are also faced with
the more general difficulties of policy formulation and evaluation that
were discussed in 9.4 and 9.5, which are especially acute in a domain
in which the consequences of actions can be so hard to anticipate.
Lederer et al. [2004] describe some of these difficulties in the privacy
context as follows:
The act of configuring preferences is too easily desituated
from the contexts in which those preferences apply. Users
are challenged to predict their needs under hypothetical
circumstances, and they can forget their preferences over
time. If they predict wrongly, or remember incorrectly, their
configured preferences will differ from their in situ needs,
creating the conditions for an invasion of privacy. (p. 447)
14Other P3P-based user agents performed privacy-related actions automatically,
such as deciding whether to block cookies or whether to allow access to a user’s
electronic wallet (cf. Cranor et al., 2006).
15For a recent brief survey and further references, see Morton et al. [2013].
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In a similar vein, Berendt et al. [2005] suggest a number of reasons
why people’s privacy-related behavior in e-commerce sites can deviate
from the policies that they express in questionnaires.
Although the results and considerations just summarized highlight
a number of problems with the automation of privacy-related policies,
there will presumably always be some efforts to achieve this type of
automation at least in connection with choices that arise with high
frequency and seem to lend themselves to policy-based choice. One
question that arises in this context is whether a policy specification
interface should allow the specification of complex rules, referring to
a number of variables; or whether only simple rules are needed (cf.
Iachello and Hong, 2007, pp. 47–49). As one might expect, there ap-
pears to be no single answer that applies to everyone. Using an experi-
ence sampling methodology in a field study, Anthony et al. [2007] asked
participants on a number of occasions whom they would be willing to
share their current location with. The responses of most users could be
captured with the simple rules “Never share your location with anyone”
or “Always share your location with the people on your white list”. For
a handful of participants, however, the choices depended on character-
istics of the situation in which they found themselves, which implies
that they would require a relatively expressive language to formulate a
satisfactory policy for revealing their location.
Benisch et al. [2010] conducted a somewhat similar study in which
they noted that many users would require considerably more complex
policy specification interfaces than the most commonly available type
(i.e., a whitelist of individuals with whom the user is always willing to
share) if they wanted to be sure that the system would make roughly
the same choices that they themselves would make on a case-by-case
basis. The authors also took into account the fact that specifying a
complex policy can require considerable effort and that at least some
users might therefore choose to adopt a relatively simple policy even if
it didn’t match their case-by-case choices.
In view of the effort and difficulty associated with manually specify-
ing policies of this sort, it is natural to consider computational support
for this process. Fang and LeFevre [2010] presented and evaluated a
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Privacy Wizard that uses sophisticated machine learning techniques
to construct a policy on the basis of a limited amount of input from
a user as to whether he would reveal a particular piece of information
to particular individuals or groups of people. They show how the rec-
ommended policy can be visualized to the user so that he can better
understand and evaluate it. This approach involves applying the strate-
gies Combine and Compute and Evaluate on Behalf of the Chooser to
the subtask of formulating a policy. It will be interesting to see, in fu-
ture research, to what extent and in what contexts machine learning
can help users to arrive at privacy-related policies whose automatic
application will yield satisfactory results.
12.6 Trial-and-Error-Based Choices About Privacy
Especially because of the inherent difficulty that users have in an-
ticipating the likely privacy-related consequences of their actions, it
is natural—though, as we will see, problematic—for privacy-related
choices to be based on trial and error. As was discussed more gener-
ally in 10.4, the information and experience that the chooser acquires
through trying options out can take various forms.
12.6.1 The Difficulty of Learning From Privacy Violations
Let’s consider first the most obvious form: feedback about the signifi-
cant consequences of the chooser’s actions. Among the most significant
consequences are violations of the chooser’s privacy. Unfortunately,
there are several reasons why learning from this type of consequence
tends to be problematic.
First, personal data is an information good; once it is out, it cannot
be taken back. There can in general be no “undo” button for any specific
piece of information (cf. 10.1.2). Even though a “right to be forgotten”
has now found its way into the draft of the new European Union pri-
vacy directive, this right is associated with many difficulties, including
technical ones (see, e.g., Druschel et al. [2012]). The irreversibility of
possible consequences is an important property with regard to explo-
ration strategies, especially when the consequences in question are seri-
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ous. This fact is taken into account in some user interfaces (e.g., when
data are about to be permanently deleted) with warnings like “This
action cannot be undone!”, which tell the user, among other things,
that simply trying the action out is unlikely to be part of a good ex-
ploration strategy. These warnings can be viewed as an instantiation of
the strategy Access Information and Experience insofar as they inform
the user about a property of the consequences of an option; if they are
presented emphatically as warnings, they can also serve as advice to
think carefully before choosing the option (Advise About Processing).
These tactics may deserve increased attention where privacy-related
choices are concerned. The privacy nudges of Wang et al. [2013] men-
tioned in can serve, in somewhat different ways, to discourage casual
trial and error.
Even when viewed purely as sources of information, privacy viola-
tions tend to be relatively hard to process as informative feedback. As
was indicated in 12.2, the prediction of the results of privacy-related
choices tends to be made more difficult by the fact that consequences
are often interrelated, invisible, indirect, delayed, and nondeterminis-
tic, partly because of the involvement of multiple stakeholders. These
same factors also constitute obstacles for the trial-and-error-based pat-
tern by making it hard for a chooser to recognize after the fact what
has happened as a result of a privacy-related choice. For each of the
pitfalls in the interpretation of feedback that were discussed in 10.5,
the interested reader should be able to think of examples in the pri-
vacy domain. For instance, many privacy violations are undetectable
for most users, such as those in the surveillance scenario that involve
the reading and analysis of data from servers or transatlantic cables.
12.6.2 Learning From Information About Potentially Problematic
Situations
Because of all of these problems with learning from privacy violations,
a promising approach is to provide to a user feedback about potential
privacy threats that have arisen because of her actions but which have
(mostly, at least) not resulted in actual problems (cf. the more general
discussion in 10.4 of the approach of providing feedback about states
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that are likely to be correlated with important outcomes). Specifically,
it can be helpful for a user to know who has been able to acquire what
information as a result of his actions—and what they may have been
able to infer from this information. Even if all of the observation and
inference that the user becomes aware of does not lead to any privacy
violation, this information can give an indication of the danger of such
violations if the user continues to make the same choices.
Providing this type of feedback takes different forms depending on
whether the other “knowers” are ordinary individual users (e.g., social
network peers) or institutions.
Feedback About Observation by Individuals
System and interface design can help a user to find out about the
identities and activities of other persons who have become knowers of
that user’s private information. An increasing number of “How To” web
pages, apps, and plugins enable users to “observe the observers”.
An example is an app for seeing who has viewed your Facebook
profile.16
Several data-based privacy awareness tools (see the general com-
ments in 12.6.1) summarize, visualize, and score a user’s past publish-
ing behavior. An example is the app PrivacyCheck (Figure 12.5),
which shows what types of personal information from the user’s Face-
book pages are made available by the Facebook API to websites that
the user visits.17
An example of a system that was designed to help users learn by
trial and error when to disclose their locations while on the move is the
Locyoution system of Tsai et al. [2009]. The user can specify, for each
weekday, the times of day during which a particular class of contacts
(friends, acquaintances, or strangers) are allowed to see her location.
She can also check, via a special feedback page, which persons have
tried to see her location at what times and whether that person was
allowed to do so by the rules that were defined at the time. In this
way, the user can essentially debug the rules over time—though the
16https://www.facebook.com/WhoHasSeenYouProfileNewApplication
17http://www.rabidgremlin.com/fbprivacy/
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Figure 12.5: Screenshots from the Facebook app PrivacyCheck. (The values of
some fields are masked in this figure for privacy reasons.)
value of the resulting policy can be limited by the expressiveness of the
mechanism for specifying rules (cf. the discussion in 12.5.2). Although
the participants in this study by Tsai et al. [2009] expressed general
satisfaction with the rule specification mechanism, they also suggested
several additional types of rules that they would have liked to have.
A possible drawback of providing even excellent feedback about the
responses of one group of persons (e.g., peers such as other users of a
social-networking site), is that it may divert the user’s attention away
from all those others who are “watching” (cf., the discussion, in earlier
subsections, of social privacy vs. institutional privacy and surveillance).
This phenomenon can be seen as a case of (maybe inadvertently) bi-
ased representation of the choice situation—specifically, the provision
of a biased sample of information about who is observing the chooser’s
actions.
Feedback About Tracking by Organizations
One way to reduce the bias just mentioned is to make available to ordi-
nary users tools for accessing information about what organizations are
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Figure 12.6: Screenshot from the Lightbeam plugin for Mozilla Firefox. (From
eugeneoloughlin.com.)
monitoring their behavior—and what knowledge they can derive from
this monitoring. An example is the plugin Lightbeam18 (Figure 12.6)
for the Firefox browser, which enables a user to get an overview of
the websites that track his website visits—including cases where one
website has recorded his visits to other websites. Typically, users are
surprised to see how many sites are tracking their behavior and how
much information a single site can acquire.
12.6.3 Characterization in Terms of the ARCADE Model
The feedback provision techniques just discussed are representatives of
a large class of choice support techniques that instantiate a combination
of the first three Arcade strategies:
18https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/lightbeam
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• Access Information and Experience, in that information about
consequences is being provided;
• Represent the Choice Situation, in that this information needs to
be represented in a convenient way for the chooser to be able to
make use of it; and
• Combine and Compute, in that in general some computational
processing of the relevant information is required to generate a
suitable representation.
12.7 Concluding Remarks on Privacy-Related Choices
In this section, we have given a number of examples of existing or possi-
ble tactics for supporting privacy-related choice. But a more important
goal of this section has been to shed light on the special challenges that
are raised by privacy-related choices, by discussing them in terms of the
choice patterns of the Aspect model. Though we hope that those who
design and deploy relevant computing technology will benefit from be-
ing able to think about these challenges in terms of the Aspect choice
patterns and the Arcade strategies, we believe that the challenges
are too great to be dealt with completely even by the best-informed
interaction and system design. Equally important is the goal of con-
veying to users of computing technology more realistic mental models
of privacy-related choices (including their effects on other people) and
a grasp of the options and tools that they have available for dealing
with them (cf. 4.7.2).
13
Concluding Remarks
The authors hope that the readers of this publication have acquired a
solid foundation for their work in their role as choice architects within
the HCI field. With some careful thought, maybe combined with con-
sultation of the cited literature, you should now be in a position to
generate and try out ideas about how to help users of computing tech-
nology make better choices, whether you are a practitioner working
on a specific application or a researcher developing new techniques or
principles.
But we also hope and intend that this publication should serve as
a basis for further research and publications, and we invite all readers
to consider what they can contribute, whether they are PhD students
looking for an exciting topic or senior researchers who are able to draw
on decades of experience.
13.1 More Focused Analyses
The present publication can be compared with an atlas of an entire
continent (for example, Europe) that comprises a large number of di-
verse countries: It is intended to be just about equally useful to people
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in many different areas of HCI, with interest in diverse application do-
mains and particular types of computing technology. A next step is to
use this relatively coarse-grained map as a framework within which to
work out more specific maps, like those of individual countries. Con-
cretely, we encourage readers to consider creating more specific works
titled “Choice Architecture for X”, where X is a particular type of
computing technology (e.g., pervasive computing or multimodal inter-
action) or a particular application domain (e.g., automotive user in-
terfaces or personal health and well-being). In particular, instead of
focusing, as in the present publication, on choices about the use of
computing technology, these new works can consider everyday choices
in any of a wide range of domains. Works like these can focus on par-
ticularly relevant tactics derived from the Arcade support strategies.
With this narrower focus, it should be possible not only to discuss ex-
isting support solutions and suggest new ones, as we have done in this
work, but also to implement and test novel solutions so that they can
be adapted on the basis of experience and reused by others, giving rise
to guidelines and design patterns.
13.2 Extension to Decision Making by Groups
Many choices are made by a group of people rather than by an in-
dividual, as when a group of collaborating authors decides what text
processing system to use to prepare their joint article. Everyday group
decision making with the support of computing technology appears to
be growing in importance with the increasing interconnectedness of
users. In the formulation of the Aspect and Arcade models, group
decision making has so far intentionally been left out of consideration.
Extending the models to include groups as choosers is a natural—
though challenging—next step. Group decision making in general in-
volves some processes, such as interpersonal negotiation of compro-
mises in cases of conflict of interest, which are not found in individ-
ual decision making (see, e.g., Kameda et al., 2003, Sorkin et al., 2004,
and Saaty and Peniwati, 2008, for general treatments of group deci-
sion making; and Jameson and Smyth, 2007, and Masthoff, 2010, for
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discussions of the special characteristics of recommender systems that
make recommendations to groups).
13.3 Application to Other Types of Choice in HCI
Everyday choices made by users of computing technology are not the
only choices that are of interest in the HCI field. Here are several other
types of choice to which it ought to be possible to apply the Aspect
and Arcade models fruitfully:
1. Choices made—and evaluations expressed—by participants in
user studies who answer questions intended to measure their
“preferences” (cf. 12.5.1)
2. Choices made by interaction designers
3. Choices made by organizations about whether and how to in-
vest in usability and user experience (cf. Bias and Mayhew, 2005;
Schaffer and Lahiri, 2014)
4. Choices made by HCI students and researchers about which re-
search questions to investigate and how to investigate them
For each of these types of choice, we can ask: What (combinations
of) choice patterns do people apply? What are the most challenging
parts of these patterns for this type of choice? What possible support
tactics can we derive from the Arcade strategies?
13.4 Shouldering Responsibility for the Future of Human
Choice
The ways in which people make choices and decisions will continue to
evolve rapidly as computing technology provides ever more essential
tools for our everyday thinking. Researchers and practitioners in HCI
have an exciting opportunity to influence the further evolution of this
central aspect of what it means to be human. In particular, they can
help to determine whether this evolution will move in the direction
of ever-increasing uncritical reliance on computational support, with
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increasing vulnerability to bias and manipulation, or whether 21st-
century computing technology will ultimately be seen to have increased
humans’ ability to make good choices for themselves.
No matter how energetically we work to achieve the latter goal,
there will inevitably continue to be many interactive systems that are
designed with a persuasive intent, the goal being to bias choices in
a particular direction that is not necessarily in the interests of their
users. It’s not just that introducing bias into choice processes is often
more lucrative than helping people choose for themselves; as we have
seen repeatedly throughout this work, bias is also normally much eas-
ier to create and indeed impossible to avoid entirely. Accordingly, we
believe it will be necessary to help people learn about the strategies
and technologies that are being used to support and/or influence their
choices; about the sorts of bias that these tools can introduce, whether
intentionally or not; and about what enlightened users can do to retain
ultimate control over their choice processes. In short, we should help
people learn how to use modern tools for choosing effectively—without
being used by them.
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